

NORMANDY INVASION BATTLEBOOK

70TH ANNIVERSARY



JUNE 1944 – JUNE 2014



COMMANDING GENERAL STAFF RIDE
UNITED STATES ARMY IN EUROPE

Commanding General Welcome Letter

"It is true that the hour of invasion draws nearer, but the scale of enemy air attacks does not indicate that it is immediately imminent."

**Feldmarshall von Rundstedt to Hitler
30 May 1944**



"Okay, let's go."

**General Dwight D. Eisenhower
5 June 1944**

Team,

I am very excited and honored to spend the next few days with you learning, analyzing and hopefully debating the strategy, actions and decisions of the leaders involved in the great battle at Normandy in 1944.


Together, we will walk over the ground contested on D-Day using proven staff ride techniques that represent a unique and persuasive method of conveying the lessons of the past to present-day operational level leaders. I encourage everyone to frame the historical lessons from these battles in the terms of our current Joint Operational Functions; Movement and Maneuver, Intelligence, Fires, Sustainment, Mission Command and Protection, as we prepare ourselves for an open dialogue.

I also ask everyone to keep in mind the following words of wisdom from *The Staff Ride* by William G. Robertson. "What the student—the professional Soldier—must achieve is what German military theorist Karl von Clausewitz in *On War* defined as critical analysis: determine the facts, establish cause and effect, and analyze the results. Critical analysis is an integral part of maximizing leader development opportunities offered as we walk through the history of perhaps the most important influential operation of World War II. In simpler terms, the Soldier must find out what happened, establish why and how events occurred as they did, and decide what these cause and effect relationships mean now." This critical thinking is essential to our Army's Leader Development process as we continue to develop ourselves within our profession.

The importance of Normandy cannot be understated, because it is here where the strength of free peoples of the West were tested and it is Normandy which, for most of us, captures the spirit of the liberation of Europe from tyranny and the delivery of hope to the long-oppressed. We retain the proud lineage of that American Army which came ashore in 1944 as we continue the legacy of trust forged in Normandy with our closest Allies in Europe.

This "battlebook" provides the background material you need to prepare for our study of the invasion. By tramping the beachheads at Normandy and reliving the dilemmas of June 1944 together, we have the opportunity to think about our own leadership and the magnificent Soldiers we are privileged to lead. I am honored to have this opportunity to join you to celebrate our heritage and to better prepare ourselves for an uncertain future.


Thanks for
your support of
this Staff Ride!



Donald M. Campbell Jr.
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army
Commanding

TAB B

Concept and Objectives



JUNE 1944

7-8 JUNE
DEFENSIVE POSITION

AA POSITION

then

and now
D-Day + 50 years

LA POINTE DU HOC

Height from sea to cliff top: 99 - 133 feet
(30-40 meters)

Concept and Objectives

Purpose:

To provide a leadership case study of the Allied invasion of Normandy, 6 June 1944, as part of the Commanding General's senior leader professional development program.

Concept:

The Staff Ride will begin with an evening seminar introducing the main themes we will explore together. The discussion will focus at the intersection of the strategic and operational levels of war. Key considerations are the continuing challenges of senior leadership – planning, organizing, and integrating complex operations in a joint and combined context; training and equipping; building, leading, and rebuilding effective teams; the constant need for resolute moral leadership under stress; the meshing of ideas and technology; and the inculcation of the qualities essential to “fighting through”.

Using a hotel overlooking Omaha Beach as a base of operations, we will travel by bus to various “stands” and from our study and initial explorations of “war on the map” determine what actually happened on the ground. We will discuss the planning, training, organizing, equipping, and mounting of Operation OVERLORD. On the ground we will observe the US airborne and amphibious operations, as part of the Allied 21st Army Group, and the subsequent combat operations to establish and expand the beachhead. Finally we will examine the extensive logistical operations required to support the forces entering the continent. Each stand has been carefully chosen, generally following the force which has the initiative, to illustrate a key objective, to emphasize the difficult U.S. and Allied coordination and integration challenges, to track the decisions of the senior leaders and to “follow the fight” on the ground. Throughout the Staff Ride we will be emphasizing the role of the leader to shape the future, to build and sustain teams, to manage process and change, and to nurture learning.

We will conclude each day with a seminar highlighting the observations and insights of the day, offering selected additional topics, and setting the stage for the following day. The Commanding General will lead an After Action Review at the conclusion of the Staff Ride at our last stop near Villers-Bocage.

Objectives:

This rich and engaging battlefield metaphor will provide a perfect setting for the USAREUR Senior Leader Team to study, discuss, and reflect on:

- Creating strategic architecture; values, vision, grand and operational strategy,
- Building and sustaining a coalition,
- Forming and forging command and staff teams,
- Large unit operations,
- Innovation in our Army; technology and doctrine,
- Dealing with the unexpected; decision making under uncertainty, and
- Generalship: Identifying, Recognizing, Shaping and Transforming.

TAB D

Planning Directive to Eisenhower

Shoulder Sleeve Insignia Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force



Upon a Norman shield of heraldic sable, representing the darkness of Nazi oppression, is shown the sword of liberation in the form of a crusader's sword, the flames arising from the hilt and leaping up the blade. This represents avenging justice by which the enemy power will be broken in Nazi-dominated Europe. Above the sword is a rainbow emblematic of hope containing all the colors of which the National flags of the Allies are composed.

The heraldic chief of azure above the rainbow is emblematic of a state of peace and tranquillity the restoration of which to the enslaved people is the objective of the United Nations.

The black shield changed to dark blue when redesignated for US Forces, European Theater in 1945, and remains the shoulder sleeve insignia of US Army Europe today.

Planning Directive to Eisenhower

DIRECTIVE

TO SUPREME COMMANDER ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

(Issued 12 February 1944)

1. You are hereby designated as Supreme Allied Commander of the forces placed under your orders for operations for liberation of Europe from Germans. Your title will be Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary Force.
2. *Task.* You will enter the continent of Europe and, in conjunction with the other United Nations, undertake operations aimed at the heart of Germany and the destruction of her armed forces. The date for entering the Continent is the month of May, 1944. After adequate Channel ports have been secured, exploitation will be directed towards securing an area that will facilitate both ground and air operations against the enemy.
3. Notwithstanding the target date above you will be prepared at any time to take immediate advantage of favorable circumstances, such as withdrawal by the enemy on your front, to effect a reentry into the Continent with such forces as you have available at the time; a general plan for this operation when approved will be furnished for your assistance.
4. *Command.* You are responsible to the Combined Chiefs of Staff and will exercise command generally in accordance with the diagram at Appendix [TAB H]. Direct communication with the United States and British Chiefs of Staff is authorized in the interest of facilitating your operations and for arranging necessary logistic support.
5. *Logistics.* In the United Kingdom the responsibility for logistics organization, concentration, movement, and supply of forces to meet the requirements of your plan will rest with British Service Ministries so far as British Forces are concerned. So far as United States Forces are concerned, this responsibility will rest with the United States War and Navy Departments. You will be responsible for the coordination of logistical arrangements on the continent. You will also be responsible for coordinating the requirements of British and United States forces under your command.

6. *Coordination of operations of other Forces and Agencies.* In preparation for your assault on enemy occupied Europe, Sea and Air Forces, agencies of sabotage, subversion, and propaganda, acting under a variety of authorities, are now in action. You may recommend any variation in these activities which may seem to you desirable.

7. *Relationship to United Nations Forces in other areas.* Responsibility will rest with the Combined Chiefs of Staff for supplying information relating to operations of the Forces of the U. S. S. R. for your guidance in timing your operations. It is understood that the Soviet Forces will launch an offensive at about the same time as OVERLORD with the object of preventing the German forces from transferring from the Eastern to the Western front. The Allied Commander in Chief, Mediterranean Theater, will conduct operations designed to assist your operation, including the launching of an attack against the south of France at about the same time as OVERLORD. The scope and timing of his operations will be decided by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. You will establish contact with him and submit to the Combined Chiefs of Staff your views and recommendations regarding operations from the Mediterranean in support of your attack from the United Kingdom. The Combined Chiefs of Staff will place under your command the forces operating in Southern France as soon as you are in a position to assume such command. You will submit timely recommendations compatible with this regard.

8. *Relationship with Allied Governments -- the re-establishment of Civil Government and Liberated Allied Territories and the administration of enemy territories.* Further instructions will be issued to you on these subjects at a later date.

TAB E

Eisenhower's General Order

***"I admire Napoleon less
since I know what a coalition is."***

Marshal Ferdinand Foch



1. The Allied commanders before D-Day: (*front*) Tedder, Eisenhower and Montgomery; (*behind*) Bradley, Ramsay, Leigh-Mallory and Bedell Smith.

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE



Soldiers, Sailors and Airmen of the Allied Expeditionary Force!

You are about to embark upon the Great Crusade, toward which we have striven these many months. The eyes of the world are upon you. The hopes and prayers of liberty-loving people everywhere march with you. In company with our brave Allies and brothers-in-arms on other Fronts, you will bring about the destruction of the German war machine, the elimination of Nazi tyranny over the oppressed peoples of Europe, and security for ourselves in a free world.

Your task will not be an easy one. Your enemy is well trained, well equipped and battle-hardened. He will fight savagely.

But this is the year 1944! Much has happened since the Nazi triumphs of 1940-41. The United Nations have inflicted upon the Germans great defeats, in open battle, man-to-man. Our air offensive has seriously reduced their strength in the air and their capacity to wage war on the ground. Our Home Fronts have given us an overwhelming superiority in weapons and munitions of war, and placed at our disposal great reserves of trained fighting men. The tide has turned! The free men of the world are marching together to Victory!

I have full confidence in your courage, devotion to duty and skill in battle. We will accept nothing less than full Victory!

Good Luck! And let us all beseech the blessing of Almighty God upon this great and noble undertaking.

