

## **The American Viewpoint of the Battle**

The following are selections from After Action Reports submitted by the 28th Infantry Division and the 112th Infantry Regiment for the period of early November 1944. Included with this material are interviews with select personnel of the 707th Tank Battalion that supported the 112th Rgt during the attack on Schmidt.

The original microfilm from which these were taken were in average condition, and thus some small portions may be eligible. Nevertheless, participants in the staff ride will gain tremendous insight from what they can glean from these reports.

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UNIT REPORT NO. 5  
From: 010001 Nov 1944.  
To : 302400 Nov 1944.

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Hq., 27th Inf. Div.  
6 December 1944.  
IN THE FIELD.

16 Dec 44 HSE  
Date Initials

MAPS; Central Europe, 0305 4416, 1:100,000, Sheets 5.1 and 7.1.  
Belgium and NE France, 0305 4856, 1:100,000, Sheets 15 and 17.  
Germany, 0305 4416, 1:25,000, Sheets 5305 and 5304.

I. SUMMARY:

a. Units in contact: (See "c" below).

b. Enemy reserves that could affect our positions: An estimated 40-50 enemy tanks were reported on the Corps front as late as 25 November. The 21 Pz Div, located in the St. Die area for a considerable time, has never been heavily engaged and is believed to be intact. It recently reported a strength of 2,000 men with 65 tanks. The 26th Pan Bn (- 3 Pz) at F9657 and the 26th Engr Bn at F9660 were both reported as being in reserve at the termination of the period.

c. Description of enemy activity: On 1 Nov enemy was holding positions in GEMETER area (see map) with forces of both 275th Inf Div and 89th Inf Div. The 275th Inf Div was composed of 275 Inf Regt, 275 Engr Bn, and 4-810mm Hows. One battalion, 18-120mm Hows, of 109 Arty Regt was emplaced to our south. At this time, 275 Div was incorporating a number of heretofore separate battalions into Regts and into the Division. 275 Div was being relieved by elements of newly formed 272 Volksgrenadier Div. On 2 Nov, CT WEGELIN in position northeast of GEMETER was about to be relieved when we attacked. Other elements of 275 Div were not well organized and confusion locally resulted. Except for CT WEGELIN (not to become a part of 275), resistance was light and a degree of surprise was obtained. On the south, however, determined resistance was offered where the newly redesignated troops of 983 Inf Regt/275 Div remained in their concrete shelters and field fortifications located behind wire and mine barriers. By morning 3 Nov, a composite 253 Engr Bn comprised of 275 Engr, 75 Engr, and 253 Engr—the latter moved north from GEMUND—had been assembled and counterattacked from area west of GEMETER - HURTGEN road. This attack was dispersed before it developed by both our and enemy artillery. Enemy losses were heavy. Meanwhile, resistance on south was maintained; and, although resistance by the remainder of 275 Div at KIMMERSCHIDT and SCHMIDT was very light, the relieved elements of 89 Div were being reassembled near HARTENBERG to counterattack. Furthermore, the enemy, realizing that both HURTGEN and SCHMIDT were threatened, alerted his 116th Pz Div resting in vicinity of MUNCHEN-GLADBACH for employment to restore the line, and movement southward of this division began. Artillery emplaced north of GEMUND was directed against GEMETER and HURTGEN. A battalion of assault guns was moved onto BRANDENBERG-BERGSTEIN ridge and the pounding of JOCHMACK began late in the day. During night 3-4 Nov, both 60th and 124th Pz

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Gen Regts/116 Pz Div were moved south by vehicle and were admitted to counterattack VOSSENACK from north and east during 4 Nov. These attacks were only partially successful due to our intense defensive fire, and the enemy had to withdraw before evening. This same morning the reassembled forces of 1000 and 1050 Inf Regts/69 Inf Div, supported by assault guns and tanks counterattacked SCHMIDT, regaining the town by early afternoon. During 4 Nov, 116 Pz Regt arrived in the area along with the remnants of another tank brigade, providing a force of approximately 80 Mk IV, V and VI tanks and an assault gun brigade consisting of 18-24 guns. Leading elements of this force supported the attack against SCHMIDT, but suffered losses due to our air support. Resistance north-east of SIMONSKAIL was overcome during 4 Nov. During day and night of 4-5 Nov, the 116 Pz Div, consisting of 116 Pz Regt, moved south to take up positions in the KLEINHAU-UNTERHAUBACH-BERGSTEIN area; and, from then until 16 Nov, enemy artillery bombardment of the HURTGEN-VOSSENACK-SIMONSKAIL area was intense, constant, and of mixed caliber. Build up of artillery and missile weapons brought the total to 12-20mm AA guns, 9-37mm AA Guns, 89-89mm AA/AT guns, 48-105mm Gun-Howa, 8-105mm Guns, 18-122mm Hows (Russian), and 8-210mm Hows. 170mm gun fire was reported but details of guns has not been determined. Several times during the period 5-6 Nov, lone and small flights of enemy planes dropped AP bombs and strafed our positions.

Beginning shortly after daylight 5 Nov, tanks and infantry began to reduce our positions in the area between SCHMIDT and KOMMERSCHIEDT; and by early afternoon, succeeded in getting tanks into the latter town, but immediately withdrew them under our artillery fire. In vicinity of SCHMIDT, enemy tanks were getting into positions north of our positions. Resistance from our own forces near SCHMIDT was not very strong. Several attempts to drive us out of positions north of SCHMIDT were unsuccessful. Throughout 6 Nov, enemy forces concentrated their efforts toward dislodging us from positions held between SCHMIDT and KOMMERSCHIEDT and made repeated attempts to regain VOSSENACK. The main effort was made by tanks, in company strength of 6-7 accompanied by small groups of infantry from north of SCHMIDT and east of KOMMERSCHIEDT. Early in the morning infantry, supported by both tanks and artillery fire, attacked VOSSENACK from the east and enjoyed a temporary success. By late morning however, enemy gains had been restored although intense artillery fire continued. Several raids on the north flank, including the reinforcement of positions north of VOSSENACK in HURTGEN woods by 600th Engr Bn, were unsuccessful and disorganized by our artillery and infantry fire. Small groups of tanks and self-propelled guns in vicinity of HURTGEN were attacked by our fighter bombers. Enemy infantry resisted stubbornly from prepared positions in the SIMONSKAIL area. By nightfall, the enemy efforts had spent themselves, except for continuous artillery and infiltration of an estimated 50 infantrymen into buildings in eastern portion of VOSSENACK. These troops harassed our patrols during the night, but were all cleared out shortly after daylight 7 Nov. During early morning 7 Nov, it is believed enemy moved tanks and infantry into attack positions due east of KOMMERSCHIEDT and other infantry into wooded area about 1 mile west of KOMMERSCHIEDT. Starting to attack first from the east at 0530A and then from the west, enemy tanks and infantry stormed our position at KOMMERSCHIEDT. For five hours tanks fired at our positions, blowing up one foxhold after another until at 1015A the tanks were in the town. As the tanks progressed toward the town from the east, infantry moved in from

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and moved west to the west. During early afternoon, an attack designed to sever our supply route, through ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ ridge by the ~~XXXXXX~~ Div was made and failed. Otherwise, enemy activity was confined to small raids on the north and continued stiff resistance to our attacks designed to outflank SIMONSKALL from the east. Enemy troops moved constantly during night 7-8 Nov and just before daylight 8 Nov attempted to move toward NESTRENGER WURLE around the north nose of the KOMERSCHIDT ridge. This attempt and several infantry attacks during the day were foiled by our artillery, air attacks, and infantry. During the day, several movements of tanks and assault guns were observed and attacked by our fighter-bombers. In the morning, a company of 982 Inf Regt/372 Volksgrenadier Division, replacing the hard-pressed 69th Div units southeast of SIMONSKALL, attacked our forces. This attack was successful only in that it halted our attack momentarily for the attackers soon had to withdraw to positions south and west of SIMONSKALL. By dark 8 Nov, remnants of 10th and 156th Pz Gren Regts/116th Pz Div were withdrawn to areas near ELKINHAU and enemy positions on north and south were consolidated. Tanks of 116 Pz Div were also withdrawn. Enemy action was entirely defensive 9 Nov as he continued consolidation of regained ground around KOMERSCHIDT and resisted our advance northwest from GRONITZ. At 1300H on 10 Nov, a counterattack by a force of 100 enemy infantry men from 372 Div recaptured a concrete fort near RAFFELSHRAND. At the same time another attack southwest of WURTGEN gained ground, but enemy losses were severe. VOSSENACK was not attacked, but continued to be subjected to intense artillery and mortar fire as the enemy fell back to the north in the woods between VOSSENACK and WURTGEN. During period 11-18 Nov,

artillery fire continued intense until 16 Nov when more urgent needs caused it to be reduced to light harassing fire.

On 19 Nov, our forces took over a new sector opposed by the 91st Inf Div, the 26th Volksgrenadier Div, and 553rd Inf Div. This force was spread very lightly along the OUR R (see map). Enemy patrols were encountered infrequently. During period 21-25 Nov, 91st Div on our north was relieved by extending sector of the 26th Div. On the night of 25-26 Nov, 553rd Div was relieved by what is now believed to be 332 Inf Div. Up to end of period, only occasional registration and harassing artillery fire had been received. Enemy patrolling was very limited due to swollen OUR River.

## 2. OWN SITUATION:

- a. Front lines: (See attached overlays - Annex #1).
- b. Location of troops, command posts boundaries, etc: (See attached overlays - Annex #1).
- c. Location of adjacent units and supporting troops: (See attached overlays - Annex #1).
- d. Our operations for the period (By dates):
  - 1 - Regiments patrolled aggressively in respective zones of action and completed preparations for attack 020900A November.
  - 2 - Division began attack at 020900A after one hour of heavy supporting

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artillery preparation. 109th Infantry advanced to its objective on the left, encountering light enemy resistance. Progress on its right was slow due to heavy artillery, mortar, and small arms fire, mine fields, and wire barricades. 110th Infantry advanced against strong enemy fire and fortified positions. 3d Battalion, 112th Infantry with attached Tank Company captured VOSSENACK, its objective, meeting light enemy resistance. 1st Battalion advanced against heavy enemy fire and defended positions. 3d Battalion prepared to assist 1st and 2d Battalions against counterattack. Division operation was successful and placed units in position for future action. Total number of prisoners taken during this period exceeded 300.

3 - 109th Infantry repulsed counterattack and made preparations to continue the attack at 040700A. 110th Infantry continued operations against strongly fortified positions. Made preparations to flank the position and continue the attack. 112th Infantry, 3d Battalion continued attack and entered SCHMIDT, meeting light enemy resistance. 1st Battalion advanced on its objective, KOMMERSCHIEDT. Due to lack of road and to difficult terrain only foot troops and three (3) tanks crossed the ILL River valley this day. An observation post was established east of VOSSENACK.

4 - 109th Infantry continued to make slow progress against strong resistance moving Northwest across numerous narrow roads. 110th Infantry continued operations against strongly fortified positions and made preparations to clean out pockets created by flanking movement of 1st Battalion. 112th Infantry received strong counterattack executed by enemy tanks and infantry. The location is of division withdrawing to position approximately four enemy tanks. Losses in this attack were repulsed with help of air support which claimed three enemy tanks destroyed.

5 - 109th Infantry continued to exert pressure in the vicinity of HURTGEN on the Division left flank. 110th Infantry captured three forts and continued to advance slowly against determined resistance. 112th Infantry, 1st and 3d Battalions reorganized at KOMMERSCHIEDT. By this time nine (9) medium tanks and nine (9) self-propelled Tank Destroyer guns had moved up. Wheeled vehicles and towed loads could not be taken to these units. Repulsed several attempted counterattacks. 2d Battalion in position east of VOSSENACK repulsed two counterattacks by artillery and small arms fire. Orders issued forming Task Force "Ripple", composed of 3d Battalion, 110th Infantry, Cos A and D, 707th Tank Battalion, and a detachment, 893d Tank Destroyer Battalion, including its Reconnaissance Company, with the mission of passing through 112th Infantry to capture SCHMIDT and block all approaches thereto. Subsequent orders were issued attaching Task Force "Ripple" to 112th Infantry upon the arrival of the Task Force at KOMMERSCHIEDT.

6 - 109th Infantry exerted pressure against the enemy, improved its position. 110th Infantry (- 3d Battalion) consolidated positions, cleaning out small pockets of resistance. 112th Infantry held positions against intense artillery and constant pressure from the enemy. The attached Engineers assisted throughout this action. 12th Infantry, 4th Infantry Division, attached, prepared to relieve 109th Infantry in its sector. Task Force "Ripple" moved the foot elements of 3d Battalion, 110th Infantry to KOMMERSCHIEDT to assist 112th Infantry. German control of the road, through intense antitank fire prevented the passage of any vehicles of this force.

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7 - 109th Infantry relieved by 12th Infantry which continued to protect the Division left (North) flank. 2d Battalion, 109th Infantry relieved 3d Battalion, 112th Infantry in VOSSNACK and undertook to hold that ridge at any cost. 110th Infantry (less 2d Battalion) advanced slowly to the southeast breaking out pockets of resistance. 2d Battalion, attached to 112th Infantry, held the KALL River crossing. 2d Battalion, 112th Infantry was relieved by 109th Infantry at VOSSNACK, after being repulsed by casualties and forced back into the village, and moved to an assembly area just West of GERHNER. Orders were issued forming Task Force "Davis" composed of 112th Inf (-2d Battalion); 1st Battalion, 109th Infantry; 3d Battalion, 110th Infantry; Company C, 103d Engineer Combat Battalion; Company C, 103d Medical Battalion; Companies A and C, 707th Tank Battalion; Companies B and C, 863d Tank Destroyer Battalion; Company D, 86th Chemical Battalion with the mission of capturing SCHMIDT, defending that position, blocking all roads from Southwest - Southeast directions. This force incorporated Task Force "Ripple" into the new force. However, before Task Force "Davis" could be organized the 112th Infantry received a heavy counterattack supported by thirty tanks and (infantry) artillery fires forcing it with attachments to retire North from position in vicinity of KOMMERSCHMIDT to high ground 400 yards north of KOMMERSCHMIDT. 112th Engineer Combat Group was charged with holding open the line of communications from VOSSNACK. They found it necessary to commit part of their personnel to combat duty in carrying out this task.

8 - 109th Infantry maintained positions in and south of VOSSNACK. 110th Infantry slowly continued advance to Southwest against determined resistance. The 112th Inf. Task Force "Ripple" were ordered to withdraw from KALL River Valley to assembly positions West of GERHNER. The enemy now withdrew to the KALL River Valley in vicinity of bridge North of KOMMERSCHMIDT. When the decision was made to withdraw, Brigadier General George Davis was directed to disregard his previous Task Force instructions and to clear the KALL River Valley in vicinity of the bridge North of KOMMERSCHMIDT and cover the withdrawal of the 112th Infantry and Task Force "Ripple". To accomplish this mission Brigadier General Davis used the 2d Battalion 109th Infantry (For route of advance and instructions - see map). By 1730A the KALL River Valley (including the bridge) north of KOMMERSCHMIDT had been cleared of the enemy and the withdrawal of the 112th Infantry and Task Force "Ripple" was accomplished without incident. 12th Infantry attacked toward the Northeast against strong enemy resistance. Protected the Division left (North) flank.

