



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
UNITED STATES ARMY EUROPE  
UNIT 29351  
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AECG

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MEMORANDUM FOR Army in Europe Leaders and Soldiers

SUBJECT: Strong Europe 2016–2017

*“In the east, Russia continues to try and rewrite the international rules and principles that have formed the foundation of stability in Europe for decades; to the south we face a different set of challenges, which is driving migration and proving fertile ground for extremism, violence, and terrorism.”*

General Breedlove, 21 May 2015

**1. Purpose.** This memorandum provides my guidance for the next 2 years (FY 17 and 18), the period after Exercise Anakonda 2016 and the Warsaw Summit. It is not meant to replace existing documents or guidance; rather it builds on those documents providing specific guidance in areas where we will expand or modify our effects. It also includes specific deliverables and metrics for measuring progress toward achieving our strategic effects.

**2. Mission.** USAREUR provides trained and ready land forces across the USEUCOM area of responsibility (AOR) to assure our Allies, deter Russia from further aggression, and protect U.S. personnel and interests in Europe.

**3. Intent.**

a. I want us to seize and retain the initiative in the months following the NATO Summit in Warsaw. I anticipate that the Summit will result in specific requirements for USAREUR. Those will likely include a requirement to continue what we are doing in Atlantic Resolve–North (AR-N) and Atlantic Resolve–Central (AR-C), but will also require us to put more emphasis on areas along NATO’s southern flank (Portugal to Turkey) and to increase our interaction with those Allies and Partners who are under pressure from Russia or the Islamic State and those who face challenges from refugees in order to continue to assure them of U.S. interest in and commitment to their security and stability.

b. Our goal in the south is to help these nations build capability and capacity, strengthen relationships, and improve overall deterrence and security. USAREUR will expand its presence in some countries and regions where our presence in the past has been episodic. I expect that by mid-2016, we will increase effects in the Black Sea region (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Macedonia, Romania, and Turkey), the Balkans, and on NATO’s southern flank. With the availability of the full rotational

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armored brigade combat team (ABCT), the maturation of the 4th Infantry Division Mission Command Element (4ID MCE), anticipated increases in rotational Army aviation, and the increased participation of Reserve Component Soldiers, we will have sufficient capability to do more in AR-C and Atlantic Resolve–South (AR-S).

c. Increased presence in the south will be achieved through exercises, visits, and exchanges with Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and Turkey. In addition, we will increase the presence of U.S. Army personnel in embassies and offices of defense cooperation (ODCs) in those countries. We will also promote the establishment of National Guard state partnership programs (SPPs) with Greece and Portugal to assure the nations along NATO’s southern flank of the commitment of the Alliance and the United States to the security of those nations. This also includes more visible cooperation with the United States Army Africa/Southern European Task Force (USARAF/SETAF); Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Europe/Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Africa/Commander, U.S. Sixth Fleet (CNE-CNA-C6F); and the Joint Forces Command–Naples.

#### 4. Vision.

**a. Strategic Effects.** Our 30,000 assigned, forward-stationed Soldiers must look and feel like 300,000 to achieve our three strategic effects: assurance, deterrence, and protection of U.S. personnel and interests.

**b. Key Concepts.** We will employ three key concepts to achieve those strategic effects: speed, enabling the environment, and key exercises.

**(1) Speed.** Speed is essential to providing deterrent land power effects for USEUCOM and the NATO enabling environment:

**(a) Speed of Recognition.** Speed of recognition requires increased indicators and warning capabilities; an increased understanding of Russian capabilities, personalities, and vulnerabilities; increased intelligence sharing; and improved integration into NATO as well as bilateral and multilateral intelligence organizations and operations. Improved coordination and information sharing with the United States Special Operations Command–Europe (SOCEUR), Army special operations forces (SOF), and our Atlantic Resolve Allies will help us see “little green men” and gain insight into Russian information operations that might indicate a pending or potential crisis. Our integration into and support of theater ballistic missile defense is equally vital to the speed of recognition.

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**(b) Speed of Decision.** Decisions will be made by nations and by the Alliance. We will be ready to act on a bilateral or multilateral basis or on a basis that supports the Alliance. The Graduated Response Planning (GRP) prepared by Allied Land Command (LANDCOM) and the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe demonstrates the Alliance’s efforts toward accelerating decisionmaking. I expect us to be as well integrated into the GRP process as we are with USEUCOM operation plans. I want us to be so closely linked to USEUCOM, ambassadors and country teams in each country in our area of operation, and the NATO Command that we help improve our and their understanding and analyses, which in turn will enable us to make quick decisions.