Dwight D. Eisenhower

Chronology of World War II

"But war is a ruthless taskmaster, demanding success regardless of confusion, shortness of time, and paucity of tools. Exact justice for the individual and a careful consideration of his rights is impossible. One man sacrifices his life on the battlefield and another sacrifices his reputation elsewhere, both in the same cause. The hurly burly of the conflict does not permit commanders to draw fine distinctions. To succeed, they must demand results, close their ears to excuses, and drive subordinates beyond what would ordinarily be considered the limit of human capacity. Wars are won by the side that accomplishes the impossible. Battles are decided in favor of troops whose bravery, fortitude, and especially, whose endurance surpasses that of the enemy's; the army with the higher breaking point wins."

George Marshall, *Memories of My Services in the World War, 1917-1918*

Chronology of World War II

Date	Global Events	Western Front	Mediterranean	Eastern Front	Southwest Pacific	Central Pacific	China/Burma/India
1939							↑
Sep	UK & FR declare war on GE			GE & USSR invade, divide Poland			Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945)
	British Army deploys to France			Russo-Finish War begins			↓
1940							
Apr	Churchill becomes Prime Minister	GE occupies Denmark, invades Norway					
May		GE invades NL, BE, FR		USSR occupies disputed Romanian territory			
Jun		FR falls; British Army evacuated from Dunkerque	Italy declares war on UK, FR				
Jul		GE begins air attacks against UK	British Fleet attacks IT Fleet				
Aug		Battle of Britain	Italy invades Egypt from Libya				
Sep		↓			JA invades Indo-China		
Oct	GE, IT, JA form Axis Pact		IT invades Greece	GE troops enter Romania to protect oil fields			
Nov	HU, RO join Axis Pact		UK attacks IT fleet at Trianto				
Dec			GE reinforces IT in Greece				
			British open drive in North Africa				

Chronology of World War II

Date	Global Events	Western Front	Mediterranean	Eastern Front	Southwest Pacific	Central Pacific	China/Burma/India
1941							
Mar	US passes Lend-Lease						
Apr	Russo-JA non-aggression pact		GE invades Yugoslavia				
			BEF withdrawn from GR				
			GE reinf IT in North Africa; Rommel's 1 st Offensive				
May			GE attacks Crete				
Jun				GE invades USSR			
Jul	US declares oil embargo vs JA						
Sep		GE torpedo atk on USS Green opens undeclared war in North Atlantic					
Oct	Lend-Lease extended to USSR						
Dec	GE, IT declare war on US			German offensive stopped before Moscow	JA Atks Philippines	JA Atks Pearl Harbor	JA alliance with Thailand
	Anglo-Amer Conf (Arcadia)		British drive for Tobruk	Leningrad besieged			
1942							
Jan	UN declaration signed by 26 nations		Rommel's 2d Offensive begins	Soviet Winter Offensive makes limited gains	US & Filipino defenders withdraw to Bataan		
	Combined Chiefs of Staff activated				JA captures Br N. Borneo, Invades Solomons		
Feb					Singapore surrenders		JA occupies Burma
					Gen MacArthur reaches Australia		
Mar					Surrender of Bataan		
Apr						Doolittle Raid (on Tokyo)	
May					US surrender in Philippines		
					Battle of Coral Sea		

Chronology of World War II

Date (1942)	Global Events	Western Front	Mediterranean	Eastern Front	Southwest Pacific	Central Pacific	China/Burma/India
Jun			Rommel opens drive into Egypt	GE Summer Offensive in southwest USSR		Battle of Midway	
			Tobruk falls to Axis				
Jul	BR-US decision to invade N. Africa			GE captures Sevastopol	JA invades New Guinea		
Aug		Allies raid Dieppe, France			US landings on Guadalcanal		
Sep				Battle of Stalingrad begins			
Oct			BR attack at El Alamein		US Naval victory in Solomon Islands		
Nov			Allied landings at Casablanca, Oran, Algiers		Buna-Gona		
		GE moves into unoccupied FR	French resistance in N. Africa ends				
1943							
Jan	Allied Conference at Casablanca	US Air Force joins bombardment of GE		Russian Leningrad Offensive			
Feb			Rommel breaks through Kasserine Pass, Tunisia	Battle of Stalingrad ends Russian Campaign in Ukraine	JA resistance ends on Guadalcanal		
				Siege of Leningrad lifted			
Mar			Allied counteroffensive	GE counteroffensive			
May	Trident Conference in Washington		Axis forces in N Africa surrender		Allies attack New Guinea		
Jul			Allies invade Sicily				
Aug	Quadrant Conference in Quebec			GE abandon Kharkov			
	Fall of Mussolini		Allied victory in Sicily				
Sep			GE reinforces IT				
Oct	IT declares war on GE		Allied landings in Salerno		Australian victory at Finschhafen, New Guinea		Stillwell's Burma Campaign begins

Chronology of World War II

Date (1943)	Global Events	Western Front	Mediterranean	Eastern Front	Southwest Pacific	Central Pacific	China/Burma/India
Nov	Cairo-Teheran Conferences. UN Relief and Rehabilitation Administration established		Winter Line Campaign		Allies invade Bougainville & Tarawa		
Dec				Soviets begin Winter Offensive			
1944							
Jan			Landings at Anzio	Soviet offensive enters Estonia			
			Unsuccessful Allied attack at Rapido River (IT)				
Feb		Allied bombing focuses on GE aircraft production				Invasion of Marshall Islands (Kwajalein)	
Mar			Attack on Cassino	Soviets drive into Ukraine	Rabaul falls	Attacks on Truk in Caroline Islands	Merrill's Marauders advance into Hukwang Valley
					Invasion of Admiralty Islands		Japanese Imphal-Kohima Offensive
Apr	UN Organization for Educational and Cultural Reconstruction formed	Strategic bombing priorities shift to support Normandy Invasion	Allies attack Gustav line in IT	Odessa retaken by Soviets	Allied landings in New Guinea		Myitkina airfield captured by Allies
Jun		Normandy Invaded	Rome liberated	Major Soviet offensive in Central Region and in Finland	JA fleet loses heavily in Battle of Philippine Sea	Strategic bombing campaign against Japan begins	
		GE launches first V weapons against UK					
Jul	UN Monetary and Financial Conference (Bretton Woods); creates IMF and World Bank	Breakout from Beachhead	Florence liberated	Warsaw uprising		Marianas invaded	Slim's Burma Offensive begins

Chronology of World War II

Date (1944)	Global Events	Western Front	Mediterranean	Eastern Front	Southwest Pacific	Central Pacific	China/Burma/India
Aug		Allies rush for Seine River Crossings	Allies land in Southern France	Romania surrenders		Guam liberated	JA invaders driven back from Indian frontier
				Soviets reach East Prussia			
Sep	UNRRA allocated \$50m to IT -- first commitment to former enemy	Brussels liberated Market Garden		Soviets declare war on Bulgaria		Landings in Caroline Islands	
	OCTAGON Conference (Quebec)	German defense of German soil begins					
Oct	Dumbarton Oaks lays permanent UN groundwork	Forces from Southern France link up with Forces from Normandy		Soviets reach Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Poland	Leyte Invasion; JA Fleet suffers major losses		Begin final major offensive
		Allied Offensives bog down					
Nov						Saipan airfields open for Allied bombing campaign	
Dec		GE counteroffensive Battle of the Bulge					

Chronology of World War II

Date	Global Events	Western Front	Mediterranean	Eastern Front	Southwest Pacific	Central Pacific	China/Burma/India
1945							
Jan				Soviet Winter Offensive liberates Warsaw	US landings on Luzon		
Feb	Yalta Conference	Allies defeat Colmar pocket; end Battle of the Bulge	5th Army offensive in northern IT	Budapest liberated	Battle for Manila begins	Landings on Iwo Jima	
Mar		US 9th Army drives to Rhine; 9 th Arm Div crosses at Remagen		Soviets capture Danzig	Manila liberated		
		Köln falls		Soviets advance in Czech, Hungary, Austria	Landings on Mindanao		
Apr	Roosevelt dies; Truman US President	US, UK forces cross Rhine in force	5th Army crosses Po River	GE resistance in East Prussia ends			
	San Francisco conference drafts UN Charter	US units reach Elbe River		Vienna falls			
May	V-E Day	War ends	War ends	Soviets capture Berlin; war ends	Resistance ends on Mindanao	Resistance ends on Okinawa	British capture Rangoon
Jul	Potsdam Conference					Carrier based planes join attack against Japan	
	Clement Atlee replaces Churchill						
Aug	Atomic bombing of Japan						
Sep	Japanese surrender accepted				war ends	war ends	war ends

World War II Conferences




Pathfinders of 6th (UK) Airborne Division synchronize watches immediately before take-off



A Royal Canadian Navy landing craft approaching Juno Beach

***"The only thing worse
than having allies
is not having them."***

Sir Winston Churchill



World War II Conferences

The first involvement of the United States in the wartime conferences between the Allied nations opposing the Axis powers actually occurred before the nation formally entered World War II. In August 1941, President Franklin Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill met secretly and devised an eight-point statement of war aims known as the Atlantic Charter, which included a pledge that the Allies would not accept territorial changes resulting from the war in Europe.

Following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the wartime conferences focused on establishing a second front. At Casablanca in January 1943, Roosevelt and Churchill agreed to fight until the Axis powers surrendered unconditionally. In a November 1943 meeting in Egypt with Chinese leader Chiang Kai-shek, Roosevelt and Churchill agreed to a pre-eminent role for China in postwar Asia. The next major wartime conference included Roosevelt, Churchill, and the leader of the Soviet Union, Josef Stalin. Meeting at Tehran following the Cairo Conference, the "Big Three" secured confirmation on the launching of the cross-channel invasion and a promise from Stalin that the Soviet Union would eventually enter the war against Japan.