9 - 109th Infantry continued to defend VOSSNACK Ridge from VOSSNACK South to KALL River Valley. 110th Infantry continued to exert pressure to the South of GERHNER cleaning out small pockets of resistance. 112th Infantry in assembly areas rehabilitating and preparing for future operations. 12th Infantry protected Division left (North) flank and continued to exert pressure to the Northeast.

10 - 1st Battalion, 109th Infantry attacked to the Northeast and reached its objective just South of HURTGEN. Remainder of regiment with 2d Battalion, 112th Infantry attached, maintained positions on VOSSNACK Ridge. 110th Infantry continued attack to the South. 112th Infantry (less 2d Battalion) continued reorganization. 12th Infantry attacked against strong resistance on the left flank. Counterattacks forced 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry to retire to original positions. 12th Infantry detached in position and passed to control of 4th Infantry Division late in the day.

11 - Division continued to defend positions with 110th Infantry exerting pressure to the South. 112th Infantry (less 2d Battalion) continued to reorganize.

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12 - 109th Infantry, with 2d Battalion, 118th Infantry attached, continued to defend VOSSEKACK Ridge. 1st Battalion, 110th Infantry withdrew a short distance after being counterattacked but regained its position in about two hours. 2d Battalion, 110th Infantry continued to exert pressure on the enemy while the 2d Battalion protected the rearward left flank. 118th Infantry (-) continued rehabilitation.

13 - Division continued to defend positions and patrolled aggressively. 110th Infantry continued to exert pressure on the enemy to the south. Plans prepared for mutual relief with the 8th Infantry Division.

14 - CT 112 initiated move to area vicinity NIKISWAMPACH, LUXEMBOURG. 2d Ranger Battalion attached to 109th Infantry, taking over former sector of 2d Battalion, 118th Infantry. Division continued to defend sector, consolidate positions and patrol aggressively.

15 - Division (less CT 112) continued to defend sector, patrol aggressively while CT 112 began relief of CT 13 in new area.

16 - 109th Infantry (2d Ranger Battalion attached) continued to defend VOSSEKACK Ridge. CT 110 relieved by CT 13, assembled in position and prepared for move to the south. 118th Infantry continued defense of sector formerly occupied by 118th Infantry.

17 - 109th Infantry (2d Ranger Battalion attached) continued defense of VOSSEKACK Ridge. CT 110 moved to 8th Infantry Division Sector vicinity CONSTHUM, LUXEMBOURG and completed relief of CT 28. 118th Infantry continued defense of its sector.

18 - CT 28 began relief of CT 109. 110th and 118th Infantry continued defense of respective sectors in 8th Infantry Division area. 2d Ranger Battalion passed to control of 8th Infantry Division.

19 - CT 112 relieved CT 110 and assumed responsibility of defense of that sector. Remainder of Division continued to defend their sectors and patrolled aggressively. Division assumed responsibility for defense of sector previously occupied by 8th Infantry Division. Division passed to control of VIII Corps at 190830A.

20 - 1st Battalion, 109th Infantry and 630th Tank Destroyer Battalion closed in new area. 707th Tank Battalion enroute to new area. 32d Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron attached to 110th Infantry for defense of its sector. All units continued defense of present sectors.

21 - 25 - Division continued to defend present sector; patrolled aggressively; all units reorganizing, rehabilitating, and training in preparation for future operations.

26 - Division continued to defend present sector; patrolled aggressively; all units reorganizing and training in preparation for future operations. 32d Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, detached from 110th Infantry, continued to defend its portion of sector.

27 - 30 - Division continued to defend present sector; patrolled aggressively. All units training in preparation for future operations.

e. **Combat Efficiency:** Although reduced in strength, particularly in unit officers and noncommissioned officers, the combat efficiency is rated excellent.

f. **Result of Operations:** During the early part of the period the Division, reinforced, seized and held vital terrain; captured 1001 prisoners; attracted to its sector and decimated several German units, including one Infantry and one Panzer Division. These results must have contributed much to the success of the attack subsequently launched by other units

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of Twelfth Army Group. Later in the period the Division occupied a defensive sector, releasing an infantry Division to participate in later phases of that attack. While occupying the defensive sector the Division reorganized itself and trained in preparation for future operations.

**3. ADMINISTRATIVE: Daily Chronological Narrative, including**

- a. Status of Strength and Replacements Needed
- b. Casualties; and
- c. Prisoners captured.

1 - Personnel requisitioned on this date: Infantry - 4 Off, 60 EM;  
Field Artillery - 1 Off, Engineer - 1 Off, 2 EM.

Instructions issued to all units that the 13 officers and 147 enlisted men attached to the division for training would not be committed to an attack, but would be held at the Regimental Recv Station until ordered by this headquarters. The above instructions were issued in compliance with instructions received from V Corps.

Casualties for the 24 hour period ending 012400 November 1944:

	BATTLE CASUALTIES											
	Killed			Wounded			Missing			Total		
	Off	EM	Total	Off	EM	Total	Off	EM	Total	Off	EM	Total
102th Inf Regt			1			1			1			1
110th Inf Regt	1	2	15			2	14		16			16
112th Inf Regt			1						1			1
229th FA Bn			2						2			2
TOTALS	1	2	17			2	18		20			20
630th TD Bn												2
447th AAA AW Bn												1

Prisoners captured: 28th Division - 2

Replacements received: 28th Division - 21 Off, 2 EM  
447th AAA AW Bn - 1 EM

Returned from medical system: 28th Division - 5 EM  
630th TD Bn - 2 EM

**Estimated strengths as of 012400 November 1944: (Effective)**

28th Division	-	225 officers	13107 enlisted men
630th TD Bn	-	38 "	696 "
447th AAA AW Bn	-	37 "	751 "
707th Tk Bn	-	42 "	676 "

2 - Personnel requisitioned on this date: None

Attack began 0900, progress favorable. Permission received from V Corps to release the 13 Off and 147 EM attached to their units for use as replacements; to be covered by requisition.

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BATTLE CASUALTIES

	KILLED		WOUNDED		MISSING		CAPTURED		TOTAL		NON-BATTLE	
	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM
109th Inf Regt		5	8	159					8	144	1	8
110th Inf Regt	1	3		58					1	58		13
118th Inf Regt			1	74					1	74		27
107th FA Bn			1	4					1	4		1
109th FA Bn				1						1		1
103d Engr C Bn	1			2					1	2		2
TOTALS	2	10	10	278					12	288	1	59
630th TD Bn				5						5		2
447th AAA AW Bn												1

Prisoners captured: 28th Division - 506

Replacements received: None

Returned from medical system: 28th Division - 2 EM

Estimated effective strengths as of 022400 November 1944:

28th Division		312 officers	18760 enlisted men
630th TD Bn	=	32	689
447th AAA AW Bn	=	38	750
707th TK Bn	=	45	520

Personnel Requirements of this date: Infantry - 20 Off, 300 EM, 1000

Engineers - 4 EM  
Tank Destroyer - 8 EM

Estimated casualties for period ending 032400 November 1944:

BATTLE CASUALTIES

	KILLED		WOUNDED		MISSING		CAPTURED		TOTAL		NON-BATTLE	
	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM
28th Recon Tr												4
109th Inf Regt		16	4	79			1		4	95	1	10
110th Inf Regt	2	1	2	94					4	95		27
118th Inf Regt	1	5	1	35					2	40		12
107th FA Bn				5						5		
103d Engr C Bn				2						2		
TOTALS	3	22	7	215			1		10	238	1	53
630th TD Bn				4						4		1
447th AAA AW Bn												1
707th TK Bn				4						4		1

Prisoners captured: 28th Division - 66

Replacements received: 28th Division - 14 Off, 358 EM. (Includes 14 officers and 147 enlisted men formerly attached, now assigned.)

Returned from medical system: None

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Estimated effective strengths as of 052400 November 1944:

28th Division	-	SIG officers	1228	enlisted men
630th TD Bn	-	38	694	"
447th AAA AW Bn	-	56	749	"
707th TK Bn	-	41	666	"

4 - Personnel requisitioned on this date: Infantry - 300 EM  
 Field Artillery - 3 EM  
 Engineer - 3 EM 1 Off

Straggler line was established by the Provost Marshal just west of Vossenack.

BATTLE CASUALTIES

	KILLED		WOUNDED		MISSING		CAPTURED		RETAIRED		NON-BATTLE	
	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM
28th SIG Co												1
109th Inf Regt	2	16	5	76			9	7	101	1		9
110th Inf Regt		6	1	41					2	27	1	16
118th Inf Regt	2	15	5	54	1	1			6	50		52
107th FA Bn		2	1	1					1	5		1
229th FA Bn		1		1					2			
105d Engr C Bn		3		7					10			2
TOTALS	4	43	11	200	1	1	9	18	253	2		61
630th TD Bn				2					2			1

Prisoners captured: 28th Division - 201  
Attached - 0

Replacements received: None

Returned from medical system: 28th Division - 10 EM 707th TK Bn - 1 EM

Estimated effective strengths as of 042400 November 1944:

28th Division	-	798 officers	12523 enlisted men
630th TD Bn	-	33	691
447th AAA AW Bn	-	56	749
707th TK Bn	-	41	666

5 - Personnel requisitioned on this date: Infantry - 300 EM; Field Artillery - 1 Off; 4 EM; Engineer - 11 EM; Medical - 20 EM; Quartermaster - 1 Off; Tank - 11 EM.

Estimated casualties for period ending 052400 November 1944:

BATTLE CASUALTIES

	KILLED		WOUNDED		MISSING		CAPTURED		TOTAL		NON-BATTLE	
	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM
28th QM Co												2
28th Recon Tr												2
109th Inf Regt	1	2	1	42		15			2	59		12
110th Inf Regt		7	2	35		1			2	43		10
118th Inf Regt		4	6	70			1		7	74		44

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**BATTLE CASUALTIES**

	KILLED		WOUNDED		MISSING		CAPTURED		TOTAL		NON-BATTLE	
	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM
107th FA Bn				2		1				3		5
229th FA Bn			1	2					1	2		1
103d Med Bn			1	2					1	2		1
103d Engr C Bn												1
<b>TOTALS</b>		1	15	11	155	19	1		15	185		75
630th TD Bn					1					1		5
447th AAA AW Bn											1	
707th Tk Bn			2		5				5			

Prisoners Captured: 28th Division - 185  
 630th TD Bn - 6

Replacements received: None

Returned from medical systems: 28th Division - 11 EM 630th TD Bn - 1 EM

Estimated effective strengths as of 062400 November 1944:

28th Division	-	786	officers	12290	enlisted men
630th TD Bn	-	33	"	227	"
447th AAA AW Bn	-	37	"	749	"
707th Tk Bn	-	41	"	662	"

6 - Personnel requisitioned on this date: Infantry - 15 Officers, 300 EM;  
 Cavalry - 2 EM.

The excessive number of personnel from Corps and Army at the Prisoner of War Cage to interrogate the prisoners necessitated an order to the Provost Marshal that no persons would interrogate prisoners unless they possessed written permission of the Division G-2.

Estimated casualties for period ending 062400 November 1944:

**BATTLE CASUALTIES**

	KILLED		WOUNDED		MISSING		CAPTURED		TOTAL		NON-BATTLE	
	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM
109th Inf Regt		30	5	135		30			6	195	1	29
110th Inf Regt		3	5	37					5	40	5	31
112th Inf Regt		6	5	108					6	114		80
107th FA Bn					1					1	1	2
229th FA Bn			1	2					1	2		
<b>TOTALS</b>		39	18	283		30			18	352	5	143
630th TD Bn					2					2		5
707th Tk Bn		1			7				1	7		

Prisoners Captured: 28th Division - 40  
 Attached - 0

Replacements received: 28th Division - 5 Off - 308 EM  
 630th TD Bn - 8 EM  
 447th AAA AW Bn - 4 EM

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Returned from medical system: 28th Division - 3 Off, 25 EM  
707th Tk Bn " " 1 EM

Estimated effective strengths as of 062400 November 1944:

28th Division	-	771 officers	12106 enlisted men
630th TD Bn	-	33 "	891 "
447th AAA AW Bn	-	37 "	753 "
707th Tk Bn	-	40 "	856 "

7 - Personnel requisitioned on this date: Infantry - 85 Off, 500 EM;  
Field Artillery - 3 Off, 3 EM; Engineer - 3 EM; Medical - 25 EM.

A special requisition was submitted for two Colonels and five Lt Colonels, Infantry.

Estimated casualties for period ending 072400 November 1944:

	BATTLE CASUALTIES										
	KILLED		WOUNDED		MISSING		CAPTURED		TOTAL	REMARKS	
	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM			O
28th Ron Tr											1
109th Inf Regt		1	20		24				1	24	16
110th Inf Regt		9	3	99	3				8	108	1
112th Inf Regt	1	42	4	114		8			8	164	2
107th FA Bn		1								1	
229th FA Bn			4							4	
103d Sqr C Bn											1
TOTALS	1	52	8	207	3	31			12	263	4
630th TD Bn				2						2	4
707th Tk Bn		2		13		6				23	

Prisoners captured: 28th Division - 79  
Attached - 0

Replacements received: 28th Division - 1 Off, 296 EM  
630th TD Bn - 3 EM  
707th Tk Bn - 2 Off, 14 EM

Returned from medical system: 28th Division - 17 EM

Returned from medical system: 28th Division - 17 EM

Estimated effective strengths as of 072400 November 1944:

28th Division	-	758 officers	11965 enlisted men
630th TD Bn	-	33 "	896 "
447th AAA AW Bn	-	37 "	753 "
707th Tk Bn	-	42 "	647 "

8 - Personnel requisitioned on this date: Infantry - 15 Off, 350 EM;  
Field Artillery - 1 Off, 13 EM.

Upon instruction from the Chief of Staff, the 2d Battalion, 112th Infantry Regiment, was filled up to T/O strength from the replacements received today.