**(c) Speed of Assembly.** A demonstrated capability to move and deliver forces and effects is the ultimate key to deterrence. This includes the immediate deployment of our forward-stationed forces (including Patriot systems) and the rapid reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) of arriving regionally allocated forces (RAF), falling in on European Activity Set (EAS) or Army prepositioned stock equipment. Since we anticipate short-notice warning of a conventional attack and obviously much less in the case of terrorist attacks, our units and leaders have to be able to build multinational formations or work with host-nation (HN) security forces instantaneously—we will not have 6 to 12 months to get ready for deployment. This is why I have directed IMCOM-Europe to assess and invest in infrastructure such as motor pools and rail and maintenance facilities that will allow us to rapidly assemble for onward movement. Having the readiness platforms on our key installations is critical to our ability to meet our Phase 0 mission.

**(2) Enabling the Environment.** Enabling the environment is at the heart of all of this and is critical from a U.S. and NATO perspective. Specific areas in which we will need to improve in the near term to achieve the required speed include the following:

**(a) Interoperable Communications.** On arrival, units have to be able to literally “plug in” on the following with multinational formations:

1. Multinational secure tactical frequency modulation that uses frequency-hopping technology to minimize the risk of jamming, dual frequency, interception, and subsequent targeting.

2. The ability to prosecute digital-fire missions across nations (for example, U.S. radar linked to Allied artillery for counter-fire).

3. The true multinational common operating picture (COP) where the icons of the subordinate unit populate the COP of the higher HQ, regardless of the system used.

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**(b) Freedom of Movement (FOM).** Strong routine relationships with NATO force integration units (NFIUs); RSOMI (the NATO acronym for what we call RSOI); the equivalent of a “military Schengen zone” that allows rapid transnational movement of units, ammunition, aircraft, and Soldiers; a perfect knowledge of infrastructure (for example, bridge military-load classifications, overpass heights, airfields, staging areas, bulk storage areas, main supply-route designations and route-movement control, HN security); and the Southern Europe Theater Sustainment Terrain Walk in April 2016 (based on the same model that we used in the spring of 2015 for northern Europe) will help tremendously. This will also signal our interest and preparation in the Black Sea region and NATO’s southern flank.

**(c) Information and Intelligence Sharing.** There will be no daylight between us and the U.S. country teams in each nation within our AOR. We will improve linguistic capability in Russian. We will increase sharing with SOF; HNs; the NATO Intel Fusion Center; and multinational intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)/Intel fusion centers. We will also encourage the pervasive use of the Battlefield Information Collection and Exploitation System (BICES). We will secure and emplace radar identification and direction (RAID) towers, aerostats, or other means of surveillance along borders in support of intelligence collection performed by HNs.

**(d) Sustainability of the Rotation Plan for Forward-Stationed and CONUS-Based Forces.** This includes accurate forecasts of requirements and rotations, reach-back to CONUS to ensure the preparation and readiness of rotational units, and lessons learned from previous rotations to ensure that we are adequately programmed and resourced for Atlantic Resolve and numbered plans.

**c. Key Exercises.** Anakonda 2016 has served as a very effective forcing function for us. It has led to improvement in each of the areas above and attracted Allied, Partner, and U.S. Army Reserve Component capabilities. We need similar exercises focused on eastern and southern Europe to provide the same “gravitational pull” in the next couple of years after Anakonda 2016 and the NATO Summit in Warsaw in July. I want the staff to consider the following three exercises, which might achieve this goal in the 2016-to-2017 period. I am, of course, wide open to other suggestions.

(1) Austere Challenge 2017: 5–19 October 2016 (combined action program) and 31 January–17 February 2017 (exercise) (USEUCOM exercise).

(2) Trident Juncture 2016: 24 October–2 November 2016 (NATO exercise, NATO Response Force centric).

(3) Saber Strike 2017: 6–22 June 2017.

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**5. Objectives.** Specific objectives that are necessary to maintain our current level of assurance and deterrence while expanding effects in the Black Sea region and on NATO's southern flank include the following:

**a. Readiness.**

(1) Increase "Freedom Shock" deployments to AR-S, the Black Sea region, and Italy.

(2) Build Mihail Kogalniceanu (MK) Air Base into a forward operating site (FOS) with an EAS, a sensitive compartmented information facility (SCIF), an ammunition supply point, aviation maintenance capability, and IMCOM-Europe services.

(3) Ensure fixed-wing (FW) and rotary-wing (RW) command aviation aircraft can provide airborne command and control (C2) capability for USAREUR and LANDCOM.

(4) Build Baumholder into a full division HQ and division artillery platform.

(5) Improve our "jointness" by doing the following:

(a) Integrate better and more consistently with SOCEUR, the United States Air Forces in Europe/United States Air Forces Africa, United States Marine Corps Forces Europe, and CNE-CNA-C6F.