In 1944, conferences at Bretton Woods and Dumbarton Oaks created the framework for international cooperation in the postwar world. In February 1945, the "Big Three" met at the former Russian czar's summer palace in the Crimea. Yalta was the most important and by far the most controversial of the wartime meetings. Recognizing the strong position that the Soviet Army possessed on the ground, Churchill and an ailing Roosevelt agreed to a number of compromises with Stalin that allowed Soviet hegemony to remain in Poland and other Eastern European countries, granted territorial concessions to the Soviet Union, and outlined punitive measures against Germany, including an occupation and reparations in principle. Stalin did guarantee that the Soviet Union would declare war on Japan within six months.

The last meeting of the "Big Three" occurred at Potsdam in July 1945, where the tension that would erupt into the cold war was evident. Despite the end of the war in Europe and the revelation of the existence of the atomic bomb to the Allies, neither President Harry Truman, Roosevelt's successor, nor Clement Attlee, who mid-way through the conference replaced Churchill, could come to agreement with Stalin on any but the most minor issues. The most significant agreement was the issuance of the Potsdam Declaration to Japan demanding an immediate and unconditional surrender and threatening Japan with destruction if they did not comply. With the Axis forces defeated, the wartime alliance soon devolved into suspicion and bitterness on both sides.

World War II Conferences & Treaties

Conference /Treaty	Date	Participants	Highlights
Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaty	August 23, 1939	Germany, Soviet Union	Hitler and Stalin sign non-aggression pact which meant the Soviets would not intervene if Poland were invaded. Hitler later invaded Russia (June 22, 1941).
Atlantic Conference	August 1941	Great Britain, US	FDR and Churchill approve the Atlantic Charter that supported self-determination, a new permanent system of general security (a new League of Nations), and the right of people to regain governments abolished by dictators.
Moscow Conference	September-October 1941	Great Britain, US, Soviet Union	Allied aid to Soviet Union systematized.
Washington Conference (ARCADIA)	December 1941-January 1942	Great Britain, US	Agreement to follow Churchill's "Europe First" strategy; Declaration of the United Nations.
Washington (2d) Conference	June 1942	Great Britain, US	Agreed to give higher priority to peripheral strategy over cross-channel invasion of Europe; agreed to share as "equal partners" in A-bomb research.
Casablanca Conference (SYMBOL)	January 1943	Great Britain, US	FDR and Churchill agree to step up Pacific war, invade Sicily, increase pressure on Italy and insist on an unconditional surrender of Germany.

Washington Conference (TRIDENT)	May 1943	Great Britain, US	Plans for invasion of Italy, stepped-up Pacific war, increased air attacks on Germany.
Quebec Conference (QUADRANT)	August 1943	Great Britain, US	D-Day Set for May 1, 1944; Southeast Asia command reorganized for war on Japan; Gilberts and Marshalls set as first objectives in central Pacific offensive.
Moscow Conference	October 1943	Great Britain, US, Soviet Union, China	Tentative plans for cooperation in postwar Europe; Joint 4-power declaration includes China; Chiang-Kai-shek invited to a meeting at Cairo.
Cairo Conference (SEXTANT)	November 1943	Great Britain, US, Soviet Union, China	Agreement on military operations in China against Japanese; promise of postwar return of Manchuria to China and of freedom for Korea.
Teheran Conference (EUREKA)	November 1943	Great Britain, US, Soviet Union	Plans for two-front war against Germany, for later Russian participation in war against Japan, and for postwar cooperation.
Cairo (2d) Conference	December 1943	Great Britain, US, Turkey	Anakim postponed, Ike command.
Bretton Woods	July 1944	Delegates of 44 nations	Establishment of International Monetary Fund and Bank.
Dumbarton Oaks	August 1944	Great Britain, US, Soviet Union, China	Agreement on establishment of U.N., disagreement on veto in Security Council.

Quebec (2d) Conference (OCTAGON)	September 1944	Great Britain, US	Broad plans for global war; FDR agreed to Churchill plan for Greece and Istrian attack, due to fear of Russia in Balkans; FDR agreed to continue Lend-Lease to rebuild Britain's economy; tentative agreement on Morgenthau Plan for postwar Germany; FDR still unwilling to recognize De Gaulle.
Yalta Conference (ARGONAUT)	February 1945	Great Britain, US, Soviet Union	Plans for dealing with defeat of Germany; Stalin agreed that Poland would have free elections and that the Soviets would attack Japan within three months of the collapse of Germany. Soviets receive territory in Manchuria and several islands.
San Francisco Conference	April 22, 1945	Delegates of 46 nations	United Nations Charter approved establishing a Security Council with veto power for the Big Five (US, Great Britain, France, China, and Soviet Union) and a General Assembly.
Potsdam Conference (TERMINAL)	July – August 1945	US, Great Britain, Soviet Union	Pres. Truman met with Stalin and Churchill (Attlee after British election) and agreed that Japan must surrender or risk destruction; Atomic bomb successfully tested on July 16 and then dropped on Hiroshima on August 6, 1945; agreement on principles governing treatment of Germany.

Allied Command Architecture & Order of Battle

*"The pious Greek, when he had set up altars to all the great gods by name, added one more altar,
'To the Unknown God'.*

*So whenever we speak and think of the great captains and set up our military altars to Hannibal and Napoleon and Marlborough and such-like, let us add one more altar,
'To the Unknown Leader',*


that is, to the good company, platoon, or section leader who carries forward his men or holds his post, and often falls unknown. It is these who in the end do most to win wars.

The British have been a free people and are still a comparatively free people; and though we are not, thank Heaven, a military nation, this tradition of freedom gives to our junior leaders in war a priceless gift of initiative.

So long as this initiative is not cramped by too many regulations, by too much formalism, we shall, I trust, continue to win our battles - sometimes in spite of our higher commanders."

Field Marshal Lord Wavell


Allied Command Architecture



The command architecture was created to be fairly straight forward and “clean,” while sharing control between the two principal (national) partners in a reasonable way. This was, however, an interim arrangement -- the command architecture to invade Normandy but not to win the war. Once ashore, Eisenhower was to take Montgomery’s place as the ground commander. 1st US Army would subordinate to a new 12th (US) Army Group, commanded by Bradley and both Bradley and Montgomery would become co-equal subordinates of Eisenhower. This created an ambiguity in authority which hindered teamwork throughout the campaign.

**SHAEF COMMAND
ARCHITECTURE**

JUNE AND JULY, 1944



U. S. INFANTRY DIVISION

1944

STRENGTH AND EQUIPMENT

781 OFFICERS
13,472 ENLISTED MEN
1,440 VEHICLES
54 105mm HOWITZERS
12 155mm HOWITZERS
57 57mm ANTI-TANK GUNS

DIVISION HEADQUARTERS



DIVISION ARTILLERY HEADQUARTERS



INFANTRY REGIMENT

INFANTRY REGIMENT

INFANTRY REGIMENT

432 Officers—8,922 Enlisted Men—642 Vehicles—
18 105mm Howitzers—54 57mm Anti-Tank Guns

105mm ARTILLERY BATTALION

105mm ARTILLERY BATTALION

105mm ARTILLERY BATTALION

155mm ARTILLERY BATTALION

123 Officers—1,920 Enlisted Men—373 Vehicles—36 105mm
Howitzers—12 155mm Howitzers

M P PLATOON

ORDNANCE CO.

QM CO.

SIGNAL CO.

CAVALRY RECON. TROOP

ENGINEER BATTALION

MEDICAL BATTALION


U. S. ARMORED DIVISION

1944

STRENGTH AND EQUIPMENT

657 OFFICERS
10,341 ENLISTED MEN
269 TANKS
1,141 VEHICLES
54 105mm HOWITZERS
9 75mm HOWITZERS
30 57mm ANTI-TANK GUNS

DIVISION HEADQUARTERS



3
COMBAT COMMAND HEADQUARTERS

DIVISION ARTILLERY HEADQUARTERS



TANK BATTALION

TANK BATTALION

TANK BATTALION

120 Officers—2,067 Enlisted Men—231 Tanks—
258 Vehicles

INFANTRY BATTALION

INFANTRY BATTALION

INFANTRY BATTALION

108 Officers—2,886 Enlisted Men—378 Vehicles—
9 57mm AT Guns—3 75mm Howitzers

SELF-PROP. ARTILLERY BATTALION

SELF-PROP. ARTILLERY BATTALION

SELF-PROP. ARTILLERY BATTALION

99 Officers—1,503 Enlisted Men—9 Tanks—
54 105mm Howitzers—159 Vehicles

DIVISION TRAINS



ORDNANCE MAINT BATTALION

MEDICAL BATTALION


M P PLATOON

SIGNAL CO.

CAVALRY RECON. SQUADRON


ENGINEER BATTALION

US Infantry Division



14,253 men, 5 halftracks, 13 armored cars,
18 105mm Inf hows, 36 105mm and 12 155mm
field hows, 1,371 motor vehicles, 10 light aircraft.

US Airborne Division




8,600 men, 24 37 mm AA guns,
36 75 mm howitzers, 81 bicycles,
392 motor vehicles.

Note that the 82d and 101st Airborne had attached two parachute infantry regiments, each, along with a parachute field artillery battalion. Each of these divisions also contained a single three-battalion glider infantry regiment.


The 17th Airborne had two glider and two parachute regiments, and three artillery battalions. The 17th Airborne thus contained 11,000 men, and the other two divisions about 13,500 apiece.

US Armored Division




10,500 men, 168 medium and 77 light tanks, 450 halftracks, 54 SP M7 105 mm howitzers, 17 M8 and 18 M4 105 mm assault guns, 54 armored cars, 1,031 motor vehicles, 8 light aircraft.