**SECRET**

Estimated casualties for period ending 082400 November 1944:

	BATTLE CASUALTIES											
	TOTALS		KILLED		WOUNDED		CAPTURED		DIED		NEW BATTLES	
	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM
28th MP Plat												1
28th Hon Tr												1
109th Inf Regt	1		1	18			1	2	19	1		18
110th Inf Regt		4	2	35		6		2	45			15
112th Inf Regt		55	6	165		28		6	244			57
108th FA Bn						1			1			1
229th FA Bn		1							1			1
103d Med Bn												1
103d Engr C Bn												9
<del>28th Div</del>	<del>1</del>	<del>55</del>	<del>9</del>	<del>216</del>	<del>55</del>	<del>28</del>	<del>1</del>	<del>10</del>	<del>250</del>	<del>1</del>	<del>1</del>	<del>81</del>
630th TD Bn			2	3				2	3			4
447th AAA AW Bn											1	
707th Tr Bn												5

Prisoners captured: 28th Division - 78  
630th TD Bn - 10

Replacements received: 28th Division - 39 Off, 691 EM

Returned from medical system: 28th Division - 48 EM

Estimated effective strengths as of 082400 November 1944:

28th Division	-	787 officers	12314 enlisted men
630th TD Bn	-	32 officers	681 enlisted men
447th AAA AW Bn	-	36 "	755 "
707th Tr Bn	-	42 "	634 "

9 - Personnel requisitioned on this date: Infantry - 10 Off, 450 EM;  
Field Artillery - 2 Off 6 EM; Engineer - 1 EM;

Upon learning that it was contemplated to commit the 2d Battalion, 112th Infantry Regiment, to an attack on the morning of the 10th, a report was made to the G-3 that this battalion, while up to strength, could not be considered more than 20% effective for combat, 515 replacements having been placed in the battalion the day previous.

Instructions were issued to all units who had been involved in the fighting in the Schmidt-Kommerscheidt area to make an accurate head-count of their men as soon as possible. The results of these head-counts showed that the 1st Battalion, 112th Infantry Regiment had the following strength:

Hq & Hq Co	-	3 Off	68 enlisted men
Co A	-	2	67
Co B	-	0	60
Co C	-	2	112
Co D	-	2	50

- 12 - **SECRET**

45

**SECRET**

The 3d Battalion, 118th Infantry Regiment, had the following strength:

Hq & Hq Co	-	4 Off	49 enlisted men
Co I	-	1	73
Co K	-	1	32
Co L	-	2	43
Co M	-	5	69

The 3d Battalion, 110th Infantry Regiment, had the following strength:

Hq & Hq Co	-	8 Off	112 enlisted men
Co I	-	2 Off	103
Co K	-	1	56
Co L	-	1	109
Co M	-	5	110

Instructions were issued by the Chief of Staff to bring the 3d Battalion, 110th Infantry Regiment, to T/O strength on 10 November 1944.

It was estimated that there were 54 officers and 675 enlisted men missing in action and Army was notified that they would be so reported on the following day.

Estimated casualties for period ending 092400 November 1944:

**BATTLE CASUALTIES**

	KILLED		WOUNDED		MISSING		CAPTURED		TOTAL		NON-BATTLE	
	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM
109th Inf Regt	1	2	1	20		16			2	38		28
110th Inf Regt	2	1	6	17	1				9	18	1	73
112th Inf Regt	7	25							7	25		
107th FA Bn												2
108th FA Bn			1	1					1	1		
109th FA Bn												1
229th FA Bn				4	1				1	4		
103d Engr C Bn												1
TOTALS	10	28	8	42	2	16			20	66	1	105
630th TD Bn												1
447th AAA AW Bn												2
707th Tk Bn		1	1			24			1	25		5
893d TD Bn	1	4		6		15			1	25		

Prisoners captured: 28th Division - 6

Replacements received: 28th Division - 1 Off, 87 EM

Returned from medical system: 28th Division - 25 EM

Estimated effective strengths as of 092400 November 1944:

28th Division	-	770 Officers	12241 enlisted men
630th TD Bn	-	32	676
447th AAA AW Bn	-	36	751
707th Tk Bn	-	41	612
893d TD Bn	-	34	578

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

10 - Personnel requisitioned on this date: Infantry - 20 Off, 375 EM;  
Field Artillery - 10 EM; Engineer - 4 EM; Medics - 16 EM.

Estimated casualties for period ending 102400 November 1944:

**BATTLE CASUALTIES**

	KILLED		WOUNDED		MISSING		CAPTURED		TOTAL		NON-BATTLE		
	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM		
28th MP Platoon												1	
28th Sen Tr												1	
109th Inf Regt	6	3	54				3	40	1			6	
110th Inf Regt 1	4		133			93				5	226	3	79
118th Inf Regt	1				22	338	12	29	34	538	5		
108th FA Bn												1	
109th FA Bn												1	
229th FA Bn			1	4		5			4	4			
103d Med Bn	1									1			
103d Engr C Bn												2	
<b>TOTALS</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>169</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>434</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>219</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>829</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>91</b>	
630th TD Bn												4	
707th Tk Bn												2	

Prisoners captured: 28th Division - 67

Replacements received: 28th Division - 9 Off 457 EM  
707th Tk Bn - 2 Off 2 EM

Returned from medical stysts: 28th Division - 35 EM  
707th Tk Bn - 1 EM

Estimated effective strengths as of 102400 November 1944:

28th Division	-	724 officers	11805 enlisted men
630th TD Bn	-	38 "	672 "
447th AAA AW Bn	-	36 "	751 "
707th Tk Bn	-	43 "	684 "

11 - Personnel requisitioned on this date: Infantry - 50 Off, 400 EM;  
Field Artillery - 2 Off, 3 EM; Medics - 2 EM; Tank Destroyer - 1 Off, 6 EM.

Two Chaplains and two Medical Corps officers, captured by the Germans at Komerscheidt, escaped and returned to duty today.

Estimated casualties for period ending 112400 November 1944:

**BATTLE CASUALTIES**

	KILLED		WOUNDED		MISSING		CAPTURED		TOTAL		NON-BATTLE	
	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	
109th Inf Regt	1	6	41				6	42	2			16
110th Inf Regt	7	3	47			4	3	3	61	3		104
118th Inf Regt			7						7			43
109th FA Bn												1
103d Engr C Bn					2				2			1
<b>TOTALS</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>97</b>		<b>4</b>		<b>3</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>112</b>	<b>5</b>		<b>165</b>

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**BATTLE CASUALTIES**

	KILLED		WOUNDED		MISSING		CAPTURED		TOTAL		NON-BATTLE
	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	

630th TD Bn

707th Tk Bn

Prisoners captured: 28th Division - 52  
 630th TD Bn - 8

Replacements received: 11 Off, 451 EM

Returned from medical system: 28th Division - 59 EM  
 707th Tk Bn - 5 EM

Estimated effective strengths as of 112300 November 1944:

28th Division	730 officers	12000 enlisted men
630th TD Bn	31	679
447th AAA AW Bn	36	751
707th Tk Bn	43	679

12 - Personnel requisitioned on this date: Infantry - 250 EM; Field Artillery 1 Off, 4 EM; Engineer - 2 EM; Medical - 1 Off.

Estimated casualties for period ending 122400 November 1944:

**BATTLE CASUALTIES**

	KILLED		WOUNDED		MISSING		CAPTURED		TOTAL		NON-BATTLE
	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	

28th Rec Tr

109th Inf Regt

110th Inf Regt

112th Inf Regt

107th FA Bn

103d Engr C Bn

TOTALS

630th TD Bn

707th Tk Bn

Prisoners captured: 28th Division - 25  
 630th TD Bn - 1

Replacements received: 28th Inf Division - 29 Off, 699 EM

Returned from medical system: 28th Division - 48 EM  
 630th TD Bn - 2 EM

Estimated effective strengths as of 122400 November 1944:

28th Division	745 officers	12536 enlisted men
630th TD Bn	31	667
447th AAA AW Bn	36	751
707th Tk Bn	43	679

**SECRET**

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13 - Personnel requisitioned on this date: Infantry - 150 EM; Engineer - 5 EM; Medics - 9 EM.

Estimated casualties for period ending 132400 November 1944:

**BATTLE CASUALTIES**

	KILLED		WOUNDED		MISSING		CAPTURED		TOTAL		NON-BATTLE	
	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	EM	
726th Ord Co												1
Band												1
109th Inf Regt	1	8	20						2	21	1	25
110th Inf Regt	3	3	61		105				5	169	2	69
112th Inf Regt			5		2					5		11
107th FA Bn												1
108th FA Bn												2
109th FA Bn												3
103d Engr C Bn			1	1	18				1	13		5
<b>TOTALS</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>66</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>119</b>				<b>6</b>	<b>210</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>111</b>
630th TD Bn												4
447th AAA AW Bn												1
707th TK Bn												1

Prisoners captured: 28th Division - 29

630th TD Bn

Returned from medical system: 28th Division - 52 EM  
630th TD Bn - 4 EM

Estimated effective strengths as of 122400 November 1944

28th Division	754 officers	12271 enlisted men
630th TD Bn	31	670
447th AAA AW Bn	56	780
707th TK Bn	43	678

14 - Personnel requisitioned on this date: Infantry - 300 EM; Field Artillery 2 Off, 8 EM; Engineer - 4 EM; Medics - 10 EM.

Estimated casualties for period ending 142400 November 1944:

**BATTLE CASUALTIES**

	KILLED		WOUNDED		MISSING		CAPTURED		TOTAL		NON-BATTLE	
	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	EM	
109th Inf Regt	17	2	16						2	25	4	33
110th Inf Regt	2		5	1	58				1	65	5	65
112th Inf Regt												20
107th FA Bn											1	1
109th FA Bn												2
103d Engr C Bn												3
<b>TOTALS</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>58</b>				<b>3</b>	<b>98</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>144</b>

**SECRET**

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**BATTLE CASUALTIES**

**KILLED WOUNDED MISSING CAPTURED TOTAL NON-BATTLE**

**O EM O EM O EM O EM O EM O EM**

630th TD Bn

707th Tk Bn

Prisoners captured: 28th Division - 5

Replacements received: 28th Division - 10 Off, 321 EM  
630th TD Bn - 5 EM  
447th AAA AN - 2 EM

Returned from medical system: 28th Division - 22 EM  
630th TD Bn - 2 EM  
447th AAA AN Bn 3 EM

28th Division - 754 officers 12360 enlisted men  
630th TD Bn - 31 " 670 "  
447th AAA AN Bn - 36 " 755 "  
707th Tk Bn - 45 " 674 "

15 - Personnel requisitioned on this date: Infantry - 3 Off, 225 EM; Engineer  
1 Off, 15 EM; Medic - 2 EM.

Advance party of the 8th Infantry Division arrived in the area to make  
initial survey for the relief of this division.

**BATTLE CASUALTIES**

**KILLED WOUNDED MISSING CAPTURED TOTAL NON-BATTLE**

**O EM O EM O EM O EM O EM O EM**

109th Inf Regt

110th Inf Regt

112th Inf Regt

107th FA Bn

109th FA Bn

103d Engr Bn

TOTALS

630th TD Bn

707th Tk Bn

Prisoners captured - 28th Division - 4

Replacements received - 28th Division - 11 Off, 344 EM  
447th AAA AN Bn 1 EM  
707th Tk Bn - 1 EM

Returned from medical system: 28th Division - 63 EM, 1 Off  
630th TD Bn - 3 EM

Estimated effective strengths as of 152400 November 1944:

28th Division - 757 officers 12690 enlisted men  
630th TD Bn - 31 " 672 "  
447th AAA AN Bn - 36 " 755 "  
707th Tk Bn - 45 " 674 "

**SECRET**

S-E-C-R-E-T

UNIT REPORT NO

FROM: 010001 November 1944  
TO : 012400 November 1944

UNIT: 112th Infantry  
DATE: 8 December 1944  
PLACE: Ouren, Belgium

MAPS: Central Europe, 1/25,000. Sheets 4414, Nideggen, 5303 Roetgen,  
and 5800 Burg Reuland.

I. ENEMY.

a. Units in Contact:

Vossenack, Germany:

- 1412th Fortress Bn
- 983rd Regt.
- 275 Div.
- 14th Co. Combat Team Friend
- 942d Regt.
- 275th Artillery Regt.
- 1055th Diesel Regt.
- 110th Panzer Div.
- 156th Regt.

15-18 Nov 44:- 1058th Regiment.

b. Enemy Reserves:

- 1 - 14 Nov 44:- The 275 Artillery Regt and other unknown units of infantry, artillery and Panzers
- 15 - 30 Nov 44:- Unknown units of Infantry and Artillery.

c. Enemy Activity:

- 1 - 14 Nov 44:- Characterized by heavy artillery, tank and mortar fire on our troops and installations in Schmidt, Vossenack and Kommerseheidt. Enemy made counterattacks using tanks and Infantry which resulted in forcing the 3d remainder of the period continuous artillery and mortar fire fell on Kommerseheidt and Vossenack and numerous counterattacks employing tanks and infantry attempted to drive our troops from these places. Enemy's patrolling was particularly aggressive.
- 15 - 30 Nov 44:- The enemy remained in contact with our forward elements by continuous patrolling; artillery and mortar fire fell throughout the regimental area.

6689  
MASTER

16

Enemy Strength:  
1- 14 Nov 44: The enemy strength to our front varied from 1 to 4 divisions.  
15- 30 Nov 44: Enemy strength equaled approximately one (1) regiment.

Material Means:  
Good infantry weapons, artillery, planes, tanks and other motor vehicles.

Morale:

Fair.

Knowledge of our situation:

None.

## II. OWN SITUATION.

### a. Front Lines:

1 Nov 44:-- From 324019 to 333502

2 Nov 44:-- East of Vossenack

3 Nov 44:-- Vossenack, Kommerscheidt and Schmidt, Germany

4 Nov 44:-- Vossenack-Kommerscheidt.

5-14 Nov 44:-- Vossenack-Germeter.

15-30 Nov 44:-- 887700 to 891729.

### b. Regimental Command Post:

1-8 Nov 44:--014313.

9-14 Nov 44:--933325

15-30 Nov 44:--855727

### c. Location of Discontent Units:

1- 14 Nov 44:-- 23d Inf on left and 11th Cav on right.

15- 30 Nov 44:-- 23d Inf on left and 32d Cav on right.

### d. Operations:

1 Nov 44:--Troops were in assembly position and in Germeter, Germany patrolling and preparing for attack.

2 Nov 44:--Attack launched at 0900 behind elements of the 707th Tank Bn.

0908:--Tanks were in Vossenack and firing at enemy in vicinity of church at center of town.

1355:--F Co reached objective, reorganized and prepared defensive positions.

1500:--All units had reached objective and were "dug in" for the night.

All movements during the day were on schedule and received heavy enemy artillery and mortar fire.

3 Nov 44:--2d Bn remained East of Vossenack defending the left flank of the regiment.

0715:--The 1st Bn followed by the 3d Bn attacked through heavy enemy artillery and mortar fire, in direction of Kommerscheidt and Schmidt.

2240:--Objectives assigned (Kommerscheidt to 1st Bn and Schmidt to 3d Bn) were reached and the Bns prepared defensive positions.

Very little shell on 2-

S-E-C-R-E-T

0639: - The 1st Bn was receiving heavy artillery fire and requested counter-battery fire.

