Impacts of Doctrinal and Technological Changes

May 25, 2011


By
Lt. Gen. Mark Hertling, U.S. Army Europe Commanding General

ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE SEMINAR
VIENNA, AUSTRIA, 24-25 MAY 11
HOFBURG CONGRESS CENTRE, HELDENPLATZ
SESSION 3: May 25, 2011
“IMPACTS OF DOCTRINAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGES”
Presented by Lt. Gen. Mark P. Hertling, Commander, US Army Europe

As prepared.

Thank you very much for inviting me.

That invite came when I was in a different job…the chief trainer of our Army.  A job I was given with the instructions to “revamp” our training programs based on 10 years of war.

But in my current role of USAREUR Commander, I oversee our JMTC capability at Graf…and that’s important to how we will train allied armies, using lessons from combat…and looking forward toward new conflicts and incorporating our doctrine – like the emerging FM 3.0 – or the techniques, procedures and tactics that will flow from that operational context.

Those of us who have been on recent battlefields in a new operating environment have seen extensive changes, and glimmers of how we might fight in the future.

I’ll talk about that, and then how we’re training with allies to prepare for the future.  First, the changes we’ve seen on the battlefield.

First, there is the issue of contiguous and noncontiguous maneuver of forces, versus the old linear and non-linear action (no longer deep, close, rear from a physical sense, although those concepts still apply in a temporal aspect).

Lethal and non-lethal targeting aspects (what we used to call kinetic and non-kinetic operations).

A focus – or should I say an attention to detail on – decentralized operations that push resources and responsibility (and sometimes increased risk) to brigade and below formations.

And a greater emphasis on contributions of allies and the increasing role of partners – (interagency, NGOs, others) in the conflict zone.
In discussing those changes in how we approach conflict, there are also significant changes in how we gather and view intelligence…which is the driver of all operations:

How we collect intel (the number of platforms, how we look at networks, how we look at formations and the good and bad in all of this technological influence to intel collection).

Also, how we share information – always an issue in combat, but made increasingly complex because of required speed, increased tempo of operations, and addition of allies in the formations.

Intel fusion versus intel collection and dissemination.

Then there are the influencers: Like the changing role of information operations and media.

This is more than the 24/7 news cycle…though that is critical to understanding what we’re experiencing.

(Example of talking to CNN and seeing it on Al Jazeera)

All of this has confused our public affairs/information operations model, so our new doctrine is also shifting to “inform and influence activities” or “IIA.”

IIA is the area within mission command which ensure themes and messages are synchronized with actions to support Full Spectrum Operations.
But perhaps of critical importance are the changes to the threat and how we see our enemies. (Assymetric)


(Examples).

Expansion of the threat to include non-state actors – (terrorists, insurgents, militias, criminals) – versus regional threats and hostile nation-states…although those still exist.

(Iraqi example…gun runners, oil selling, etc.)

The threats today are dynamic, unpredictable, diverse, fluid, networked, and constantly evolving; requiring our leaders and formations to be more adaptable.

So all of this has contributed to the U.S. publishing a new doctrine.

A doctrine that will elaborate on our new fundamental operating principles, tied to other Army doctrinal publications (ADP), and supported by a variety of education packages that are much different than anything we’ve done in the past.

DVDs, YouTube videos, applications on smart devices that will show interactive training, podcasts, mobile apps.

At the center of all this is the term “mission command.”

Mission Command is defined as the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to ensure disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to accomplish full spectrum operations. [FM 3-0]

We’re using the term mission command versus command and control because that suggests informed intuition and instincts different that Auftragstaktik.

(Links to comprehensive approach.)

This change reminds us that as leaders of soldiers in coalition formations, a commander must view the total mission, not just “Battle Command” or “Command and Control of Forces.”

Using Mission Command helps us establish an approach – that we relearn in every war – that the best understanding of intel and information, enemy activity, various actors that influence the conflict, all bubbles up from the bottom.

And that context – along with the experience and requirements for operational and strategic action at the senior levels of command – is critical for tactical, operational and strategic success.  So these are changes on the battlefield driving other requirements.

Within USAREUR, we have several training venues where we execute training with partners.

The Joint Multinational Training Command or JMTC is our “crown jewel.”

At JMTC, we incorporate the latest doctrinal changes; tactics, techniques, and procedures; and lessons learned during training.

USAREUR continually seeks greater multinational integration in training, especially at JMTC.

I’d like to show you what that looks like.

(Show battle action summary video).

Many of our multinational partners – Poles, Italians, Germans, French, Bulgarians, Albanians – are taking part in this kind of training.

While doing that, they also participate in things like counter-improvised explosive device training (C-IED), Operational Mentor and Liaison Team (OMLT) and Police Operational Mentor and Liaison Team Training (POMLT), and multinational leader training.

An example: This past January, 1-4 Infantry Battalion – our opposing force unit – concluded their partnership mission with Romanian forces in Afghanistan.  The partnership started in 2006 as a battalion-size Romanian Task Force with a company-size U.S. force.  The partnership mission concluded after four years of multinational training exercises and continuous six-month deployments.  The Romanian Battalion now operates independently and provides the main ISAF effort in Zabul Province.

As a result of working together, seeing changes and training together, Romanian forces are the only NATO force to double their contribution to ISAF by adding another battalion to their rotations over the past few years.

Another example: one of the first multinational embedded training teams in Afghanistan – in late 2008- was an effort between the Latvian Army and the Michigan National Guard as part of the U.S. State Partnership Program.  For three months, Latvian soldiers and U.S. soldiers training in preparation for the OMLT mission, to mentor and advise the Afghan National Army.

Beyond the training, multinational exercises such as Saber Strike, Bagram, Nemesis Sword, Immediate Response, Austere Challenge, Anaconda, and Rapid Trident also help spread the new TTPs, and the exchange of doctrinal advances.

I hope what I’ve talked about is of interest.  But the key point is this:  while the enduring nature of conflict remains, the way we conduct operations has changed radically.  This drove new doctrine and new related training techniques.

That’s because of advancement in technology and significant adaptation in doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures.

To ensure success in coalitions, actions matter most.  And that can only be achieved by editing our doctrine and related actions associated with training, exercises, and shared discussions like these.

Thanks for allowing me this time.