US "Heavy" Armored Division




14,500 men, 232 medium and 158 light tanks, 640 halftracks, 54 SP 105 mm howitzers, 18 M4 105 mm and 14 M8 75 mm how. assault guns, 54 armored cars, 1,242 motor vehicles.

UK Infantry Division




18,000 men, 32 TDs, 70 armoured cars, 72 towed Arty,
550-600 Bren carriers, 1,800 motor vehicles.

UK Airborne Division




12,500 men, 48 towed Arty, 48 lt and 16 hvy AT guns.

university of technology



UK Armoured Division



14,500 men, 200 tanks, 24 TDs, 24 SP and 24 towed Arty, 250 halftracks and Bren carriers, 1,600 motor vehicles.

Allied Order of Battle

In the initial landings, 21st Army Group put ashore four corps of five and one-third divisions plus three airborne divisions; totaling over 100,000 men.¹ These numbers grew rapidly into the millions, with thousands of tons of supplies and vehicles. Only the “D-Day Corps” and their principal units are shown below (follow-on brigades generally landed on D-Day but follow-on divisions generally landed on D+1 or later).

Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force

Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary Force

General Dwight D. Eisenhower

Deputy Supreme Commander

Air Chief Marshal A. W. Tedder

Commander-in-Chief Land Forces

General Sir Bernard L. Montgomery

Commander-in-Chief Allied Expeditionary Naval Force

Admiral Sir Bertram H. Ramsay

Commander-in-Chief Allied Expeditionary Air Force

Air Chief Marshal Sir T. Leigh-Mallory

British 21st Army Group

General Sir Bernard L. Montgomery

¹ Conditions on the first three days were such that accurate accounting was not possible. First hand journalistic reporting put the number as high as 157,000 (*Time* magazine), but historians have been more likely to accept numbers in the 120-135,000 range.

First United States Army

Lieutenant General Omar N. Bradley

Engineer Special Brigade Group (Provisional)

Brigadier General William M. Hoge

V (US) Corps (OMAHA Beach)

Major General Leonard T. Gerow

1st (US) Infantry Division Group (OMAHA Beach)

Major General Clarence R. Huebner

16th Regimental Combat Team (initial assault)

116th Regimental Combat Team (initial assault; later resubordinated
to 29th Division Group)

18th Regimental Combat Team (follow-on)

Attached units

6th Armored Group

Engineer units

29th (US) Infantry Division Group (OMAHA Beach) (follow-on, D-Day)

Major General Charles H. Gerhardt

26th Regimental Combat Team (later resubordinated
to 1st Division Group)

115th Regimental Combat Team

175th Regimental Combat Team

2d Ranger Battalion Group (Point du Hoc)

Lieutenant Colonel James E. Rudder

2d (US) Infantry Division (follow-on)

Major General Walter M. Robertson

VII (US) Corps (UTAH Beach)

Major General J. Lawton Collins

4th (US) Infantry Division Group (UTAH Beach)

Major General Raymond O. Barton

8th Regimental Combat Team (initial assault)

22d Regimental Combat Team (follow-on)

12th Regimental Combat Team (follow-on)

359th Regimental Combat Team (follow-on; subsequently resubordinated
to 90th Division Group)

Attached units
6th Armored Group
Engineer units

90th (US) Infantry Division Group (UTAH Beach) (follow-on, D+1)

Brigadier General Jay W. MacKelvie
357th Regimental Combat Team
358th Regimental Combat Team

9th (US) Infantry Division Group (UTAH Beach) (follow-on, D+1)

Major General Manton S. Eddy

79th (US) Infantry Division Group (UTAH Beach) (follow-on, D+1)

Major General Ira T. Wyche

British Second Army

General Sir Miles C. Dempsey

1 (UK) Corps (SWORD and JUNO Beaches)

Lieutenant General Sir John T. Crocker

3d (UK) Infantry Division Group (SWORD Beach)

Major General T. G. Rennie
8th Brigade Group (initial assault)
185th Brigade Group
9th Brigade Group
Attached units (organized into the brigade groups)
27th Armored Brigade
33rd and 36th Artillery Regiment
36th Artillery Regiment
Commando and Engineer units

3d (Canadian) Infantry Division Group (JUNO Beach)

7th Canadian Brigade Group (initial assault)
8th Canadian Brigade Group (initial assault)
9th Canadian Brigade Group (follow-on)
Attached units (organized into the brigade groups)
7th Canadian Armored Regiment
12th, 13th, 14th, 15th Artillery Regiments
Commando and Engineer units

51st (UK) Division (follow-on)

4th (UK) Armored Brigade

30 (UK) Corps (GOLD Beach)

Lieutenant General Gerard C. Bucknall

50th (UK) Infantry Division Group (GOLD)

69th Brigade Group (initial assault)

131st Brigade Group (initial assault)

151st Brigade Group (follow-on)

56th Brigade Group (follow-on)

Attached units (organized into the brigade groups)

3rd Armored Brigade

86th, 90th, 147th Artillery Regiments

Commando and Engineer units

7th (UK) Armored Division (follow-on)

Major General G. W. E. J. Sir George Erskine

49th (UK) Infantry Division (follow-on)

33rd (UK) Armored Brigade

8 (UK) Corps (follow-on)

Lieutenant General Sir Richard N. O'Connor

Airborne Units (subordinate to 21st Army Group but operationally aligned with their respective national forces)

6th (UK) Airborne Division (Orne Bridgeheads)

General Sir Richard Gale

82d (US) Airborne Division (Ste. Mere-Eglise Area)

Major General Matthew B. Ridgway

325th Glider Infantry Regiment

505th Parachute Infantry Regiment

507th Parachute Infantry Regiment

508th Parachute Infantry Regiment

101st (US) Airborne Division (Ste. Marie-du-Mont Area)

Major General Maxwell D. Taylor


327th Glider Infantry Regiment

501st Parachute Infantry Regiment

502d Parachute Infantry Regiment

506th Parachute Infantry Regiment

Allied Order of Battle



TAB I

Allied Biographies



From left: Elwood "Pete" Quesada, Commanding General, IX U.S. Tactical Air Command, responsible for giving First U.S. Army close air support; Omar N. Bradley, Commanding General of First U.S. Army, later of the 12th U.S. Army Group; William B. Kean, General Bradley's Chief of Staff

Allied Biographies

American Commanders

General Dwight David Eisenhower Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces



Eisenhower was the senior officer in the European Theater of Operations and commander of the Allied coalition against Hitler. Born in the little east Texas town of Denison in 1890, he graduated from the U. S. Military Academy at West Point in 1915 with a commission in the infantry. World War I brought the temporary rank of lieutenant colonel and service with training the Army's new tank corps, but Eisenhower was disappointed that he never had the chance to command in France during the fighting. He was promoted to major in 1920 and held that rank through the next sixteen years of service in the small interwar Army, serving in various staff positions and, occasionally, with troops. He did not command a battalion until 1940. The key to his professional development was an early assignment in Panama with Brig. Gen. Fox Conner, operations officer on General John J. Pershing's staff during World War I in France and at that time commanding an infantry

brigade. Conner tutored Eisenhower in the military art and, most significantly, caused him to think deeply about the problems of coalition command. After graduating from the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, the acknowledged portal to future advancement, and two years later from the Army War College, Eisenhower served on the War Department General Staff, where he worked in the Office of the Chief of Staff while Douglas MacArthur led the Army. He subsequently worked again for MacArthur in the Philippines and returned to the United States as a lieutenant colonel in 1939 for battalion command in the 15th Infantry, duty as regimental executive officer, and then as chief of staff of the 3rd Infantry Division. Thereafter, Eisenhower became chief of staff of the newly-activated IX Corps and then of Third Army. It was in that position that he first gained national attention, being credited with the battle plan by means of which Lt. Gen. Walter Krueger's Third Army decisively defeated Lt. Gen. Ben Lear's Second Army in the famous Louisiana Maneuvers of 1941.

Almost immediately, Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall summoned Eisenhower to Washington, where he soon made the younger man chief of the War Plans Division of the general staff and quickly promoted him to major general. Developing plans that were then in formulation, Eisenhower sketched the basic strategy of establishing a base in the United Kingdom and attacking

Germany by amphibious landings in France. In June 1942, Marshall named him the commanding general of the new European Theater. In only a few months, Eisenhower had earned Marshall's full trust. Marshall saw in him a man who had the vision to execute the strategy that the Allies had agreed upon. After commanding the 1942 Allied landings in North Africa and the subsequent campaign in Tunisia, Eisenhower went on to command the Allied assault on Sicily and the Italian mainland, in the process gaining valuable experience not only in coalition command, but also in the difficult problems of amphibious operations. At the end of 1943, he was named Supreme Allied Commander for the invasion of Europe and directed the SHAEF effort to "utilize the resources of two great nations . . . with the decisiveness of a single authority." This was never easy, but in Eisenhower, President Franklin Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill found a man whose single-minded dedication to the goal of Allied unity was equal to the task. Following the success of the Allied landings at Normandy on 6 June 1944, the buildup of the beachhead, the breakout at St. Lo, the destruction of a large part of the German Army in the west in the Falaise Pocket, and the race across France in September, 1944, Eisenhower's armies stood on the very frontiers of the Reich by the early fall—far ahead of the most ambitious predictions of staff planners.

Eisenhower's perpetual good humor was often strained by the problems involved in keeping the Allied coalition firmly wedded to a single strategy, and in coping with the strong personalities of many of his subordinates. His perennial problems were Field Marshal Sir Bernard Law Montgomery, commander of British 21st Army Group, and Lt. Gen. George S. Patton, Jr., commander of Third U.S. Army—two men who were, as General Omar N. Bradley remarked in 1978, "two sides of the same coin." Some British commanders, and in particular Montgomery and his mentor, Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, saw Eisenhower as "a nice chap; no general," and thought him unsuited to command the ground battle, although they agreed he was superb at the political level. American commanders, including Patton and Bradley, often complained that Eisenhower forgot that he was an American and was unable to say no to Montgomery. Whatever the nature of the disagreements among senior commanders, however, Eisenhower had firm control of SHAEF and imposed his will in his subordinates.