0905: - Enemy tanks reported in Schmidt. The 207th Tank Bn due to poor road conditions and time was able to get only 3 tanks into Schmidt.

1100: - Enemy counterattacked and forced 3d Bn from Schmidt back on the 1st Bn in Kommerscheidt.

1315: - Orders received from Division to attack Schmidt at 1500, capture it, prepare defensive positions and hold at all costs. Subsequently the 1st Bn was preparing for attack on Kommerscheidt.

1500: - L Co received a stiff counterattack and plans to attack Schmidt were cancelled.

1615: - 1st Bn sent 3 tanks located between Kommerscheidt and Schmidt and 10 enemy tanks, knocked out one and was engaged with the remaining 9 enemy tanks.

1710: - The Regimental CQ (Lt Colonel Peterson) went to Kommerscheidt and personally assisted in the reorganization of the 1st and 3d Bns.

2245: - Enemy patrol reported infiltrating through F Co.

A patrol consisting of Lt Off, S-2, 2 newspaper reporters and an MP succeeded in front to get first-hand information. They did not return to the front to report back were not successful.

5 Nov 44: - Three (3) Bns held their positions against enemy tank and Inf attacks and received heavy artillery and mortar fire.

0930: - The S-2 though wounded, returned with 2 German prisoners and reported that Lt Off, newspaper reporters and MP had been captured by the enemy. The S-2 (Capt Montgomery) stated that the 2 Germans who had been left to guard him surrendered because they were tired of fighting.

1000: - Division ordered Regiment to attack Schmidt at 1100. Members of the Regimental Staff moved to Kommerscheidt to prepare plans for the attack on Schmidt.

A request for air support was denied because of weather conditions. Later the attack was cancelled by Division and the Regiment was directed to hold present positions. The Regimental Commander was wounded by a shell fragment.

-3-

S-E-C-R-E-T

Lt Peterson finally went up front

Reporters!

Div. Com still did not understand the situation

0600--~~Our supplies in three days reached front line troops.~~

Again the demand  
assault on Schmidt

0215--The Division Commander notified the Regiment that Task Force "Ripple" now attached was to be used as a reserve for an attack on Schmidt.

0810--The 2d Bn was undergoing a counterattack and ability to hold was questionable.

0830--Assistance to 2d Bn being given by tanks and TD's.

1115--2d Bn reports that they doubted if Vossenack could be held much longer and that air support was badly needed.

1200--The attack started to reach Objective (high ground SW of Schmidt) which was to be held at all costs.

~~2d Bn reports that 2d Bn was in critical view of 5 days and nights of continuous shelling.~~

1610--Capt. Pruden took command of 2d Bn, reorganized it and fought off an enemy attack.

2330--Supply train left Service Co for the front. Throughout the day, the 1st and 3d Bn received heavy artillery and mortar fire.

0600--Supply train intercepted by enemy patrols, suffered casualties and lost 3 weasels (assigned to regiment to overcome poor tracking record).

0705--1st and 3d Bns were attacked by tanks. 2d Bn area relatively quiet. Tanks from 707th Tank Bn were sent to Kommerscheidt to assist 1st and 3d Bns. The 2d Bn attacked through Vossenack by moving from house to house. Although all artillery, including the 229th FA Bn was firing on Kommerscheidt, a urgent request was sent for additional artillery fire and an air strike.

1350--All tanks reported out of action and armor was badly needed. Our artillery was unable to fire into Kommerscheidt because of our wounded left in the town and prisoners captured by the enemy.

Now know why  
was 116 PzD

1715--2d Bn was attacked by approximately 600-700 enemy of the 116 Panzer Division but repulsed attack without giving ground.

2000--2d Bn relieved by 2d Bn 109th Inf and moved to assembly area in vicinity of Service Co to be re-equipped and to receive replacements. Col. G. M. Nelson assigned to regt.

8 Nov 44: 0600 - Enemy tanks reported in vicinity of Komerscheidt by our artillery observers. The attached to Regiment immediately placed 3 guns in Komerscheidt and 3 in Vossenack.

1400 - The CO of Task Force "Ripple" reported his situation critical and that tanks, food, ammunition and water were needed. The 1st and 3d Bns held their positions in Komerscheidt in spite of heavy enemy artillery and mortar fire (including direct fire weapons) and against aggressive enemy combat patrols.

1500 - Colonel Balson arrived in Komerscheidt area, took command of the Regiment. He delivered a message from the Division Commander directing that the 1st and 3d Bns withdraw to assembly areas. The 1st and 3d Bns completed withdrawal and completed and 1st and 3d Bns closed in assembly areas. Lt Col Train was assigned to Regiment as its Off.

*Now Div understands*

10 Nov 44: 2d Bn moved to a forward assembly area. From this position they took over defensive positions in Uckerath and Vossenack. The unit was attached to the 109th Inf. Information was received that Chap. Madden, Chap. Maness, Capt. DeMarco and Capt. Linguitti who were at the 1st Bn Aid Station East of Vossenack had been taken prisoner by the enemy. 2d Bn received heavy artillery and mortar fire throughout the day. The 1st and 3d Bns were being reorganized in the Service Co area. Here they were receiving equipment and replacements in the mud and snow.

11-12 Nov 44: 2d Bn still receiving heavy artillery and mortar fire. The 1st Bn (12 Nov) was alerted to move forward to relieve a Bn of the 110th Inf. This alert was later cancelled. The two chaplains and 2 Captains who were detained by the enemy returned to our lines.

13 Nov 44: 1st and 3d Bn continued reorganization and the 2d Bn received heavy artillery and mortar fire. The Regiment was alerted for motor movement on 14 Nov.

14 Nov 44: 0830 - Regimental billeting parties left CP for sector in vicinity of Weiswampach, Luxembourg.

1600 - 1st serial departed for Weiswampach over route through Zweifall, Rott, Roetgen, Eupen (I.P.), Belle Croix, Malmedy, St. Vith, Grufflang, Oudr, Malscheidt, Weiswampach. The movement continued all night, trailing elements closing on Weiswampach at 150917 Nov 44.

2300 - Last elements of 2d Bn relieved by 2d Ranger Bn and 2d Bn commenced motor movement.

S-E-C-R-E-T

15 Nov 44:- Regiment commenced the relief of the 13th Inf Regiment on position. Relief completed 2358.

16-30 Nov 44:- Reorganization of Regiment continued on position. Defensive line was held and a very few casualties were suffered. Troops participated in the following activities:-

Showers  
Red Cross Club  
Movies  
U.S.O. shows

Claryvoux.

On the 23rd Nov, an excellent Thanksgiving dinner was served to all troops. On 30 Nov, a propaganda broadcast to the Germans produced only an artillery barrage about one-half hour later.

e. **Combat Efficiency of Our Command:**  
Excellent.

f. **Results of Operation covered by this report:**

1 - 14 Nov 44:- Attack by this regiment captured Vossbach, Kommerscheid, Schmidt, Germany. Army counterattacks including heavy artillery and tanks and Inf caused the withdrawal from the Schmidt-Kommerscheid area. These attacks by the 112th Inf caused the Germans to concentrate elements of 4 divisions in this area.

15- 30 Nov 44:- Regiment was assigned mission to hold a defensive line approximately 6 1/2 miles long East of Weiswampach.

III. ADMINISTRATION.

a. **Effective Strength:**

On the 30th Nov - 3315. Total replacements received and RTDs for the month-2203.

b. **Casualties:**

Total for the month:-	Killed	---	167
	Wounded	---	719
	Missing in Act	-	431
	Non-Battle Cas	-	544
	Captured	---	232

c. **Prisoners:**

Captured:	-	357
Evacuated:	-	357

-6-

S-E-C-R-E-T

What?

Taking a  
good care  
on things

66%  
Replaced  
The  
losses

B-E-C-R-E-T

d. Evacuation Other Than Normal:

On the 9th of Nov, a four hour truce was declared for the purpose of evacuating the wounded on both sides of the lines.

e. Location of Class I, II, III, IV, and V Supplies and Evacuation Point of Interest to Higher Headquarters:

30 Nov 44:-- Service Train was located at 796742.

f. Status of Supplies:

Rations:-- 2872 -B's

6400 -A's

475 -C's in 156

g. Gasoline:-- 6590 gallons (4.8 days)

Oil:-- SAE/10 - 40 gallons (1 day)

SAE/30 - 20 gallons (1.5 day)

SAE/50 - 15 gallons (3 days)

Ammunition:-- 95% of Basic Load.

h. Condition of Roads and Circulation in Area:

Poor.

*G. M. Nelson*

G. M. NELSON

Colonel, 112th Inf. Bn.  
Commanding.

**SECRET**

Estimated effective strengths as of 302400 November 1944:

25th Division	788 officers	12975 enlisted men
630th TD Bn	33 "	701 "
447th AAA AW Bn	34 "	739 "
707th TK Bn	45 "	675 "
687th M Bn	31 "	487 "
33d Cav Recon Sq	33 "	690 "

An analysis of the estimated losses of the 25th Division over the period 2 November to 26 November 1944, indicates that over that period it was estimated that the 25th Division suffered a total loss of 848 officers and 5452 enlisted men as casualties from all causes. During that same period the Battle Casualty Section turned in Battle Casualty Reports showing a loss of 241 officers and 5445 enlisted men, casualties from all causes. This is a difference of 7 officers and 7 enlisted men between estimated and actual casualties from all causes.

The present policy in this theater of assigning replacements to units in combat is found to be sound and, until such times as casualties in infantry battalions go over 20% in a very short period of time, it is believed that the units can continue in combat with but a very little, if any, drop in efficiency. Even with casualties going over 50% in some battalions, the policy of immediate replacement of casualties prevents the necessity of the complete reorganization of the unit.

d. **Evacuation:** During the period of combat, 2 November 1944 through 14 November 1944, it was necessary to request additional medical personnel from the Corps Surgeon to replace losses due to casualties. Five (5) medical officers and one hundred and six (106) enlisted men were received and were given duty in the Medical Detachment and Collecting Companies. They gave excellent service. Three ambulances, with drivers and assistant drivers, were received upon request from the Corps Surgeon. These were used to replace deadlined ambulances of one Collecting Company.

1. Due to the lack of adequate roads, one (1) Cargo Carrier, M29, was assigned to each of the Infantry Battalion Medical Sections for the purpose of evacuating casualties. Two (2) litter cases, or five (5) walking cases, were able to be evacuated on each vehicle at one time. They were properly marked in accordance with Circular #20, Headquarters, Communications Zone, ETOUSA, dated 19 September 1944. Casualties were evacuated to advanced loading posts.
2. Due to the road traffic control, it was necessary to evacuate most casualties through two Collecting Companies, supplemented by ambulances from the third Collecting Company.
3. One ambulance control and dispatch point with telephone was used to facilitate distribution of ambulances to aid stations. The pool usually contained five (5) to eight (8) ambulances. This control worked very satisfactorily.

e. **Location of Supplies and Evacuation Establishments:**

1. All supply agencies of the Division and Division Clearing Station were located at ROTGEN, GERMANY (K9027) from 1 November 1944 to 191900A November 1944.
2. Location of Division supply agencies after 191900A November 1944, were as follows: (Map: -BELGIUM - LUXEMBOURG - 1:100,000, Sheet No. 17)

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Class I	-P675516
Class II & IV - Div QM Sup	-P706538
Div Ingt Sup	-P706471
Div Med Sup	-P706534
Div Ord Sup	-P706471
Class II & IV - Div QM Sup	-P706538
Div Sig Sup	-P706471
Class III	-P711538
Class V - D40	-P706471

f. Status Of Supply: Supply for this period was normal with the following exceptions:

1. (a) Upon arrival of the Division in the Hurtgen Forest area an estimate of the supply and evacuation situation showed that the mission assigned the Division could not be accomplished with normal T/E transportation, this left two alternatives, i.e., horses with pack saddles, or cargo carriers, M29, or a combination of both.
- (b) Army supply agencies were contacted with regards to pack saddles and cargo carriers, M29, and the following action was taken:
  - (1) Pack Saddles - Army advised this Headquarters that there was on hand at the Army QM Class II dump a supply of pack saddles that were not complete. Upon investigation by the Div QM it was found that the parts of the pack saddles that were available were not complete enough to be put in use, so this plan was discarded.
  - (2) (a) Cargo Carriers, M29 - A request was made to Army for a supply of these vehicles and a total of forty-seven (47) was furnished. These vehicles were formed into three provisional platoons and operated under the supervision of the A. C. of S., G-4. Personnel to operate these platoons were detached from organizations of the Division and attached to the 28th QM Co. The assignment of these vehicles to tactical units was based on the units mission and the terrain over which the operation was contemplated. Strict control was maintained by the Division in order to insure flexibility of action and proper supervision of maintenance.
    - (b) The mission for which these vehicles was requested was to expedite transport of supply and evacuation of personnel over terrain on which wheeled vehicles could not operate. The vehicles proved very satisfactory in the operation.
    - (c) Of the total 47 Cargo Carriers, M29, issued to the Division, 22 were lost in action with no opportunity for recovery, and 25 returned to Army.
  - (3) Overshoes, artic - The terrain over which the Division operated during the period 1 November 1944 thru 19 November 1944, was wooded and muddy, and the roads were generally trails and fire breaks, which necessitated that the men's feet be kept as dry as possible. The Division was short 9,000 pair of overshoes when it moved into the area. Although every effort was made to provide overshoes and to improvise methods to keep the men's feet dry, receipt of overshoes was not had from Army until 14 November 1944. The shortage of overshoes was a contributing factor to the tremendous number of casualties due to immersion feet.

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g. Condition of roads and circulation in area (See Annex 4).

1. Due to the lack of adequate roads in the Hurtgen Forest area, traffic circulation and maintenance of roads created a tactical as well as an administrative difficulty. In addition to the Regimental and Battalion traffic control posts, the Division operated several (11) traffic control stations and three roving patrols. Maintenance of all secondary roads. The secondary roads were narrow and muddy and as shown on the attached overlay were used as one way roads only.