(b) Man, equip, and train as a joint task force (JTF)/coalition force land component command (CFLCC) for Exercise Austere Challenge 2017.

(c) Provide mission command by connecting the Combined Operations and Intelligence Center (COIC) to joint forces commands (JFCs), LANDCOM, the NATO Force Structure (NFS) Corps (NATO Rapid Deployable Corps–Spain (NRDC-Spain), Allied Rapid Reaction Corps, Multinational Corps–Northeast (MNC-NE), 1 German–Netherlands Corps, Rapid Reaction Corps–France, NRDC-Italy, NRDC-Turkey, EURO-Corps, NRDC-Greece), the Multinational Division–Southeast (MND-SE), and NFIUs.

(d) Develop a "Mission Command System Shock" to demonstrate sensor-to-shooter and RED-BLUE COP display on both the U.S. SIPRNET and BICES from the Mission Command Center (MCC) COIC through tactical brigade combat team (BCT) command posts (CPs); demonstrate integration of mission-command systems (for example, Command Post of the Future, Advanced Field Artillery Targeting and Direction System, Distributed Command Ground System–Army) and the ability to move digital

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information through mission-command systems at the speed of war, including tactical sensor-to-shooter links. Do the same on BICES with Allies.

(e) Develop a “heel to toe” (H2T) operational concept that transitions the EAS to theater-provided equipment (TPE) by the end of FY 17.

**b. Support the NATO Readiness Action Plan.** *(NOTE: It is important that we are in the “fabric” of NATO; it is not enough to admire or support the Alliance. We are completely integrated in it, in all warfighting functions and aspects).*

(1) Create a “military Schengen zone” that allows FOM across Europe for military formations similar to what civilians and businesses enjoy today. This will require our compliance with all European Union and HN regulations on safety, environmental concerns, and related issues.

(2) Establish formal relationships with the Joint Warfare Center in Stavanger, Norway; the Joint Force Training Center in Bydgoszcz, Poland; the Joint Electronic Warfare Core Staff, which is NATO’s Electronic Warfare Center of Excellence in the United Kingdom; and with the national training centers in allied countries. These relationships give us the opportunity to routinely participate in distributed NATO exercises and, in turn, enable our Allies to participate in ours. At least one of these training centers should be connected to and participate in every simulation that we run.

(3) Establish a formal link between the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) and all U.S. Forces allocated to the VJTF (High Mobility Artillery Rocket System, the Attack Reconnaissance Battalion (ARB), and the 21st Theater Sustainment Command) and have a representative from these units at each VJTF exercise or key-leader event.

(4) Help LANDCOM, MNC-NE, and MND-SE meet fully operational capability (FOC) requirements.

(5) In coordination with Germany and Great Britain, support transatlantic capability enhancement and training to bolster the military capabilities of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland. Lead the following four objectives as tasked by USEUCOM:

(a) Enhance intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance capabilities at battalion level in all four countries.

(b) Facilitate the enhancement of ground-based air defense capabilities in all four countries.

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- (c) Enhance artillery capabilities in Estonia and Latvia.
- (d) Facilitate the development of a training infrastructure in Lithuania.
- (6) Ensure that every convoy that enters a nation that participates in Atlantic Resolve reports to the NFIU in that country through the 4ID MCE.
- (7) Work with USEUCOM and LANDCOM to develop command or support relationships with LANDCOM and other NFS Corps HQ.
- (8) Ensure that all USAREUR units are competent on NATO communication and information systems (BICES, Logistics Functional Area Services, and Tool for Operations Planning Force Activation and Simulation) by the end of 2016. Maintain a BICES “pie chart” for tracking and assessing progress.
- (9) Transition the USAREUR command net to a NATO-capable network.
- (10) Ensure USAREUR C2 is linked to all NFS Corps HQ by the end of 2016.
- (11) Ensure that all USAREUR and RAF units execute Atlantic Resolve as well as day-to-day operations and exercise planning on mission simulators and BICES.
- (12) Establish Seventh Army Joint Multinational Training Command (JMTC) connectivity to training and simulation centers in Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and Turkey.
- (13) Resource and fence the tasks on the ARB collective mission-essential task list in accordance with requirements for VJTF.

**c. Atlantic Resolve.**

- (1) Sustain persistent presence in AR-N and AR-C by doing the following:
  - (a) Reestablish Miroslawiec, Poland, as the AR-C RW aviation platform.
  - (b) Expand the RW aviation infrastructure at Lielvardi, Latvia.
- (2) Provide continuous presence in AR-S by doing the following:
  - (a) Expand AR-S to also include Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Greece, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia.