In the Normandy campaign, Eisenhower, like many other Allied commanders, was still feeling his way into a new job, commanding immense forces. Some of the British and, indeed American, criticisms of his lack of tactical acumen appear well justified by the way the Falaise operation played out. Martin Blumenson probably best summarized the problems implicit in Eisenhower's command style: "Eisenhower's major fault was to allow his two army group commanders, Montgomery and Bradley, to drift apart. Each pursued his own course at critical moments, and a single firm direction of the operations never emerged. Although Eisenhower had the power to rectify the situation, he permitted the pocket to remain open too long and let the Seine River envelopment unfold haphazardly. Had he been more perceptive and more forthright, he could have insisted on behavior in conformance with what was his forte, coalition cooperation and coordination. Instead, he pursued his traditional hands-off policy, and the result was unsatisfactory for all save the Germans, who took advantage of the loose Allied reins." (*Dr. Charles Kirkpatrick*)

Lieutenant General Omar Nelson Bradley Commanding General, First U.S. Army



Born in Clark, Missouri, in 1893, Bradley was a West Point classmate of Eisenhower and graduated from the U.S. Military Academy in 1915 with a commission in the infantry. Like Eisenhower, he did not serve in battle during World War I, but instead made a reputation as a trainer of troops. After teaching at West Point, graduating from Command and General Staff School, and serving in various troop assignments, Bradley went to Fort Benning, Georgia, where from 1929 through 1933 he had the most important assignment of his early career. Teaching at the infantry school while Brig. Gen. George C. Marshall was assistant commandant, Bradley earned Marshall's confidence and regard. Thereafter he was a "Marshall man," one of the select handful of officers to whom Marshall later looked to command the mobilization Army. After graduating from the Army War College and again serving at West Point, Bradley in 1938 served on the War Department General Staff.

Marshall promoted him over the grade of colonel to brigadier general in 1941 and made him commandant of the Infantry School, following the tenure of Brig. Gen. Courtney Hodges. Shortly thereafter, he commanded both the 82nd and 28th Infantry Division during their training and, as a major general, went overseas to serve with Eisenhower in North Africa. There, he took command of II Corps during the battles in Tunisia and, promoted to lieutenant general, led that corps in the invasion of Sicily in 1943. At that time, he was under command of Lt. Gen. George S. Patton, Jr., who led Seventh Army. Selected by Eisenhower as the American ground commander for the invasion of Europe, Bradley went to England and took over First U.S. Army, commanding it in the assault at Normandy and the exploitation from the beachhead. With the activation of 12th Army Group in July 1944, Bradley moved up to a command that included First Army and Third Army, under command of Patton (by then Bradley's subordinate), and eventually of the Ninth Army (in September 1944) and Fifteenth Army (after the Battle of the Bulge) in the advance across France and to the borders of Germany. Bradley's 12th Army Group eventually numbered 1.3 million men, the greatest force ever to serve under one American field commander.

Bradley's reputation has suffered somewhat over the years. He really had little experience of higher command, having commanded a Corps in Sicily and having to learn to command an army, and then an army group, on the ground in France. He had his ups and downs in Normandy, vacillating from wrenching self-doubt to exuberant independence of action. In the Falaise operation, he lost confidence in his subordinates and in Montgomery and allowed his command structure to become complicated and ponderous. Throughout the operation, he demonstrated periodic indecisiveness and an unwillingness to take risks. As Blumenson concluded, Bradley "made instant decisions and then second-guessed himself," and "initiated potentially brilliant maneuvers, then aborted them because he lacked confidence in his ability to see them through to completion." Blumenson concluded that he simply mismanaged his part in the entire Falaise operation.

Chester Wilmot, probably the greatest promoter of Montgomery's abilities, criticized Bradley as being "unable to appreciate the importance of concentration and balance. He was successful in conducting operations as long as someone else was controlling the battle as a whole."

Bradley ran the Veterans Administration at the end of the war and became Chief of Staff of the Army in 1948. In 1949 he was promoted to the rank of General of the Army and became the first Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He held that post through the Korean War until he retired in 1953. He wrote his war memoir, *A Soldier's Story*, in 1951, and subsequently authored another memoir in collaboration with Clay Blair. He died in New York City in 1981. (CK)

Lieutenant General John C. H. Lee **Commanding General, Services of Supply**



John Lee was a Regular Army officer, a West Point graduate of 1909, and, like so many of the officers who were to hold key positions in the European theater, an engineer. Between 1909 and 1917 his assignments included tours of duty in the Canal Zone, Guam, and the Philippines, as well as the zone of interior. During World War I he served first as aide to Maj. Gen. Leonard Wood, commanding general of the 89th Division and later Army Chief of Staff, and then as chief of staff of the 89th Division, actively participating in the planning and execution of the St. Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne offensives. In the course of his overseas duty he was awarded the Silver Star, the Distinguished Service Medal, and was twice decorated by the French Government. During most of the period between wars Lee held the usual peacetime engineer assignments, principally on rivers and harbors projects. In 1940 Lee was given command of the San Francisco Port of Embarkation and promoted to brigadier general; a year later he took command of the 2d Division; and in 1942 he was again promoted.

The history of U.S. logistics of the war in Europe is basically the history of the Services of Supply (SOS) and its successor on the continent, the Communications Zone; and the logistical story is therefore inseparably associated with the officer who in May 1942 was designated by General Marshall to command the SOS. General Lee was commanding the 2d Division at Fort Sam Houston, Texas, when on 3 May Lt. Gen. Brehon B. Somervell, commanding general of the War Department SOS, summoned him to Washington for the new assignment.

The choice of General Marshall and General Somervell thus brought to the job a man of varied experience and an officer with a reputation as an able organizer and strict disciplinarian. It also brought to the job a controversial personality, for about Lee and his position most of the controversies over theater organization and command were to rage for the next three years.

Lee arrived in Washington on 5 May and in a series of conferences in the next two weeks laid the basis for the SOS organization in the United Kingdom. A staff was selected within the next week. On 14 May General Lee held the first meeting of his service chiefs, at which he read the draft of a directive indicating the lines along which General Marshall and General Somervell desired to have the SOS organized. Before leaving Washington, acutely aware of the difficulties faced by the SOS in 1917-18, General Lee also called on Maj. Gen. James G. Harbord, commanding general of the American Expeditionary Forces SOS in World War I, hoping to profit from his experience and thus avoid a repetition of the errors of that period. On 23 May 1942 General Lee left the United States with nine members of his staff and with basic plans for the organization of the SOS in England.

The fledgling theater headquarters in the United Kingdom was to be organized "along the general pattern of a command post with a minimum of supply and administrative services." These were to be grouped under the SOS and commanded by General Lee. More specifically, General Lee was given the following powers:

[He was] invested with all authority necessary to accomplish his mission including, but not limited to, authority to approve or delegate authority to:

a. Approve all plans and contracts of all kinds necessary to carry out the objectives of this directive.

b. Employ, fix the compensation of, and discharge civilian personnel without regard to civil service rules.

c. Purchase any necessary supplies, equipment, and property, including rights in real estate practicable of acquirement.

d. Adjudicate and settle all claims.

e. Take all measures regarded as necessary and appropriate to expedite and prosecute the procurement, reception, processing, forwarding, and delivery of personnel, equipment, and supplies for the conduct of military operations.

The directive of 14 May thus assigned broad powers to the SOS, and for this reason it developed into one of the most controversial documents in the history of the theater. It undoubtedly bore the strong influence of General Somervell, who was acutely conscious of the difficulties experienced by the SOS in World War I. But the attempt to limit the top U.S. headquarters to a minimum of administrative and supply functions and to assign them to the SOS was the cause of a long struggle between the SOS and the theater headquarters and the basic reason for the several reorganizations which the two headquarters underwent in the next two years.

Lee was indefatigable in his rounds of inspections of field organizations, and was fully aware of the criticism generated by his use of a special train for that purpose. The acquisition of such a vehicle had been strongly urged on him by General Harbord. The train was intended as a timesaver, and that it undoubtedly was. General Lee refused to bow to the criticism, convinced in his own mind that the train was fully justified. As attested by members of his staff, it was a work train, and an instrument of torture. General Lee set a grueling pace on his inspection trips, and it was rare when a meal was served on the train during daylight hours, for most runs were made at night. The day's work, consisting of inspections & conferences, normally began at five in the morning and lasted until evening. Most of the staff members who accompanied the SOS commander considered the trips agonizing ordeals and would have avoided them if possible.

One other criticism of the SOS commander was probably more justified. Lee assigned some officers to positions of authority and responsibility whose qualifications were at times obscure.

He was exceedingly loyal to these subordinates, usually placing full confidence in them. This otherwise admirable trait sometimes put him in difficult positions, and his own reputation often suffered from their actions and unpopularity. In any event, the atmosphere at the ETOUSA-SOS headquarters was not consistently conducive to the best teamwork.