4. a. In reviewing the operations of the 28th Infantry Division during the period 020900 A November 1944 to the time of its relief by the 8th Infantry Division, the following must be kept in mind if a true picture of the operation is to be obtained:

The mission assigned the 28th Infantry Division was as follows:

1. FO No 30, Hq, V Corps, 21 Oct 44.  
Relieve 9th Inf Div (less 47th Inf) on 25 & 26 October in sector and prepare to attack on Corps order to secure objective shown. (Overlay shows objective as area including Kommerscheidt and Schmidt).
2. Letter of Instructions (Supplementing FO No 30) Hq, V Corps, 23 Oct 44.  
To attack on Corps order (target date 1 Nov 44), to secure the high ground in the vicinity of Schmidt; to maintain contact with units of VII Corps on the North and South. When the Vossenack - Schmidt (FO432) - Schmidt (FO629) line is secured the Division to attack to Southwest and secure the general line: Lammersdorf - Rollesbroich - Strauch - Steckenborn.
3. Letter of Instructions, Hq, V Corps, 30 Oct 44.  
When the initial operations of the 28th Division have been completed, namely, securing the general line: Vossenack - Schmidt (See FO No 30) and (Letter of Instructions, 23 Oct 44), the operations outlined below will be undertaken.  
28th Inf Div: Hold the Vossenack - Schmidt line. Advance to the West and South and capture Steckenborn. Concurrently with this advance, attack to the South astride the Hurtgen - Rollesbroich road and clean up enemy resistance North of Rollesbroich. Prepare to take over defense of the Kesternich - Simmerath line after capture by elements of 5th Armored Division, while maintaining the security of the Vossenack - Schmidt - Steckenborn position.

b. Plans for accomplishing this mission were based on the following factors, generally agreed upon by all concerned:

1. The local battlefield was to be isolated by air action. This in turn would necessitate the weather being favorable for air action. An air plan was drawn up and approved by higher headquarters to accomplish this result.

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2. The capture of Schmidt would be an infantry action as the most intensive study of aerial photographs and other G-2 information failed to verify the existence of any road or trail across the Kall River between Vossenack and Schmidt. G-2 information indicated that there was little likelihood of enemy armor intervening in the attack, and that the enemy had no armor in the area. The enemy had, the location of such tanks, and the air support action planned as given in (1) above.
  3. Supply and evacuation of any force attacking Schmidt would be most difficult - at one time the use of an animal pack train was considered.
  4. One Regimental Combat Team would be required to clear the enemy from the Germeter - Hurtgen road and adjacent wooded areas to the clearing Southwest of Hurtgen. This for the purpose of providing a road and line of departure for the 4th Infantry Division, which was to be assembled in the northern part of the V Corps zone, in its forthcoming attack toward Hurtgen as part of VII Corps. This Combat Team was also considered necessary to protect the North flank of the Division as, from past enemy actions, the main hostile threat was considered to be from the North along the Hurtgen - Germeter road and to the West thereof.
  5. ~~Regimental Combat Team, attached artillery, and~~  
~~artillery of higher echelons available for support could not~~  
~~effectively neutralize hostile artillery and the observation afforded~~  
the enemy from the Hurtgen - Bergstein - Schmidt - Steckenborn ridges.
  6. The maintenance of the security of the Germeter - Vossenack - Kommerscheidt - Schmidt - Steckenborn road would require security forces of at least one battalion on the high ground E of Vossenack, and covering detachments along the Kall River road to cover the crossing of the Kall River; the road Bergstein - Freitscheidt - Schmidt; Harscheidt - Schmidt; and the road Hasenfeld - Schmidt.
- c. The plans adopted, the way the battle developed, and the results obtained are contained in the previous paragraphs of this report and the accompanying journals. The three decisive elements were:
1. The battle for Schmidt turned into an armored battle, beginning the morning of 4 November 1944, instead of the anticipated infantry battle. Success then depended on ability to defeat the enemy armor. The road Vossenack - Kommerscheidt could not sustain the traffic required to combat enemy armor.
  2. Weather on the whole was unfavorable for air action to isolate the battlefield.
  3. Artillery was unable to neutralize the hostile observation on the Hurtgen - Bergstein - Schmidt - Steckenborn ridges. When the enemy moved in large numbers of artillery pieces on and in

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the rear of these ridges, they possessed the capability of concentrating heavy direct fire on the only supply route available, and practically denied its use.

- d. The operation developed certain weak links in the training of the Division, both tactical and administrative. In general, however, my reaction as commander of the Division and its attached troops is expressed in the letter of commendation I sent to all officers and men of the Division and attached troops on 20 November 1944, and in the letter of commendation received from the Commanding General, V Corps, dated 21 November 1944. Copies of both these letters are attached hereto. A copy of a translated captured German account of one phase of the battle is also attached.

*Norman D. Cota*

NORMAN D. COTA,  
Major General, USA,  
Commanding

Incls - 3

- Incl # 1 - Ltr, Hq, V Corps, 21 Nov 44.  
Incl # 2 - Ltr, Hq, 28th Inf Div, 20 Nov 44.  
Incl # 3 - Translation of Captured German Document - 89th Div - "The Battle of Schmidt and Kommer-scheidt"

**SECRET**

64

HEADQUARTERS 28TH DIVISION ARTILLERY  
APO # 28, U. S. ARMY

RESTRICTED

4 December 1944

315/100

HEADQUARTERS & HEADQUARTERS BATTERY 28TH DIVISION ARTILLERY

UNIT REPORT - AFTER ACTION

FROM: 010001 A November 1944

TO : 302400 A November 1944

1. Enemy.

(a) See After Action Report, Headquarters 28th Infantry Division for period.

(b) See After Action Report, Headquarters 89th Infantry Division for period.

(c) Enemy activity during the period 1 November 1944 to 30 November 1944: This report will be divided into three parts to cover the operations of the Division.

PART ONE: Period 1 November to 7 November 1944 Incl.

PART TWO: Period 8 November to 14 November 1944 Incl.

PART THREE: Period 15 November to 18 November 1944 Incl.

PART FOUR: Period 19 November to 30 November 1944 Incl.

(1) (a) Order of battle at close of period:  
275th Artillery Regt (275th Inf Div)  
2 Battalions 105 LFH  
1 Battalion 150 SFH

189th Artillery Regt (89th Inf Div)  
1 Battalion 105 LFH

GHQ Artillery

(b) Strength:

The battalions of the 275th and 189th Artillery Regiments are thought to consist of 3 batteries of 3 howitzer sections each. It is thought that organic transportation is limited and that the guns cannot be readily displaced and will therefore rapidly lose their effectiveness once they have been located by counterbattery agencies.

GHQ Artillery is present in the SP assault guns of which about 18 are thought to be operating on the Division front and in the dual purpose. AA AT 88mm guns of which 8 are known to be in position around the Dam southeast of the city of Schmidt and which are capable of firing on our forward elements.

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(2) **Combat Efficiency:**

(a) **Methods:**

- (1) **Day -** Fires during daylight have been harassing, interdiction and neutralization of forward elements and areas. The enemy has concentrated on these elements and areas almost to the exclusion of long range interdiction and counter battery. Counter Battery has been conspicuous by its absence indicating that there is a lack of sound and flash ranging equipment and personnel or a lack of the necessary counterbattery artillery. The latter assumption is probably more correct because of the general absence of heavy caliber shelling anywhere on the front.
- (2) **Night -** Fires during the night have been harassing and interdiction. No counter-battery has been reported. Shelling at night by SPs has evidently been done from positions near prominent terrain features easily identified on the map and on equally easily identified points. This fire has of course been only harassing. Fires by the Division Artillery have been limited. Some long range interdiction of roads and towns has been fired by heavy guns from positions outside the Corps Zone.

(b) **Accuracy:**

Observed fires have been accurate and well placed. Unobserved fires have been relatively inaccurate.

(c) **Counter Battery:**

None reported.

- (5) **Summarizing** it may be that his fires have been confined to the target most dangerous to him; the infantry soldier who is taking over his territory and must be stopped at all costs. He has neither the equipment nor the ammunition to expend on long range targets unless a particularly profitable one presents itself. Our MSR is within easy range and yet receives relatively little shelling and he must know that is the only road of sufficient capacity to be used as such.

**PART TWO:**

- (1) (a) **Order of Battle at close of period:**

375th Artillery Regt  
129th Artillery Regt  
GHQ Artillery

(b) **Strength:**

Strength of the artillery listed in (a) above remained unchanged. During the period however, 146 AR and possibly 30 GHQ Tanks, operated in support of 116th Pz Div. 146 AR is known to consist of 3 Battalions 105 LFH 18 - 1 Battalion 105 K 18 - 1 Battery of 210mm Howitzers. During the operations of the Pz Div in our zone all of the 146 AR was in position with the possible exception of the 210mm Btry. Only one shellrep was turned in which gave 210mm as the caliber. It is therefore assumed that the organic battery was not present, but that this

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shelling, is as reported, as done by a 210mm How in position east of the river.

(c) Location:

No change in location of 189 AR was noted. Two batteries of 225th AR were forced out of position, NE of Brandenburg, by the flame bombing and it is probable that counter-battery forced the extensive use of alternate positions but no major change of position area was discernible. The batteries of 146 AR went into position in the vic of Gey - Grosshan. The GHQ Tanks fired from the Brandenburg - Bergstein and Harscheidt - Schmidt areas in their role as SP Artillery. The GHQ Tanks which accompanied the Inf Regts of 116th Pz Div were used as Inf support Tanks and as SP Arty and greatly increased the volume of fire brought to bear on the Vossenack Schmidt areas.

(2) Combat Efficiency:

(a) Methods:

(1.) Day - Again the enemy artillery concentrated on the forward elements of our infantry. Little real area harassing or counter-battery fire was reported. His counter-attacks died out as soon as he had secured the Schmidt Komersheidt area and the 116th Pz Div elements were withdrawn. The artillery of this Div remained in position for approximately 48 hours after the infantry was withdrawn.

(2.) Night - During the night the enemy again confined his fires to interdiction and harassing fires. His ammunition expenditures were very limited. Occasionally concentrations fell in or near battery positions but it is felt that these were interdiction of nearby MSR rather than counter-battery.

(3.) Accuracy - Observed fires were accurate and well placed. Unobserved fires were inaccurate and not well placed. It is estimated that approximately 50 rounds were fired in the vic of Rott without hitting at or near any BJ CR or installation. In one case 300 rounds were fired into an empty draw. Counter-Battery - None Reported.

(3) Summary - Again his artillery concentrated on our Infantry. As long as we held ground which was dangerous to his plan of defense he poured the fire of Tanks, SP guns and artillery on the leading elements. Once he had regained the ground he wanted, he withdrew his extra tanks and the Pz Div Arty. He is demonstrating more and more that he must conserve both ammunition and equipment and at the same time showing that he will expend both in almost unlimited quantities when faced with a threat to his defensive scheme. In other words it can never be assumed that, because he is faced with critical shortages in ammunition and equipment over the whole front, any penetration of his main defensive line will not immediately be countered with a violent and well coordinated counterattack heavily supported by artillery.

PART THREE:

(1) (a) Order of Battle at close of period.  
No change from 14 November 1944.

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(b) Strength:

There was a decrease in the strength of GHQ Tanks and SF Artillery active on the front. The withdrawal of the M VI Tanks which accompanied the Pz Gren Regts of 116th PZ Div apparently took place during night 12-16 Nov 1944 or possibly on the morning of 15 Nov 1944. This conclusion is drawn from the fact the last shellrep reported on 88mm fire was received as of 180450 A Nov. No shelling by calibers larger than 150mm was reported during the period. No Nebelwerfer fire was reported. The above leads to the conclusion that all artillery, other than the organic artillery of 275 & 89 Inf Div had withdrawn or shifted its fire to other friendly activity.

(c) Locations:

No change in the general position areas of 275 & 189 AR was noted from the previous period.

(2) Combat Efficiency:

Method:

There was an increase in the number of shellings on rear areas during the period. Shelling was light and scattered and seemed to have the characteristics of searching fire. Shelling of forward areas was also lighter. There was two relatively heavy concentrations of 105mm on Forward Elements. One of 83 rounds in 10 minutes and one of 28 rounds in 5 minutes. The heaviest shelling of rear areas was 20 rounds 105mm in 25 minutes.

Accuracy: Observed Fire - Good. Unobserved Fire - Poor.

Counter-Battery - None Reported.

PART FOUR:

(1) (a) Order of Battle at close of period:

26 AR (26 VG Div)  
353 AR (353 Inf Div)  
GHQ Artillery

(b) Strength:

(1) IPW gives the strength of the 26th AR as follows:

2 Lt Bns - Each 2 Batteries of 6 75mm G.  
1 Med Bn - 2 Batteries of 6 160mm LFH.  
1 Med Bn - 2 Batteries of 6 105 K 18.

(2) It is believed that the artillery of 353 Inf Div conforms to the standard Inf Div Artillery organizations as follows:  
3 or 3 Lt Bns each of 3 batteries of 3-105 How.  
1 Med Bn of 3 batteries of 3-150 How.

(3) GHQ Artillery is thought to be present in emplaced 105mm and 122mm field. Hows, which are manned, according to PW statement, by personnel of organic Division Artillery units holding a particular sector. These weapons do not move with the units but are passed on from unit to unit.

(c) The location of the organic Division Artillery is not known at this time. PW statements place the 3d Battalion 26 AR in the vic 8967 but checking against PI & CBI has not been completed.

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(2.) Combat Efficiency:

The lack of firing on the part of the enemy artillery precludes judging his combat efficiency or the accuracy of his fire.

(3.) Counter-Battery: 1 Counter-Battery mission reported of 10 rds. No damage.

(4.) Summary: The enemy has confined his firing to light scattered harassing and interdiction fires. One round hit and destroyed a 1/2 ton in Beaumont but this was believed to be an erratic round as no other firing has been reported in that area. The one counter-battery mission reported as fired on an old position, formerly occupied by another unit, and is believed to have been fired on the belief that it was being used rather than on a positive information that a battery was actually firing at the time.

(d) See "After Action Report", Headquarters 28th Infantry Division for period.

(e) See "After Action Report", Headquarters 28th Infantry Division for period.

2. Cav Situation

(a) See "After Action Report", Headquarters 28th Infantry Division for Period.

(b) See "After Action Report", Headquarters 28th Infantry Division for period.

(c) See "After Action Report", Headquarters 28th Infantry Division for period.

(a) 1 to 18 November 1944 Incl: CP located at BOTT, GERMANY. Coordinates P9226 0200, 0000, Central Europe, 1/100,000, Sheet # 7, ARLON. Artillery under centralized control.

19 to 28 November 1944 Incl: CP located at WILTZ, LUXEMBOURG. Coordinates P7048-5321, GSGS, Central Europe, 1/100,000, Sheet # 7, ARLON.

107th Field Artillery Battalion, Btry "D" 447th AAA AW Bn, Co "A" 630th Tank Destroyer Battalion (Towed) attached to 109th Infantry Regiment for operations only.

109th Field Artillery Battalion, Btry "A" 447th AAA AW Bn, Co "B" 630th Tank Destroyer Battalion (Towed) attached to 110th Infantry Regiment for operations only.

229th Field Artillery Battalion, Btry "C" 447th AAA AW Bn, Co "C" 630th Tank Destroyer Battalion (Towed) attached to 112th Infantry Regiment for operations only.

108th Field Artillery Battalion General Support.

697th Field Artillery Battalion attached to 110th Infantry Regiment for operations only.

32nd Cav. Ron. Sq. attached to 110th Infantry Regiment.

707th Tank Battalion supplemented Artillery Fires. (Coordination of Employment only).