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(b) Build MK Air Base, Romania, into an FOS that serves as the principal logistics hub and power projection platform for AR-S and the Black Sea region.

(c) Have a U.S. armor battalion join multinational brigades with Bulgaria and Romania.

(d) Support the development, manning, and connectivity of MND-S in Bucharest, Romania, and support Lithuanian, Polish, and Ukrainian brigades with manning, training, and connectivity.

(e) Add RW staging capacity in the Novo Selo Training Area (NSTA).

(f) Increase exercise presence in AR-S, including multinational participation in AR-S exercises beyond just U.S. and HN participation and with the Black Sea Rotational Force. Use SPPs, RAF, and assigned forces.

(g) Establish RW class IX assaults forward in AR-C, AR-N, and AR-S. Assess and build additional supply support activity line-item numbers and on-hand authorizations.

(3) Increase the frequency and visibility of exercises and visits to support the Kosovo Force (KFOR). Additionally, increase the frequency of exercises and visits in the Balkans, particularly in Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia. Use KFOR as an “anchor point of stability” in the Balkans and “maneuver” around it to strengthen ties, build capacity, and reduce susceptibility of those nations to malign Russian influence.

(4) Ensure that all TPE sites are complete and operate as FOCs by the end of the 1/3 BCT's next rotation in September 2016.

(5) Ensure that, under contingency-basing conditions, all AR sites will have APO mail, WiFi connection (that is, wireless Internet connection), and suitable life support.

**d. Air and Ballistic Missile Defense.**

(1) Improve interoperability from “mud to space” with more than 20 nations.

(2) Integrate counter-unmanned aerial system capabilities into combined-arms maneuvers.

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(3) Identify capability gaps and build organizational capacity to meet emerging-threat capabilities and force-structure requirements.

(4) Develop a persistent interoperable joint and multinational command-post training capability that expands and validates U.S., NATO, and Coalition air and missile defense (AMD) policies, doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures.

(5) Be prepared to accept H2T persistent presence of a rotational ABCT beginning in January 2017.

(6) Develop an AMD center of excellence through advanced distributed digital and simulation training accessible across combatant commands and through Joint Project Optic Windmill by the 2d quarter of FY 17.

**e. Joint Multinational Training Group–Ukraine (JMTG-U):**

(1) Support Ukraine and the Ukraine/USEUCOM Joint Commission (JC), especially in the USAREUR-led ground and medical subcommittees.

(2) Enable the Ukrainian training center at Yavoriv to become self-sustaining by the end of 2016.

(3) Leverage the JC/JMTG-U to influence security in the Black Sea region.

(4) Provide medical training and lessons learned as well as required medical supplies.

(5) Support Ukrainian artillery, rocket, and counter-fire training and share lessons learned with U.S. and Allied systems and organizations.

**f. Force Protection and Security of our Installations and FOSs.**

(1) Develop a USAREUR-wide comprehensive set of overlays that show the threats and vulnerabilities to our installations in relation to migrant housing areas, schoolbus routes, soft targets, and local national capabilities.

(2) Continue “Freedom Shock” events and crisis action planning and battle drills that rehearse terrorist incidents on or near our installations to maintain our readiness posture and response capability.

(3) Invite all Family members to register in AtHoc by the end of 2016.

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(4) Establish a theater-wide communications net that enables immediate antiterrorism/force protection information sharing across all USAREUR and IMCOM-Europe installations.

**g. Strategic Effects.**

(1) Develop and enact a strategic engagement plan that includes a “Stakeholder Map,” which identifies and positively influences all stakeholders who care (or should care) about USAREUR, USEUCOM, NATO, land power in Europe, and the Army.

(2) Look for ways to support USARAF/SETAF more visibly and fully (for example, through exercises, JMTC, logistics).

(3) Obtain DA approval to make Baumholder our principal surge-capacity site at the brigade level.

(4) Ensure that we have an Army officer on every embassy country team in Europe and in each ODC, and develop an ODC/Attaché COP for the COIC.

(5) Develop plans for SPP relationships with Finland, Greece, Portugal, and Sweden.

(6) Participate in all European, NATO, and multilateral security conferences in the Black Sea and Mediterranean regions.

(7) Work with the George C. Marshall Center to take advantage of existing programs that focus on the Black Sea region and NATO’s southern flank.

(8) Develop a land-power-influence network that includes country teams, ODCs, NATO Corps, NFIUs, USEUCOM, SOCEUR, and other stakeholders.

**6. Backbriefing.** Units will incorporate their backbrief regarding this guidance during my visits to their locations. Units that will not be visited before the end of May should coordinate with my office to schedule a video-teleconference backbrief.



FREDERICK “BEN” HODGES  
Lieutenant General, USA  
Commanding