However inaccurately these circumstances may have reflected the real efficiency of the SOS, it is an inescapable fact that General Lee at least gave poor first impressions and did not always immediately inspire the confidence of the various commanders of the theater. Both General Andrews and General Devers were at first disposed to make a change in the command of the SOS when they assumed command of the theater. The former commanded the theater only a few months. General Devers, after a second look at the operations of the SOS, was satisfied that General Lee was doing a very satisfactory job. General Eisenhower's reactions were similar. While he initially had doubts of Lee's ability to create an efficient supply organization and was fully aware of the complaints of the combat commanders and the tensions between the various headquarters, he finally decided to abandon at least temporarily any thought of replacing the SOS commander, to put complete faith in him, and to trust in the ability of his organization to support the American forces in the coming operation. While the top-level organization and functioning of the SOS left something to be desired, and while there were shortcomings in the supply procedures within the SOS, observers from the Army Service Forces generally agreed that its field organization was functioning well and that the qualms felt by some commanders regarding the SOS's ability to support the cross-Channel operations were unjustified. (Ruppenthal, Roland G., *Logistical Support of the Armies: Volume I, May 1941-September 1944*, Center of Military History, Washington, D.C., 1953)

Lieutenant General Leonard Townsend Gerow **Commanding General, V Corps**

Born in Petersburg, Virginia, Gerow entered the Virginia Military Institute as a State Cadet on 4 September 1907, and graduated with the Bachelor of Science degree and honors in 1911. As the one honor graduate selected each year for appointment to the United States Army, Gerow was granted a Regular Army commission as a second lieutenant of Infantry on 29 September 1911, and assigned to the 19th Infantry at Ft. Leavenworth

Gerow served with the 19th Infantry Leavenworth, at Fort Meade, South Dakota, in the landings at Vera Cruz, Mexico, at Galveston, Texas, and subsequently on the Mexican border at Del Rio, Texas. He was commended for his work in the Galveston storm of 16-17 August, 1915. He remained at various posts throughout Texas and New Mexico. Gerow served briefly in the black 24th Infantry at Columbus, New Mexico, but was detailed within three months to the Signal Corps School at Leon Springs, Texas, where he instructed candidates for commission. While there, he received orders for duty in France and arrived in Brest at the end of April 1918.

Gerow was assigned as officer in charge of purchasing and disbursing for the Signal Corps in all foreign countries, including France, England, Switzerland, Spain, and Italy, and maintained an office in Paris. In those duties, he purchased roughly \$20 million worth of signal equipment for the Army. After the Armistice, his office became the Sales and Disbursing Department for the Signal Corps and he was designated the officer in charge, disposing of approximately \$15



million in Signal Corps materiel to foreign buyers. To his later expressed disgust, he saw no combat action during the war. He was, however, cited in the General Orders of the American Expeditionary Force and the French government awarded him the decoration of Chevalier of the Legion d'Honneur. He returned to the United States in October 1919 and, following brief duty in Washington, assumed command of the 52nd Telegraph Battalion and subsequently the Signal Corps School at Fort Sam Houston. His service in World War I was finally recognized on 6 November 1922 when he was awarded the Distinguished Service Medal.

Promoted to permanent Major in July 1920, Gerow left Fort Sam Houston in December of 1920 and in early 1921 was ordered to duty in the Office of the Chief of Infantry, where he served until July of 1923. He then was assigned to the War Plans Division of the General Staff, where he worked until selected for the infantry advanced course at Fort Benning in September of 1924. Gerow graduated from the Infantry School in May of 1925. He was the honor graduate; the number two man in the class was Omar N. Bradley. Immediately after graduation, Gerow entered the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth and was honor graduate of his course, graduating in 1926.

From August to September of 1929, Gerow was assistant executive officer in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War. He then entered the Army War College, graduating in 1931. Also in 1931, he completed the Field Officers' Course at the Chemical School at Edgewood Arsenal and served as Assistant Commandant of that school.

He next served in the 31st Infantry in Shanghai and the Philippines, commanding both the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of that regiment until May of 1934, when he became commander of Camp John Hay (Philippines). He served in Ninth Corps Area in San Francisco, and was Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, of Fourth Corps Area in Atlanta, in 1935. In April of 1935, he was promoted to lieutenant colonel and returned to the War Plans Division of the War Department General Staff, becoming executive officer of the division.

In March of 1939, Gerow became chairman of the special board for the development of tactical doctrine at Fort Benning, and then was Chief of Staff of the Provisional 2nd Division (later 2nd Infantry Division) at Fort Sam Houston. He remained in that position until the end of 1939. Gerow was a senior control officer with Third Army during the 1940 Louisiana maneuvers. After promotion to Colonel, he was assistant commandant of the Infantry School.

Gerow was promoted to brigadier general in October 1940, well before Patton, Clark, Spaatz, or Eisenhower, and was assigned to duty with the 8th Infantry Division at Fort Jackson. In December of that year, he became Chief, War Plans Division, WDGS. In February 1942 he was promoted to major general and took command of the 29th Infantry Division at Fort Meade. He took the division to England in October 1942, and was subsequently appointed Commander of Field Forces, European Theater of Operations.

At the age of 53, Gerow took command of V Corps in July of 1943, one of the youngest generals to be given command of a major American formation. He commanded V Corps during all of its operations from Omaha Beach on D-Day through January of 1945. These operations included Normandy; the Breakout; the liberation of Paris, where he was the first American general to enter the city; the capture of Compeigne, St. Quentin, Charleville, Sedan, Bastogne, and the city of Luxembourg; penetration of the Siegfried Line; the Huertgen Forest, and the Battle of the Bulge. Gen. Omar Bradley considered Gerow one of his most trustworthy subordinates.

Gerow was promoted to lieutenant general on 1 January 1945 and assumed command of the Fifteenth Army on 15 January. Upon his return to the United States that year, he became Commandant of the Command and General Staff School, where he remained until January of 1948, when he assumed command of Second Army at Fort Meade.

Gerow retired on 31 July 1950. He was temporarily recalled to active duty in April 1951 and served as a member of the Army Logistical Support Panel in the Office of the Chief, Army Field Forces, Fort Monroe, Virginia. While in retirement, Gerow was promoted on the retired list to the rank of general, under the Act of 19 July 1954. He died at Fort Lee, Virginia, on 12 October 1972 and was buried in Arlington Cemetery.

Gerow lacked the tactical imagination, and probably the intuitiveness, that made Collins Bradley's favorite corps commander. He was capable, but uninspired, "a commander of impeccable credentials, hardly brilliant but balanced and sound," according to Martin Blumenson. Gerow was slow to launch the crucial attacks on 17-18 August to close the Falaise Gap, and was criticized for it. In many ways, Bradley was more at fault than Gerow, since he sent him to take command of a situation about which Gerow knew nothing, in the face of very little sound intelligence about German dispositions. (CK)

Major General Joseph Lawton Collins Commanding General, VII Corps

Born in New Orleans in 1896, Collins graduated from West Point in 1917 and was assigned to the 22nd Infantry, earning promotion to temporary captain by 1919. He did not serve in the AEF but was ordered to duty with the Third Army in occupation of Germany in May of 1919. He taught at West Point from 1921 through 1925 and then attended the Infantry School at Fort Benning. From 1927 through 1931, he was an instructor at Benning. Promoted to major in 1932, Collins was next a student to the Command and General Staff School in 1933, whereupon he was ordered to the Philippines. He graduated from the Army Industrial College in 1937 and

the Army War College in 1938, serving as an instructor there until 1941. In that year, he was appointed as chief of staff of VII corps in Alabama.



After the attack on Pearl Harbor, Collins became chief of staff to Maj. Gen. Delos C. Emmons, commander of the Hawaiian Department. Promoted to temporary brigadier general in 1942, Collins took command of the 25th Infantry Division and led it in battle at Guadalcanal and New Georgia, establishing a reputation as an effective and vigorous combat commander. In March of 1944, he was ordered to England, where he assumed command of VII Corps for the Normandy landings. VII Corps landed at Utah Beach and then secured the Cotentin Peninsula and the port of Cherbourg in June and July. In July, VII Corps was the spearhead for the breakout at St. Lô and played a major part in the envelopment of German Seventh Army at Falaise.

Young, attractive, vigorous, and well-spoken, Collins was a good corps commander who consistently delivered results. As a consequence, he was Omar Bradley's favorite commander and a particular favorite of Eisenhower's. Hard driving and able, he had a gift for appearing at the correct point on the battlefield to influence events, as he demonstrated particularly at La Fiere, behind Utah Beach, where he orchestrated the resources of VII

Corps to support a river crossing at a critical moment.

He was impatient with those who lacked his mental agility, however, and was quick to relieve officers from command, occasionally impulsively. In fact, far more division commanders were relieved of command in VII Corps than in any other corps in the European Theater of Operations.

Collins became Chief of Staff of the Army in 1949, succeeding Bradley. He remained in the Army at Eisenhower's request after that tour was over as the U.S. Representative on the Military Committee and Standing Group of NATO, 1953-1956. He was briefly Eisenhower's personal representative to Vietnam with the rank of ambassador. He retired in 1956. Collins died in Washington, D.C., on 12 September 1987. (CK)

Major General Clarence R. Huebner **Commanding General, 1st Infantry Division**

Major General Clarence Huebner assumed command of the 1st Infantry Division on 7 August 1943. Born in 1888 in Bushton, Kansas, Huebner enlisted in the 18th Infantry Regiment in 1910. In the next six years he held every rank from private to sergeant before he earned a regular army commission in 1916. In June 1917 he deployed to France with the 1st Division, where he fought in the battles of Cantigny, Soissons, St. Mihiel, and the Meuse Argonne. He was wounded several times and earned two Distinguished Service Stars. He commanded a company, a

battalion, and a regiment before the war ended in November 1918. He returned to the United States in 1919 with the 1st Division.



During the Interwar Period, Huebner remained in the regular army and attended the Command and General Staff College in 1924. He also served on the CGSC faculty from 1929 through 1933. In 1939, George Marshall recognized the fighting qualities of his former comrade in arms from the Big Red One. By 1942, Huebner was a major general assigned to the North African Theater of Operations as the senior American liaison officer to the British 18th Army Group. He earned some notoriety when he thoroughly irritated General Harold Alexander with his criticism of the British condescension to American soldiers and leaders. He was relieved from his liaison duties and, consequently, was a spare major general in Eisenhower's Allied forces Headquarters when Operation Husky commenced on 10 July.