28 to 30 November 1944 Incl: CP located at WILTZ, LUXEMBOURG, Coordinates P7048-5321, GSGS, Central Europe, 1/100,000, Sheet # 7, ARLON.

107th Field Artillery Battalion, Btry "D" 447th AAA AW Battalion, Co "A" 630th Tank Destroyer Battalion attached to 109th Infantry Regiment for operations only.

109th Field Artillery Battalion, Btry "A" 447th AAA AW Battalion, Co "B" 630th Tank Destroyer Battalion in Direct Support of 110th Infantry Regiment,

and 32nd Cav. Ron. Sq.

229th Field Artillery Battalion, Btry "C" 447th AAA Av Bn, Co "C" 630th Tank Destroyer Battalion attached to 118th Infantry Regiment for operations only.

108th Field Artillery Battalion General Support.

Operations only.

ATTACHEMENTS: 1 to 30 November 1944. (Entire Period).

630th TD Bn (T)

447th AAA Av Bn.

ATTACHMENTS: (Various times during period).

Co "C" 86th Cml Bn, attached 29 Oct 1944.

Co "A" 801st TD Bn (SP) attached 7 Nov 1944.

86th Cml Bn (-3 Cos) attached 7 Nov 1944.

42nd Field Artillery Battalion attached 7 Nov 1944.

687th Field Artillery Battalion attached 18 Nov 1944.

REINFORCEMENTS:

893rd TD Bn (-) Reinforced fires of Div Arty.

Co "A" 630th TD Bn (Supplements fires of 107th FA Bn.)

Co "B" 630th TD Bn (Supplements fires of 109th FA Bn.)

Co "C" 630th TD Bn (Supplements fires of 229th FA Bn.)

893rd TD Bn (-) Reinforced fires of Div Arty.

28th Div Arty Reinforced by 187th FA Group from 1 to 18 Nov.

187th FA Bn 155 mm Howitzer.

952nd FA Bn 155 mm Howitzer.

Co "C" 86th Cml Bn relieved from attachment 4 Nov '44.

Btry "A" 927th FA Bn relieved from attachment 9 Nov '44.

42nd FA Bn relieved from attachment 10 Nov '44.

Co "A" 801st TD Bn relieved from attachment 11 Nov '44.

86th Cml Bn (-3 Cos) relieved from attachment 11 Nov '44.

76th FA Bn relieved from attachment 18 Nov '44.

893rd TD Bn (-Co "A") relieved from attachment 18 Nov '44.

GENERAL:

1 to 8 Nov 1944 incl.

During this period the Arty supported all attacks, firing on all targets of opportunity and conducted a highly active harassing program at night.

The Div Arty prior to the day of attack to capture Schmidt, engaged in a "softening up" program, concentrating on counter-battery, supply dumps, OP's, avenues of approach, strong points and upon towns being used by the enemy.

The attack scheduled for 020900 A November 1944 was preceded by a 1-hour preparation and followed by 1 hour of scheduled supporting fires, by the division artillery assisted by Corps Artillery and reinforced by guns of the 630th TD Bn, 707th Tank Battalion and 893rd TD Bn.

Co "C" 86th Cml Bn smoked the Schmidt Ridge from H-hour until dark.

After H-hour the direct support battalions fired missions on call from the Infantry while the remainder continued on the scheduled supporting fires until H-hour(+ 1). The Division Artillery (including Tks & TD's) fired during the period, a total of 64 counter-battery missions, 1437 harassing missions, 1596 Target of opportunity expending a total of 46,035 rounds during the period.

- 6 - **RESTRICTED**

55

7 to 16 November 1944 Incl:

During this period the Arty was engaged primarily in protecting the Infantry so as to obtain the objectives that had been taken. Most Arty missions were Defensive Fires and Harassing Fires. Numerous local counter-attacks were driven back by Artillery fire.

During this period the Artillery fired a total of 58 counter-Battery missions, 3451 Harassing Missions, 1031 Target of opportunity, and Defensive Fires expending a total of 49169 rounds.

17 to 30 November 1944 Incl:

The Div Arty displaced to VIII Corps Sector by Combat Teams during the period 15 to 19 November 1944. The Div Arty, during period of 17 to 21 November 1944, was occupied in the planning and coordinating of defensive fires as well as selecting more suitable locations for OP's so that observation would be along the entire front and all observation would be coordinated.

The Div Arty conducted a planned and active harassing program. Due to visibility, targets of opportunity were few. However, on the observed missions, the effect was generally good.

Div Arty fired during the period a total of 2 counter-battery missions, 954 harassing missions, 174 targets of opportunity expending a total of 8962 rounds of ammunition.

The Div Arty fired (during entire period fr 010600 to 300600 November 1944) a total of 119 counter-battery missions, 954 harassing missions, 2801 targets of opportunity for a grand total of 3762 missions, expending a grand total of 104,156 rounds during the entire period.

(g) See "After Action Report", Headquarters 28th Infantry Division for period.

(f) See "After Action Report", Headquarters 28th Infantry Division for period.

Summary of Air Operations 1 to 30 November 1944:

Total number of hours flown by all aircraft during the month: 22415

Total number of aircraft lost or salvaged during the month: None.

Number and Type of Missions flown during the month:

Adjustment of Fire - - - - -	27
Reconnaissance (Combat) - - - - -	87
Night (Combat) - - - - -	0
Others (Combat) - - - - -	0
Training - - - - -	0
Administrative - - - - -	13

3. Administrative:

(a) 20 Officers; 1 Warrant Officer; 103 Enlisted Men. Attached: 1 Officer and 3 Enlisted Men (Anti-Tank Subsection). No replacements received during the period; Two (2) on requisition at conclusion of the period.

(b) Casualties:

- a. Killed - None
- b. Wounded & injured - None
- c. Sick & gassed - 1 EM sick, evacuated, NBC.
- d. Captured - None
- e. Missing - None

(c) None.

(d) Normal.

(e) See Administrative Orders, Headquarters 28th Infantry Division for same period.

(f) Rations drawn daily, two days emergency rations on hand. Ammunition drawn continuously to maintain Basic Combat Load. Gas and oil drawn daily.

(g) See Unit Report, Headquarters 28th Infantry Division for same period.

For the Commanding General:

EDWARD L. STROHBEHN  
Colonel, FA  
Executive.

RECORDED

VOSSENACK-KOMMERSCHIEDT-SCHMIDT  
(2-9 November 1944)

Company A, 707th Tk.Bn.(M).

Interview with: Capt. Bruce M. Hestrup, Co.C.O.  
1/Lt. Raymond E. Fleig, 1st platoon leader  
2/Lt. Richard H. Payne, 3rd platoon leader.

Place: A Company CP, Reetgen, Germany. 14 November 1944

All of the above officers were with the forward group which was cut off in Kommerscheidt with elements of the 112th and later 110th Inf (3rd Bn) for approximately three days. "A" Company was the only tank unit to cross the draw between Vossenack and Kommerscheidt and furnish close support in the disastrous attack of the 112th Inf. Regiment on the town of Schmidt. Lt. Fleig was in command of the 9 operational tanks during most of the period, 4-9 November.

2/Lt. Rahn J. Clark, the 2nd platoon leader, was injured in action on the 4th of November.

Overlay: 1/25,000 sheet 5304.

Interviewer: Captain John S. Howe (V Corps)

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Capt. Hestrup

"A" Company was initially assigned to a reserve position in the Gemeter Area. Its mission was to support by fire the attack of the 2nd Bn 112th Infantry and "C" Company of the 707th Tk Bn on the town of Vossenack, to guard against a possible counterattack from Hurtgen and the NE, and, lastly, to be prepared to support the attack of the 1st and 3rd Bns, 112th Infantry on the town of Schmidt.

At about 1800 hours on 2 November, I was called to the CP of the 112th Inf and told that A company was to support the attack of the 3rd Bn 112th on 3 November with the mission of first taking and securing the town of Kommerscheidt, then driving on to seize, consolidate and establish road blocks in the town of Schmidt. I then met Lt. Col Flood, CO of the 3rd Bn 112th and we made detailed plans for the attack.

This was the plan: The infantry were to use the NS road through Gemeter as an IP. They were to cross this IP at 0700 hours, 3 November. K Company on the right, leading in column of platoons. L company on the left and about 300-400 yards to the rear of K Company. The companies were to maintain this relative position until they reached the vicinity of the church in Vossenack. When they reached this point, K company was to

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28

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

A Company 707th Tk.Bn.(M)

halt and reorganize while L company moved up to and abreast of them. Then the two companies were to change direction and attack to the south, abreast, K company on the right across country to take Kemmerscheidt. (This will have to be checked against the material obtained from the 112th Infantry by Capt.Fax.† Capt.Hostrup, after the interview was all finished stated that he was not positive that he had the relative positions of K and L companies absolutely correct.)

The tanks were to be deployed roughly as follows: 3rd platoon in support of K company. 2nd platoon in support of L Company. The 1st platoon was to be held in mobile reserve and follow the other two platoons by approximately 400 yards.

The two assault platoons of tanks were to leapfrog each other in support of the assaulting infantry, sheeting into the draw north of Vessenack where there were still some German ~~infantry~~ infantry and mortars reported. Also, if necessary, into building in the town of Vessenack proper. (This because the leading infantry which had previously taken Vessenack on the 2nd of November...2nd Bn 112th...had reported the presence of snipers in the western end of town.)

When the attack halted to allow the infantry to reorganize and change direction, the tanks were to pass through them and lead out across the high ground south of Vessenack, assist in cleaning out any Germans from dug in positions on the nose of this hill, proceed as close as possible to the woods line on the forward slope of this nose, and fire into the woods until the infantry had passed through them. Then the tanks were to pull back to positions on the higher ground from which they could fire into Kemmerscheidt fire until they could see the infantry going over the top of the hill immediately north of the town. (I asked Capt. Hostrup what means of communication they planned to use as a 'cease fire' order when the infantry reached the forward area. He said that they had planned to rely mainly on visual means. In addition however, the assault companies were to lay wire as they advanced. If necessary this line would be used to give the cease fire order to the tanks. They did not plan to make use of pyrotechnics. JSH)

This part of the plan went nearly according to plan. The infantry moved out

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A Company, 707th Tk.Bn(M)

in platoon column, about 5 yards between men, reached Vossenack with no resistance and reorganized. The tanks pulled ahead onto the nose of the high ground south of Vossenack and fired into the woods until the infantry had passed through them. (One platoon, the 2nd, under Lt. Clark, went considerably farther to the eastern end of town than was apparently planned before it attempted to turn south. The firing of this platoon caused considerable concern among the tanks of C company. Lt. Clark's tank struck a mine about 300 yards east of the church...See interview with C company 707th.)

Then the tanks pulled back up onto the high ground south of Vossenack and fired over into Kemmersheidt. We lifted our fire about 1100 when we saw the infantry going up the high ground on the other side of the draw. They were in good formation. A double line of skirmishers. There appeared to be almost no enemy resistance aside from spasmodic artillery and/or mortar fire. Control of the infantry at that point appeared to be excellent.

As soon as we had crossed the road leading south from Vossenack we began to draw some mortar fire. Artillery fire for about a half an hour (0800-0830) was almost nonexistent. Then it began to increase.

When we lifted our fire about 1100, we took as much defilade as was possible on the nose of the high ground south of Vossenack. There, we waited for word from the engineers that the road through the draw was passable.

At about 1700, word came from Lt.Cel.Ripple, our Bn CO, and not directly from the Engineers as I had understood it was to come, that the engineers had sent word the road was passable. Having seen this road earlier in the day, I doubted that it was passable. So, I took one of my tanks and started down this road into the draw. When I had gone about a quarter of the way past the point where the road enters the woods, and northern end of the draw, darkness had begun to set in. The tank was having great difficulty remaining on the road which was very slippery. The left shoulder of the road, sloping towards the draw, kept giving away. The road was about nine feet wide. So was the tank. There were rocky formations jutting out of the bank on the right side of the road. The

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A Company, 707th Tk.Bn (M)

tank slipped and nearly went off the left bank down into the draw. I decided to halt. Backed the tank out of there and returned to the high ground where the rest of the tanks had remained.

I then reported to Col. Ripple that the road was still impassable. He told me to stand by while he called this information on to higher headquarters. Shortly after this, about 1900, he called me back to tell me that the engineers were coming to work on the road all night. I was to be ready to move through and into Kemmerscheidt and Schmidt at dawn the next morning, 4 November.

We remained in these positions for the night. Considerable enemy artillery and mortar fire fell in the area. Several of the tanks received direct hits. Aside from having sirens and headlights and other minor fixtures blown off, and personal gear such as bed rolls, shelter halves, etc., perforated or torn, no tank suffered material damage.

Up to this time, we had lost three of our 16 tanks. One, the tank of Lt. Clark, had struck a mine in the eastern end of Vossenack and had had to be abandoned. A second tank had thrown a track in the draw north of Vossenack. A third tank had gotten bellied on a sharp ridge on the hill south of Vossenack. We had hoped to retrieve this latter tank with a T-2 retriever during the night, but the heavy enemy artillery and mortar fire prevented us from moving around in the open. That left us with 13 tanks immediately available for use the next morning.

4 November: At about 0500, we started forward. The 1st platoon was to lead out along the road into the draw supported by fire from the other two platoons into possible AT positions which might have been by-passed by the infantry in the vicinity of Kemmerscheidt. As seen as this 1st platoon had reached the high ground just North of Kemmerscheidt, it was to hold up and wait for the balance of the company to come forward.

At about 0530, Lt. Fleig leading, the 1st platoon started. As Fleig reached the entrance to the draw road (046318) his tank struck a mine and threw a track. This, after the engineers had 2 1/2 hours earlier reported the road to be clear of mines. Lt Fleig reported this to me over his radio. I told him to get that tank clear of the road. We HAD

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A Company, 707th Tk.Bn.(1

to go through.

Lt. Fleig:

My tank, which had thrown a track when it struck the mine, partially blocked the road. I tried to drive the second tank around it, but it got stuck on the steep, slippery slope down from the left shoulder of the road. My platoon sgt - S/sgt. Anthony R. Spenser thought of a method by which we might be able to get around the "dead" tank. He took a tow cable from the dead tank, and hitched it to the 2nd tank. Using the dead tank as a pivot, he winched the 2nd tank around it and back onto the road. I told him to take charge of the other tanks and get them around. He repeated this process and successfully winched all the other three tanks of the platoon around the dead tank.

Meanwhile, as soon as the 2nd tank had been cleared, I continued on down the road into the draw. The sharp bends in the road, (which had not been shown up by previous map study..either on the 1/25,000 or the 1/10,000 which were made later in the operation) necessitated a good deal of stopping and backing. I could see that my tank was tearing away part of the left shoulder of the road, but did not think at the time that it was doing sufficient damage to hold up any of the remaining tanks. I got down through the draw ~~xxxx~~ crossed the narrow stone bridge and started up the other side of the draw road without much difficulty. However, at the three switchbacks it was necessary for me to dismount and lead my tank around. It required much backing and hauling to negotiate these turns. From these, I led my tank, on foot, nearly to the top of the hill north of Kemmerscheidt. Here, after a hasty visual reconnaissance of the situation, things appeared fairly quiet. I mounted the tank and went right down the road into town arriving there about 0730-0800, just in time, I found out to support a partial withdrawal of elements of the 3rd Bn 112th Inf from Schmidt.

As soon as possible, I reported to Maj. Wade Haislep, CO of the 1st Bn at his CP in Kemmerscheidt. I told what I had with me and that I expected the rest of the company to join me before noon. He gave me the situation, a German counterattack had pushed part of the 3rd Bn out of Schmidt, and asked me to take up positions from which I could support

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37

A Company, 707th Tk.Bn(M)

the withdrawal from Schmidt. I took up firing positions in the woods at the southwestern outskirts of town(053307). ~~about~~ About 0930-1000, S/Sgt. Speener with two more tanks joined me. I placed these two additional tanks in the partial defilade near mine with fields of fire into the town of Schmidt.

At about 1100, the Germans counterattacked with infantry and tanks. 10 enemy tanks were reported in Schmidt, but Speener and I saw only five. We engaged these. My tank knocked out two Mark IV's. Speener and the other tank crew knocked out a third Mark IV.

At the peak of the scrap, one of my men called my attention to the fact that the infantry were retreating on the left flank of Kemmerscheidt. Realizing that something was up, I moved over to the loved flank. Looking through an orchard on the eastern outskirts of the town, I spotted a Mark V (Panther) going into position. I fired and hit him with 2 rounds of HE. Then I discovered that I had no more AP ammunition available for the gun. It was all in the spensen rack. I ceased firing and turned the turret to get at the rack. While I was doing this, the German crew bailed out of their tank. I took a couple of minutes getting the ammunition. The German crew re-entered their tank and opened fire. By that time, we had our AP. We opened fire. We scored four hits. The first one cut the barrel of his gun. The other three tore upon the entire left side of the hull of the German tank and set it afire. None of that crew escaped.

I remained in this position for a short while, as I expected that more enemy tanks might try to come in on this left flank. Meanwhile, the other two tanks of my platoon were having a sharp fight with some enemy tanks, so I went over to support them.

This German counterthrust, was beaten back by about 1300. We spent the remainder of the afternoon, firing on two pillboxes west of Schmidt which the Germans were attempting to reoccupy.

We could not fire into Schmidt. We were told by the 1st Bn C<sup>o</sup> that part of M Company of the 3rd Bn was still in town.

About 1500, 8 P-47's came over and bombed and strafed the town. Right after this our infantry came running out of Schmidt in sizeable groups. Some of them apparently

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33

A Company, 707th Tk.Bn.(M)

did not stop at Kammershheidt. (See Hestrup a bit below here.)

About 1700, I received an order from Col. Petersen, CO of the 112th Inf, not to withdraw my tanks for servicing, but to secure these present firing positions with the aid of infantry support. He told me he expected an enemy counterattack that night with tanks using headlights to dazzle, blind and rattle our infantry. He was also very concerned that the infantry would pull out, with or without orders, if we withdrew even our small tank force. (Still only three tanks.)

The night was, however, free from counterattack, but we received almost continuous artillery and mortar fire from several directions. I moved my tank into the shelter of the buildings in Kammershheidt, partly for cover, and partly to tie in better with the infantry. (According to the reports of medical officer... attached to all this material on this operation... several A company tanks were at times parked right around the building which was used as an aid station. Lt. Fleig was unaware of this.)

#### Capt. Hestrup

Immediately after Lt. Fleig had radioed me of the damage to his tank, I left my tank and proceed on foot to the south of the draw. There I found that Sgt. Spooner had successfully winched the remaining three tanks of the platoon around the dead tank and started down the road into the draw. Walking down this road, from north to south, I first came across a tank commandeered by S/Sgt Markey. His tank was slipping off the left shoulder of the road. One track was beginning to slip off. I gave him a few instructions. He started to back up onto the road. I continued on down the road about 100 yards to the next tank. This was the one commanded by Sgt. Spooner. He had been going along all right but had stopped because the tank in front had slipped off to the left side of the road while trying to negotiate a tricky turn past an outcropping of rock in the bank on the right hand side of the road. I walked ahead to that tank and found that it was commandeered by S/Sgt. Barten. One track had been partially thrown. I decided that we could get that tank back onto the road and fix the track by using Sgt. Spooner's tank to pull it back. We did that. Then by using Sgt. Spooner's tank as an anchor, Barten managed to pull his tank ahead around this bad corner in the road. Then, we shifted the tow cable

A Company, 707th Tk.Bn (M),

to Barton's tank. He in turn pulled Spooner around the bend in the road.

Lt. Fleig had radioed me that he had gotten through. I assumed that the rest of the road must be passable. I ordered Spooner to take charge of these tanks and get them through to Kemmerscheidt as rapidly as possible where he was to report to Fleig.

I then contacted an engineer Lt. (name not known) whose platoon was then working on the road about 100 yards south of this bad spot and asked him if he could blow that projecting rock off. He said that he couldn't...that he had no demolitions. We hunted around for a few minutes and found three German Teller Mines which had previously been removed by the Engineers, and used these. The small amount of explosive did little more than blow the sharpest projection of this rock. (Hostrup said later that what the engineers really needed here was either a compressed air drill or a large amount of TNT to do the job properly. About five minutes after this, S/Sgt. Markey with the last tank of the 1st platoon, came down the road. With the help of the engineer platoon, we got him around the bad corner and I sent him on his way to join Lt. Fleig.

While we were helping Markey, the 2nd platoon started to come down the road. The leading tank was commanded by S/Sgt. Zarelsinski. Riding with him, I found out later, was Lt. Clark, whose tank had been knocked out by a mine in Veesenack the preceding day. They reached Fleig's dead tank. But did not know of the winching process used by Spooner. (Hostrup was not in a position to see all this himself. It was reported to him a few minutes later by S/Sgt. Allen) They attempted to go around the dead tank but slipped off the road and were unable to back up owing to the steep and slippery decline. They dismounted from the tank. Almost immediately, enemy artillery or mortar shells landed nearby, killing Zarelsinski and wounded Clark. S/Sgt. Allen, commanding the third tank in the platoon, ~~was~~ (this was the 2nd tank in line now that Clark's tank had been knocked out) came forward on foot and reported this incident to me. He explained the positions of the tanks and said that he believed that he could squeeze through between the two, using Zarelsinski's tank as a buffer to prevent his (Allen's) tank from sliding down into the draw. I told him to go ahead and try it. He went back, got his own through, put Sgt. Yarnon in charge, then led his own tank through and dismounted it.

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A Company, 707th Tk.Bn (.

~~through the tank~~ He went back and led the next tank in the platoon, commanded by S/Sgt. Yarmon, successfully through. Then he remounted his own tank and started forward, getting through between the two 'dead' tanks in the same manner.

Yarmon came down the road. When his tank reached the bad corner, it slipped off the road to the left and threw the left track. Allen, didn't know this. He led his tank past the two disabled tanks at the entrance to the draw road. When he reached a point about 150 yards behind Yarmon, his tank slipped off the road to the left and threw both tracks. He(Allen) came down and reported this to me in the vicinity of Sgt.Yarmon's tank. At about the same time, Sgt.Markey came up to tell me that he had gotten stuck in the bottom of the draw. His tank had also thrown one track.

I made a survey. Markey's tank could not be pulled out unless someone could get into a position directly behind him. This was impossible owing to the steep bank off the road at that point. I decided that Allen's tank, minus both its tracks, could not be made operational without regular maintenance. That we did not have with us. However, with the aid of the engineer platoon, the right bank of the road past Allen's tank could be dug away sufficiently to allow other traffic to pass.

This was about 1100.(4 Nov). I sent word back to Lt. Payne to take command of the tanks remaining on the high ground south of Vessenack and to remain there until further notice.

We started to work immediately on Sgt.Yarmon's tank. During the course of the afternoon we replaced the track. Yarmon pulled ahead about ten feet and again threw the track. This time damaging the left idler wheel. Lacking maintenance, and with the tank still blocking the road, we again replaced the track and hoped that it would stay put. Yarmon moved ahead another 15 feet or so and again the track jumped off. By this time it was about 1600. Major Jack C. Fish, Bn S-3(707th) came down into the draw to see what was holding us up and to find out why more of the badly needed tank support had not gotten through to Kemmerscheidt. After looking around he told me we were doing everything possible and that he would report same to Col.Ripple. At this time, about 1615, we noticed an abnormal number of men coming back up the ~~draw~~ Vessenack.

36

A Company, 707th Tk. Bn (

We stopped a few of these men and asked them who they were and what had happened. They said that they belonged to the 3rd Bn (Hestrup did not remember them saying which company) part of the 112th and said that they were retreating from Schmidt. All they could talk about was enemy tanks and having been hit by our own air strike. Major Fish made a note of this. However, before we could report it, we met Lt. Col. Flood CO of this Bn. He gave us much the same story and said that he was back trying to reorganize his men.

Major Fish and I then went up out of the draw to one of our tanks which had a radio transmitter. We reported the above incidents to Col Ripple and told him that the draw road looked as he might imagine the Burma road to look in flood season: That if more tanks were to get through to Kemmersheidt, more engineers were needed and soon.

Col. Ripple then ordered me to return to the draw to help and hurry the engineers who were already there...that more Engineers would be up during the night. I then contacted the Engineer Lt. and told him that the road had to BE FIXED! (Capt. Hestrup has neglected in part of this narrative to bring out the fact that some artillery and mortar fire was falling in this general vicinity making work slow and tedious. It was purely interdictory fire for the most part, but it had the effect of keeping our men pinned to the ground at the very time when all cautions should have been abandoned.)

At about 1730, I received a radio message from Col. Ripple that there would be more engineers down shortly. I was to be prepared to take the rest of the company through at dawn the next day. Maintenance crews for the tanks were on the way.

About 1900, 1/Lt. Stanley Lisy, "A" Co. Maintenance Officer and his crew, accompanied by the Bn Maintenance Officer, Capt. George C. Harris, joined me at Yarmen's tank. Lisy immediately put his crew to work. By 2200 they had the track back on again. The tank moved ahead about 25 yards and off came the track again. Wethen broke the track which had become twisted. Lisy sent two men up to Lt. Fleig's tank. They removed the good idler from this tank, came back, replaced the damaged idler on Yarmen's tank and put on a new track. By this time it was about midnight. Capt. Pinchen, the Bn S-4, pulled up in back of Yarmen's tank with his supply train. He brought a message from Col. Ripple. "Holiday 6 (Gen. Norman D. Cota) wants to give you all the time possible to get your vehicles,

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A Company, 707th Tk. Bn (M)

BUT, that main supply route must be open by daybreak. If necessary, you will roll your immobilized tanks down the slope and into the draw."

Upon receiving this message, we renewed our efforts to repair the tank. By 0200, we had gotten the track back on the tank. It started forward...moved about 10 yards. The left shoulder of the road gave way and again off came the track. By this time everyone of us was ready to pull out his hair, root by root. I decided that if Pinchen's supply train were to get through that night, we would have tes top working on the tanks and get them off the road.

I ordered Sgt. Allen to fasten his tow cable to some trees and pull his tank as far off the road to the left as possible. We took two tow cables and fastened them to Yarmen's tanks and some trees and pulled it as far off the left bank as possible. We had to do some digging on the right bank to make sufficient room for vehicles to pass. Markey's tank in the bottom of the draw we left where it was since we figured that vehicles could get around it by using the switchback. This cleared the MSR. The supply started through. (For its difficulties see interview with Capt. Pinchen and Lt. Rogers...attached.)

5 Nov I then walked up the road and rejoined Lt. Payne, remaining there for about 1 1/2 hours. About 0600, 5 November, I went back down into the draw and learned that the engineers had gotten two bulldozers in to the area, and had cut away enough of the right bank so that the road was passable. I then went back to bring forward the rest of the company. On the way, I met 1/Lt. Leonard, (leader 1st platoon C.Co. #93rd TD Bn SP) who was just starting to take his platoon down the road into the draw. (Two platoons of TD's...7 M-10's went through in the morning and 2 TD's of the 3rd platoon went through in the afternoon); I believe that he went on through with no great difficulty. (One of the M-10's had thrown a track in attempting to get out of its bivouac area just near the entrance to the draw road. See Interview with Capt. Marion C. Pugh, CO C.Co.)

About 0700, I started forward with my 3rd platoon, now 3 tanks, the two remaining tanks of the 2nd platoon and my own command tank. I incorporated the 2 tanks of the 2nd platoon into the 3rd to give Lt. Payne a full platoon.

A company, 707th Tk.Bn(M)

Lt. Payne led the way going down into the draw. I brought up the rear of the column. This time we experienced very little difficulty in negotiating the tricky road. Lt. Payne, with the leading tanks, reached the edge of the woods on the reverse slope of the hill north of Komerscheidt about 0900.

He was in radio contact with Lt. Fleig. I, at that time was still only about 100 yards past the bridge. Because of the hill mass, I could not reach Fleig by radio. We set up a communication net or chain: - Hestrup to Payne to Fleig and reverse. Fleig radioed Payne to remain under cover in the woods as a friendly air strike was expected on Schmidt about 100-1100. He was not sure of the time. (The Air Support Party's journal gives no concrete report of an air strike on Schmidt at that hour..by Armed Reconnaissance being flown in the area did report having struck at tanks in that general area...see journal for ASP attached to materials on this action.) Payne notified me of this.

I then sent word to Fleig, that since he was in a commanding position, he should take command of all tanks there until such time as I could join him. My tank had stopped and refused to start. Something happened to the motor. (No more explicit information was vouchsafed on that latter point.)

About 1130, Col. Petersen sent word via Fleig that he wanted me to join him at his CP at (04853130) at about 1600 hours. I remained in position where I was since the tank would not budge.

About 1530, Fleig sent word again via Payne, for me to come ahead in my tank to the Regt CP and that he would meet me on route. By this time, my driver had gotten the tank started. I continued up the draw road and met Fleig in his tank about 150 yards from the 112th CP. Together we continued on the this CP. Col. Petersen then ordered me to remain in the vicinity of his CP so that he could have the use of my radio for emergency communication. He also told me to order Fleig and Payne to remain on the high ground in the vicinity of Komerscheidt. The town was to be held "at all cost." these were his orders from Gen. Cota. I remained at the CP as directed until this German counterattack came down the draw from the NE, cutting our supply route about 0330, 6 Nov. I found out later that for that night and the next two night, the German key's tank in

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139

A Company, 707th Tk. Bn (.

the draw as a meeting place. Markey had remained in his tank. He told me after our withdrawal that he had several times heard the Germans outside his tank, talking and laughing, peering it here and there but making no effort to examine the inside of the tank.