In July, when Lieutenant General Omar Bradley decided that he was going to relieve Major General Terry de la Mesa Allen from command of the 1st Infantry Division, Eisenhower made Huebner available as a replacement. On 6 August, just as the Big Red One captured Troina, Bradley unceremoniously and rudely relieved Allen and his ADC, Brigadier General Teddy Roosevelt from command and replaced them with Huebner and Colonel Willard Wyman.

Clarence Huebner swiftly brought much needed order and discipline to the ranks of the 1st Division and instituted a rigorous marksmanship program. In October 1943 Huebner and the 1st Division moved to England where they trained for the invasion of Normandy. On 6 June 1944, the 1st Infantry Division spearheaded the assault on Omaha Beach. After vicious fighting the division established a solid bridgehead and moved inland. Huebner landed on Omaha Beach on the afternoon of 6 June and led his division twenty-five miles inland in the next six days. This was the deepest Allied penetration in France in June 1944.

In late July, Huebner commanded the Big Red One as it led VII Corps' breakthrough at St. Lo. The division then raced across France with the 3rd Armored and 9th Infantry Divisions as part of Joe Collins' corps. On 12 September Huebner's division reached the German town of Roentgen, and during the next month surrounded and then captured Aachen, the first German city captured by the Allies in World War II.

Huebner led the division through the Battles of the Huertgen Forest in October and November, losing in the process over six thousand casualties. On 8 December, the division was pulled out of the line for much needed rest. Eight days later the Big Red One was ordered into the Battle of the Bulge, where it helped to hold Elsenborn Ridge and to help destroy three German divisions. Huebner took command of V Corps in December when Leonard Gerow was promoted and assigned to command Fifteenth Army. From then until the end of the war, Huebner led V Corps across Germany to the Elbe River, where he met Russian forces in May 1945.

Huebner served as Seventh Army commander and as Commanding General, USAREUR before he retired as a lieutenant general in 1950. He played a critical role in the racial integration of the European command in 1948-49, where he recognized the need for additional education and

training for African American soldiers assigned to Germany. He died in 1972, having served his nation faithfully in every rank in the army from private to lieutenant general. (*Dr. Scott Wheeler, COL(ret)*)

Walter M. Robertson **Commanding General, 2nd Infantry Division**



Walter Robertson started his Army service at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, and then became a junior officer in the 24th Infantry Regiment with service at the Presidio of San Francisco and Ft. Missoula, Montana. He served in the Inspector General Directorate of the Army Expeditionary Forces in France and then had normal school and troop assignments after the war. But his assignments were largely centered on Fort Sam Houston, home of the 2nd Infantry Division, and before he became the Division Commander in late 1941 he had commanded two of its three regiments (9th and 23rd) and had served as its Assistant Division Commander. He led the Division through the Louisiana Maneuvers, subsequent tests of the use of liaison and artillery spotter airplanes, and an experiment in airlifting an infantry division. He then led the Division through a change of station from Fort Sam Houston (its home since 1919) to Camp McCoy, Wisconsin, where it spent the winter in training for winter warfare, including equipment tests and exercises on skis and snowshoes. These culminated in division-sized winter maneuvers conducted in northern Michigan. He moved the division to Northern Ireland in October 1943, where a lack of training areas limited training to small unit drills. The division staged into Southern Wales in mid-April 1944 and came across Omaha Beach behind the 1st and 29th divisions as part of V Corps. Robertson led the Division in the fight for St. Lo, in the breakout across France, in the hard fighting on the German border, and on into the German heartland. He commanded XV Corps in Austria, 1945-46 and then became deputy commanding general, 6th Army before retiring in June 1950. (*Dr. Hal Nelson, BG(ret)*)

Major General Raymond O. Barton **Commanding General, 4th Infantry Division**

Raymond "Tubby" Barton was born in Granada, Colorado, in 1889. Raised in Oklahoma Territory, he graduated as valedictorian of Ada High School in 1907, the year Oklahoma became a state. He graduated in the West Point class of 1912, three years ahead of his superiors

Eisenhower and Bradley and five years before his immediate superior, Collins. Barton did not see combat in World War I, but he served for four years in Europe in the postwar occupation forces, commanding the last American military post in Germany prior to the departure of the U.S. Army from its occupation zone in 1923, as the commander of 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry.



By 1944, at fifty-four years old, Barton had perhaps reached the age at which Chief of Staff Marshall did not believe men should be commanding combat outfits, but his former West Point sports of boxing and wrestling had helped produce an extraordinarily tough and confident soldier. Described by one 4th Division colonel as “a very strict disciplinarian who commanded his division with an iron hand”, Barton did command respect. During exercises, he was so frequently near the fighting men that it was easy for the troops to recognize his weather-beaten face with its clipped mustache and bushy eyebrows. Shortly after he took command of the 4th in 1942, a member of the 22nd Infantry noted: “His

manner was firm and brisk, but not sour or stiff. The rank and file are strongly impressed with the ability and energetic leadership he has exhibited in the short time since he took command of this division.” In a speech to the 22nd Infantry, 3 July 1942, he said, “I am your leader. I want to know what you think. In the not too distant future we will be in battle. When bullets start flying your minds will freeze, and you will act according to habit. In order that you develop the right habits, training discipline must be strict. I know 90 percent of you want to cooperate. I will take care of the other 10 percent”.

Barton commanded the 4th Infantry Division from 3 July 1942 to 26 December 1944, from Utah Beach to the Liberation of Paris, breaching the Siegfried Line, into the Hürtgen Forest and through the Battle of the Bulge, leaving command due to health problems. He retired in 1946 to Augusta, Georgia, and served as the president of the Augusta Chamber of Commerce. He died in 1963 in Augusta. (Balkoski, *Utah Beach: June 6 1944*, et al)

Major General Manton S. Eddy **Commanding General, 9th Infantry Division**

Manton Eddy was born in 1892 in Chicago. He entered the Regular Army in November 1916 and was commissioned in the infantry before World War I. He served with the rifle and machine gun units of the 4th Infantry Division in France and was wounded in action in August of 1918. After the war, he served on the Infantry Board from 1921 to 1924, and then was Professor of Military Science at Riverside Military Academy from 1925 through 1929. He graduated from Command and General Staff School in 1934 and remained there as an instructor in tactics until 1939.

Eddy became the G2 of III Corps in 1940, a position he retained until assigned to command the 114th Infantry Regiment of the 44th Infantry Division in 1942. He was promoted to brigadier



general in March of that year and to major general in August, whereupon he assumed command of the 9th Infantry Division. General Eddy commanded the 9th Infantry Division in campaigns in Tunisia, Sicily, and Normandy. He was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for his part in the capture of the port of Cherbourg. By July of 1944, he had been chosen to command XII Corps, and was assigned to the newly-activated Third Army.

Eddy had a sound, if unspectacular, record as a combat commander. Reporting on his achievements with the 9th Infantry Division in North Africa, Sicily, and Normandy, the press called Eddy "the country's most brilliant division commander." That reputation was not enhanced by his physical appearance; even his greatest admirers commented that he looked like a Midwest school teacher. Eddy was somewhat more tentative as a Corps commander and had a tendency to control his divisions very closely, a trait that

quickly brought him into conflict with the dynamic Maj. Gen. John "P" Wood, who commanded the 4th Armored Division. He seemed to worry too much about the other corps commanders and whether they were doing better than he. Too, he was not nearly as audacious as Patton, and in the advance from Avranches worried constantly about the Third Army's flanks, which Patton had left to XIX Tactical Air Command to secure. For his part, Patton regarded Eddy as a very sound commander upon whom he could depend.

After the war, Eddy became Commandant of Command and General Staff College, deputy commander of EUCOM, and commanding general of Seventh Army. He retired as a lieutenant general. Aside from the DSC, Eddy received the Distinguished Service Medal with Oak Leaf Cluster, the Silver Star, the Legion of Merit with Oak Leaf Cluster, two Bronze Star Medals, the Air Medal, and the Purple Heart. (CK)

Major General Charles H. Gerhardt **Commanding General, 29th Infantry Division**

Charles Hunter Gerhardt (June 6, 1895 – October 9, 1976) commanded the U.S. 29th Infantry Division from 1943 until the end of World War II and during part of the occupation of Germany. The division's combat operations included the Omaha Beach landings of June 6, 1944 (his 49th birthday), and the taking of the French crossroads town of Saint-Lô in July 1944.

Gerhardt grew up in the Army as the son of a career officer who retired as a brigadier general. The younger Gerhardt attended the United States Military Academy at West Point where he earned a reputation as a skilled football, baseball and polo player. In 1916, Gerhardt



quarterbacked West Point to a 30-10 upset win over Notre Dame, which was led by the famed freshman George Gipp. It was Notre Dame's only loss that year. Upon graduation he was commissioned a Second Lieutenant of Cavalry and served during World War I with the 89th Division. In 1932, Gerhardt was selected as a judge in the equestrian events for the Olympic Games held in Los Angeles, CA. He commanded the 91st Infantry Division at Camp White, Oregon, prior to leading the 29th Infantry Division.

Gerhardt was a hard taskmaster, strict disciplinarian and considered by many of his men to be a martinet, who often became upset at small things such as a soldier not having the chinstrap of his helmet buckled. One famous story has him admonishing a soldier on the day after D-Day on Omaha Beach for dropping peels from the orange he was eating on the ground. He was intolerant of any dirt or mud being on the trucks, and would make soldiers stop and clean a truck under almost any circumstance. Gerhardt was, however, a superb and driven trainer of soldiers and expected the same from his subordinates.

Gerhardt was also one of the European Theater's more controversial generals. His critics held that he was lacking as a military tactician and careless with the lives of his men; often pointing to the astonishingly high casualty rate of the 29th Division. It was said that Gerhardt actually commanded three divisions: one on the field of battle, one in the hospital and one in the cemetery. Gerhardt usually walked the line between approval and disapproval with his superior officers. After the war, he was reappointed to his permanent rank of colonel.