Colonel Petersen decided that his move by the Germans had brought them much too close to the Regtl CP. So he moved it forward to the same location as that of the 1st Bn in Komerscheidt. We arrived thereabout 0500. (6 November.)

Lt. Payne:

When we started off the morning of the 5th, I led out. We had some difficulty negotiating the switchbacks on the both sides of the draw but got through without mishap. We moved very slowly. During most of this time we were under intermittent mortar and artillery fire. About 3/4 of the way up the hill towards RJ053315), we caught up to the TD's. The leading TD under Lt. McElroy had received a direct hit by enemy artillery and thrown a track. We sat there in the road for nearly an hour. Finally Lt. Leonard came back and asked me to lead out. He pulled his vehicles off the road into the woods. I ordered my other four tanks to wait in position. I then went forward, past the TDs and halted in the woods just below the crest of the hill. From this position I radioed Fleig and asked for direction to his positions. He told me to take cover and stay put until he called for me as a friendly air strike was expected shortly. I moved my tank off the road and into the woods placing it next to a TD. While waiting for word from Fleig, I was surprised to see the rest of my tanks come forward. I dismounted, halted them and moved them off the road and under cover.

About 1230, (Payne was not at all certain of the time,) there was an air strike in Schmidt.) (This is not shown in the ASP journal. However, the ASP Officer, Maj. Howiser stated that it might have occurred. He had been unable to maintain radio contact with the planes flying Armed Reconnaissance.) Shortly after this, Lt. Fleig called me by radio and told me to come ahead to Komerscheidt, staying off the road to the right as I moved south. I led my platoon down into the western edge of town where I met Lt. Fleig. He told me to take over his positions and he moved over onto the left flank of the town. We took over his previous positions and remained there for the balance of the afternoon

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A Company, 707th Tk.Bn (1

noon, occasionally pulling up to the crest of the hill, firing a few rounds of HE into Schmidt and then pulling back into covered positions. About 1730, we moved around into the shallow draw just north of the town. During the night, Capt. Pinchen came up with some weasels bringing a small amount of gasoline and rations and water.

At about 0530, 6th November, I sent three of my tanks back to the gas dump NW of the town for re-fueling. When these had gassed up, they returned and we took over positions on both right and left flank of the town to relieve Lt. Fleig and his other two tanks who then went back to refuel.

About 0900, 6 November, the Germans launched another counterattack with about 3 tanks and some infantry. (None of these interviewed knew how many). This attack was broken up by our artillery, supported by our tanks and the TD's. During the entire day, we were under observed artillery fire from positions almost all around us. We were on a forward slope, as was the infantry who were dug in on the forward slope. The enemy had virtually unrestricted observation from the higher ground in Schmidt, Harscheidt to the south and south east, and from Bergstein and Burtgen to the east and North. As a result, we had to continually move around and change our positions to prevent being registered in on by either enemy artillery or high velocity weapon (tank, TD's or AT guns) which could place direct fire on us. (This constant movement created a heavy drain on the small amounts of gasoline available. However, from presently available information none of the Tks were prevented from functioning during the short period in Kemmerscheidt because of lack of gas.)

That night, we remained in and around the buildings in the town. Three of the tanks pulled back into the shallow draw just north of the town. Lt. Fleig sent two of his tanks to the rear. They had suffered direct hits during the day. The turrets of both had become jammed as a result.

Tuesday morning, 7 November, a strong enemy attack began with tanks and infantry. I counted about 10 tanks. I spotted a German tank coming around the western end of Kemmerscheidt. Shell fragments the previous day had damaged the elevating mechanism of my gun. I was unable to depress it sufficiently to engage the German tank.

A Company, 707th Ik.Bn(M)

We did register two hits on his turret but the tank kept on coming. I hollered to the TD's which hadn't yet seen this German tank to 'get on him." They spotted it after a couple of minutes and each placed two rounds right into the German tank. It backed out. We saw it no more.

About 0900, our infantry started falling back on the left flank. They yelled to us that a german tank attack was coming in from that direction. I took my tank and two others and moved over to the left flank (eastern part of Kemmerscheidt) to ward off this threat. As soon as we started to move, German artillery opened fire on us. I pulled my tank over the crest out of the shallow draw, and spotted a Tiger Tank in among the houses in the eastern end of the town. I called for S/Sgt. Lipe who was commanding one of the other tanks to come up on my right flank and engage this tank. He opened fire on the German tank and hit it with his first round of AP. German artillery and high velocity weapon fire was coming in damned close to me so I pulled my tank back into the protection of the shallow draw, radioing Lipe to do likewise. Apparently he did not hear me. Another German tank started coming through the center of the town between a couple of houses. Sgt. Lipe engaged it, hit it, but in turn had his own tank knocked out. S/Sgt Olsen's tank on Lipe's right was knocked out by German artillery or AT fire. Lipe dismounted from his tank and took over a tank destroyer whose crew leader had either been killed or wounded, and stayed with it firing at the Germans until the TD itself was knocked out. We were forced to withdraw from Kemmerscheidt. I first withdrew to the woods immediately to the west of the town, but when artillery started registering in on this area, I moved north to the vicinity of (052317).

There I dismounted from my tank and found my way on foot to the Regtl CP for instructions. I met col. Ripple there. He told me that we would have to stay with our tanks and slug it out. He had been ordered to hold the position at All Costs. I returned to my crew. Shortly thereafter, I received a radio message from Col. Ripple that an enemy tank was coming into our position ~~and~~ on the left flank and that I was to move forward to engage it. I started up out of the woods, but my tank would not pull

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42

A Company 707th Tk.Bn(M)

(Payne) ---- up the grade. I tried to go back through the woods. My tank got bellied on a ridge in the ground and there was a track. I radioed this bad news to Col. Ripple and told him that I didn't think we could fix the tank during daylight, but that we might try it after dark. I then had my crew dismount and take up infantry positions, after they had removed and taken with them various parts of the guns. We did not at that time destroy the guns, because we hoped to return to the tank and make use of it. We had left about 14 rounds of HE and 1 round of AP ammunition in the tank. We spent the balance of that afternoon in foxholes. Towards dark, we decided that we had better not attempt to repair the track since during the afternoon and enemy patrol had been poking around the tank. After dark, I asked for volunteers for a patrol to go back to the tank to recover the badly needed 14 rounds of HE and 1 of AP for the one tank (Lt. Fleig's) which still remained in operation by this time. The patrol got the Ammunition with no trouble.

From this time on, until we were ordered to withdraw we remained in these positions

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Lt. Fleig:-

On the morning of 5 November, about 0600, an heavy enemy mortar and artillery barrage began. It lasted for about a half an hour. When it lifted, the enemy launched an attack with about 5 tanks and some infantry, perhaps a company. I was still in positions on the right (west) flank of Kemmerscheidt. We got seven direct hits on a German Mark VI tank and immobilized it. The attack seemed to bog down then until about 0900 when the Germans either renewed the attack or launched a second attack...this time without tanks. During this second attack, the TD's (C Company 893rd TD Bn) came up. One platoon went into position near my platoon on the right flank. A second platoon went into positions on the left flank. The 3rd platoon of TD's, so I was told, was to be held in reserve in the woods just south of the regimental CP. ~~At about 1130, after I had heard several rumors of a task force being sent up to relieve us, pass through and attack Schmidt, I contacted Col. Petersen to find out if this were true. He verified the rumors and told me that the task force would be to support~~

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A Company, 707th Tk.Bn (.

(Fleig) — the attack of this task force as it advanced through us to take Schmidt. This attack was scheduled, he told me, to jump off from a line of departure, our then front line in Kommerscheidt, at about 0730, 6 November.

I radioed Capt Hostrup, via Payne, that Col Petersen wanted to see him at 1600 to make plans for this attack.

The Germans attacked regularly, at about 4 hour intervals throughout the day. We withstood all attacks and buttened up for the night in our positions on the right flank with infantry support. We were short of both fuel and ammunition by this time. Both were to be brought up during the night.

The TDs withdrew under cover of darkness to re-arm. We were ordered to remain in position to help repel any counterattack that night. Also because chances were great that if we withdrew, the infantry would also pull out. Throughout the night, although there was no attack, the Germans harassed us contiguously with mortar and artillery fire.

Several hours before dawn (it was about 0300) Capt Kelly told me that while they had been able to get water, rations and gasoline up, it didn't look as though we were going to get any ammunition. (See interview with Capt Kelly).

As daylight came, we again took up positions to carry out our fire support for the attack expected by the Task Force. This never materialized. Our dispositions throughout the morning were...1st platoon (TKS) plus one platoon of TDs on the right (west) flank of KOMMERSCHIEDT. The 3rd platoon (TKS) with another platoon of TDs on the left (east) flank. The morning was relatively quiet. Enemy artillery and mortar fire was spasmodic. I doubt that over 20-25 rounds came in on us.

Shortly after 1200, our infantry was harassed by enemy tanks in Schmidt. Some of the infantry by this time were so shaken up and unnerved, that the mere sound of a German tank starting its motor, caused a few of them to leave their foxholes and run to the rear. One infantry Sgt, about 1330, came running towards my position. I stopped him and asked him why he was running. He mouthed the answer. "A German tank." I

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- 17 -

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held him there talking to him to steady him...asked him if he hadn't learned in training that a tank cannot depress its guns to hit a man on the ground when it has come within 35 yards,-if he hadn't learned that a tank can run over a foxhole without injury to the occupant, and if he hadn't learned that the safest place during an artillery or mortar barrage (normal...not air bursts) was his foxhole. He replied "yessir...but I can't stand it anymore." This Sgt was not an isolated case. The infantry were in very exposed position. They were dug in on the forward slope...exposed to direct fire from the higher ground in Schmidt, and Marscheidt. In addition, the Germans had begun to make considerable use of air bursts with their artillery. This was becoming increasingly effective against both the infantry and the TDs, whose open turrets provided little protection against artillery.

The situation became critical. Many of the infantry were leaving their positions. Col Petersen ordered the tanks and TDs to take the German tanks in Schmidt under fire in an attempt to restore the situation. Lt Leonard, who was commanding the right platoon of TDs (1st Plat, C Co, TD) and I made our plan. I was to take my tanks up to the crest of the hill just in rear (north) of Kemmerscheidt to draw the fire of the enemy tanks, while he and his platoon maneuvered to the right in an attempt to get behind the enemy armor. We decided that he should be the ones to do the maneuvering since his TD guns were more capable of knocking out the enemy tanks, which we believed to be Mark VIs.

I and my three tanks moved out in the attack and as planned immediately began drawing fire from the enemy tanks in the vicinity of Schmidt. Lt Leonard dismounted from his vehicle in the face of direct enemy fire from an enemy pillbox (t (0575-3000) and tried to lead his platoon into position. They did not move. I saw him return to his vehicle and from his gestures assumed that he was ordering his gun commanders to follow him. He again walked forward, still under direct small arms fire from this pillbox, and motioned his TDs to come forward. They still did not move. That was the last I saw Lt Leonard.

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18 -

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By that time, my position was becoming untenable because of heavy artillery fire and considerable point blank fire from enemy tanks and/or TDs. I withdrew into the defilade offered by the shallow draw just north of Kemmerscheidt. Two of my tanks, as a result of this fire, had sustained damages which had jammed the turrets..of both. During the action which took place some time between 1330-1430, we destroyed one enemy Mark VI tank in the vicinity of Schmidt. After this, the situation quieted down. We fired intermittently from our defiladed position into Schmidt with HE.

About 1730, I sent the two tanks with jammed turrets to the vicinity of the gas dump to act as rear guard and reserve. We again remained in place and under cover of darkness pulled into town and took up positions among the houses in the western end of the town.

7 Nov - It was very quiet during the early part of the morning. At about 0600 a heavy enemy artillery barrage began. It lasted for about half an hour. At 0630 the Germans attacked with infantry and tanks. I saw only 5 or 6 tanks. We later heard that the infantry was estimated at roughly a battalion. (This does not quite coincide in time aspects with the 28th Division G-2 Periodic report for the period but in essence it is very close. The report for the period stated that an estimated 30 German tanks, some of them Mark VIs were used as close-in artillery to overrun the infantry positions. The attacking infantry was believed to have attacked from two directions. It was estimated to consist of approximately 500-600 men from the 1055 Inf Regiment.) Our infantry were over-run and forced to withdraw to the next available cover (woods in vicinity of the gas dump). The tanks and TDs fought a rearguard action. We lost two tanks and three TDs from enemy action. In withdrawing, two more tanks were disabled by thrown tracks. When we reached the woods NW of the town, our one remaining tank and two remaining TDs took up defensive positions on the eastern edge of the woods facing towards Kemmerscheidt with fresh orders to hold this position at all costs.

The remainder of the afternoon and night we remained in these positions and fired at the enemy in Kemmerscheidt. [According to information from Lt Col Harry E. Messec,

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46

28th Division G-2, the Germans are reported to have withdrawn from Kemmerscheidt in the afternoon having accomplished their aim of driving the Americans out of the town and reducing the threat to their road net through Schmidt) (Prisoners taken during the night of the 7th reported that an attack had been planned for before midnight, 7 November, but our artillery plus the fact that their tanks had run over and crushed some of their own infantry troops, so disorganized and disrupted things that the infantry balked at attacking. Had they made this attack, assuming that the report is accurate, they would undoubtedly have succeeded in over-running the badly shaken American positions. As it was, the German radio is reported to have triumphantly bleated forth the fact that they had annihilated the 112th American Infantry. In essence, they did. Over approximately 150 men of the regiment are still listed as missing. At the close of action, 9 November, it was definitely no longer an effective fighting force. (This from Lt Col T. E. Briggs, Division G-3).

8 Nov - We held our positions during the morning. The only enemy activity that I can recall was sniper fire from both flanks, and occasional mortar fire. About 1700 Colonel Nelson, whom I later found out was the new CO of the 112th (Peterson was wounded) came up to the Regt CP and gave us orders to withdraw under cover of darkness.

At 1730 we received orders to destroy the remaining tank and TDs. We did so although it was a difficult task without light and with orders to make no noise.

At about 1800-1830 we started our withdrawal. About 1900 we came under mortar fire. This disrupted our column. The column scattered and broke up into small groups. Various sized groups were rounded up and started on the way again, by different officers of the column. Capt Hestrup and I had about 50 men in ours. We went down the hill in close column, close together to avoid losing contact (about 2 yards between men and columns), forded the stream about 200-300 yards north of the bridge since we suspected it was still held by the Germans. Up the other side, we skirted the edge of the woods south of Vessenack. It was beginning to get foggy when we entered Vessenack about 2300. As we did so we encountered some small arms fire, friendly or enemy we never did find out, but suffered no casualties so far as I knew.


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


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Kammerloch  
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
A Co. 707 TK Bn.

Action - 3/4 Nov. 1944

☐ German TKs.

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