Following World War II Gerhardt served as the United States Defense Attaché to Brazil and in a post at Fort Meade, Maryland. He reattained the rank of brigadier general and was retired at his highest held rank of major general.

Gerhardt is buried at Arlington National Cemetery.

Major General Matthew B. Ridgway Commanding General, 82nd Airborne Division

Ridgway graduated from West Point in April 1917, deployed to the Mexican border, but was assigned to teach Spanish at West Point in September 1918, missing his chance to join the American Expeditionary Forces in France. Ridgway's career was quite unusual. After teaching Spanish, he stayed on at West Point as executive for athletics and graduate manager of athletics. He then shipped out for Tientsin, China, where he served a tour with the 15th Infantry, arriving before George C. Marshall's tour as commander ended. He then became executive assistant to MG Frank McCoy on a special mission to regularize relations between the United States and Nicaragua. He moved on to become a member of the Commission of Inquiry and Conciliation

on the Bolivian-Paraguayan border dispute. After two years in Panama he went to the Philippines in 1932 to serve as military advisor to Theodore Roosevelt, Jr. He then returned to the United States, attended the Staff College and the War College, and joined the War Plans



Division in September 1939, just as Marshall became Chief of Staff. In March 1942 he was promoted to brigadier general and became assistant division commander of the 82nd Infantry Division. Ridgway helped lead the conversion of the Division into the first U.S. airborne division and then became its commander. In March 1943 he took the 82nd into North Africa, and then to Sicily, Salerno, and Anzio.

On D-Day Ridgway jumped with the division into Normandy. In August 1944 he became Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps, before Operation Market Garden, and James Gavin took command of the Division. During the Battle of the Bulge his corps headquarters assumed command of the 30th Infantry Division and 7th Armored Division as well as the 82nd Airborne Division.

After leading his corps to victory in Europe, Ridgway was promoted to lieutenant general and commanded the Mediterranean Theater of Operations, later becoming the deputy Supreme Allied Commander there, 1945-46. He was posted to the United Nations Military Staff Committee where he simultaneously served as the United States Representative and as chairman of the Inter-American Defense Board. He commanded the Caribbean Command, 1948-49, and then served as Deputy Chief for Administration, Department of the Army. During the Korean War he commanded 8th Army, halting the Chinese counteroffensive and replacing General Douglas MacArthur as commander of all UN forces in Korea. He then became NATO Supreme Allied Commander and ended his career as Army Chief of Staff (1953-1955). Ridgway published his memoir, *Soldier*, in 1956. (HN)

Major General Maxwell D. Taylor **Commanding General, 101st Airborne Division**

Maxwell Taylor was born in Keytesville, Missouri, on 26 August 1901. He graduated from the United States Military Academy in 1922 and was commissioned in the Corps of Engineers. He served in the 3rd Engineers in Hawaii until 1926, when he transferred to the Field Artillery. He learned the basics of his new branch in the 10th Field Artillery, but was then sent to Paris to study French. He taught both French and Spanish at West Point, and then attended the Field Artillery School (1933) and the two-year course at Ft. Leavenworth (1933-1935). He was a student of Japanese at the American Embassy, 1935-1939, with detached military attaché duty in Beijing in 1937. He graduated from the Army War College in 1940 and commanded the 12th Field Artillery battalion, 1940-1941. He served in the Office of the Secretary of the General Staff,



1941-1942 and received temporary promotions to lieutenant colonel (December 1941), colonel (February 1942), and brigadier general (December 1942).

He was chief of staff, 82nd Airborne Division in late 1942 and became its artillery commander during its deployment to North Africa in 1943 and during its operations in Sicily and Italy. He received his promotion to temporary major general in May 1944 and commanded the 101st Airborne Division in its operations from D-Day to V-E Day. He then served as Superintendent of the United States Military Academy (1945-1949) and as Commanding General, Berlin Command, 1949-1951. He was promoted to lieutenant general and became the Army's Deputy Chief of

Staff for Operations, 1951-1953. He went to Korea (and received his fourth star) in 1953 as the 8th Army commander. He moved up to command Army Forces Far East in 1954 and then the joint Far Eastern Command in 1955. He was the Army Chief of Staff, 1955-1959.

Taylor was unimpressed with the Eisenhower administration's "Massive Retaliation" strategy, and began writing his critique before he retired. The resulting book, "Uncertain Trumpet," argued for flexible response with stronger conventional forces. President Kennedy recalled him to active duty to serve as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (1962-1964). He again retired, but President Johnson selected him to serve as ambassador to South Vietnam (1964-1965) before bringing him back to Washington as special consultant to the president and chairman of the Foreign Intelligence Advisory board (1965-1969). He served as president of the Institute of Defense Analysis until 1969 and then fully retired from government service. He died in Washington, D.C. in 1987. (HN)

Brigadier General Theodore D. Roosevelt, Jr. Assistant Division Commander, 4th Infantry Division

Theodore D. Roosevelt, Jr. (September 13, 1887 – July 12, 1944) was an American political and business leader, a Medal of Honor recipient who fought in both of the 20th century's world wars. He was the eldest son of President Theodore Roosevelt and his second wife Edith. Roosevelt served as Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Governor of Puerto Rico (1929-32), Governor-General of the Philippines (1932-33), Chairman of the Board of American Express Company, and Vice-President at Doubleday Books, and as a Brigadier General in the United States Army.

Graduating from Harvard in 1908, he entered the business world. He had a flair for business and amassed a considerable fortune in the years leading up to World War I and on into the 1920s. The income from his investments stood him in good stead to become involved in politics after the War. In 1924, he was the Republican nominee for Governor of New York. His cousin Franklin D. Roosevelt opposed his candidacy, and his opponent, incumbent governor Alfred E.

Smith, defeated him by 105,000 votes. Theodore's resignation as Governor-General of the Philippines after the election of FDR as president effectively ended his political career.

In consonance with their father's philosophy of "every man doing his part", all the Roosevelt sons except Kermit had had some military training prior to World War I. After the declaration of



war the Roosevelt boys' father wired Major General "Black Jack" Pershing asking if his sons could accompany him to Europe as privates. Pershing accepted, but, based on their participation in pre-war training that had anticipated US involvement in the war, Archie was offered a commission with rank of second lieutenant, while Ted, Jr. was offered a commission and the rank of major. Quentin had already been accepted into the fledgling Army Air Service. Kermit would volunteer with the British in the area that would eventually become modern-day Iraq.

Theodore volunteered to be one of the first soldiers to go to France. There, he distinguished himself as a battalion commander. So concerned was he for his men's welfare that he purchased combat boots for the entire battalion with his own money. He eventually commanded the 26th Infantry Regiment in the First Division as a lieutenant colonel. He was gassed and wounded at Soissons during the summer of 1918. In July of that year his brother Quentin was killed in combat. Theodore received the

Distinguished Service Cross, and was one of the originators and founders of the soldiers' organization that would become the American Legion.

Theodore resumed his reserve service between the wars. He attended the annual summer camps at Pine Camp and completed both the Infantry Officer's Basic and Advanced Courses and the Command and General Staff College, and so was eligible for senior commissioned service in World War II. In 1940, he attended a military refresher course offered to many businessmen as an advanced student, and was promoted to colonel in the Army of the United States. He returned to active duty in April 1941 and was given command of the 26th Infantry Regiment, 1st Infantry Division, the same unit he fought with in World War I. Late in 1941, he was promoted to brigadier general.

Upon his arrival in North Africa, he was soon known as a general who often visited the front lines. He had always preferred the heat of the battle to the comfort of the command post. Roosevelt led his regiment in an attack on Oran, Africa, on November 8, 1942. During 1943, he was the second-in-command of the 1st Infantry Division in the North African Campaign under Major General Terry Allen. He was cited for the Croix de Guerre by the military commander of French Africa, General Alphonse Juin.

Roosevelt's collaboration and friendship with his commander, the hard-fighting, hard-drinking Allen, and their unorthodox approach to warfare, did not escape the attention and disapproval of General George S. Patton. When Allen was relieved of command of the First Division and reassigned, so was Roosevelt, "on the theory of rotation of command," and adding, concerning Roosevelt, "there will be a kick over Teddy, but he has to go, brave but otherwise, no soldier."

In February 1944, Roosevelt was assigned to England as the Assistant Division Commander of the U.S. 4th Infantry Division. After several verbal requests to the division commander, Maj. Gen. "Tubby" Barton, to lead the first wave ashore were denied, Roosevelt sent a written petition. Barton finally approved this letter with much misgiving, stating that he did not expect Roosevelt to return alive.

Roosevelt would be the only general on D-Day to land with the first wave of troops. He was one of the first soldiers off his landing craft as he led the U.S. 4th Infantry Division's 8th Infantry Regiment and 70th Tank Battalion landing at Utah Beach. Roosevelt was soon informed that the landing craft had drifted more than a mile south of their objective, and the first wave was a mile off course. Walking with the aid of a cane and carrying a pistol, he personally made a reconnaissance of the area immediately to the rear of the beach to locate the causeways that were to be used for the advance inland. He then returned to the point of landing and coordinated the attack on the enemy positions confronting the two battalions. Roosevelt's words were, "We'll start the war from right here!" These impromptu plans worked with complete success and little confusion. With artillery landing close by, each follow-on regiment was personally welcomed on the beach by a cool, calm, and collected Roosevelt, who inspired all with humor and confidence, reciting poetry and telling anecdotes of his father to steady the nerves of his men. He pointed almost every regiment to its changed objective. Sometimes he worked under fire as a self-appointed traffic cop, untangling traffic jams of trucks and tanks all struggling to get inland and off the beach. With his division's original plan modified on the beach, the division was able to achieve its mission objectives by simply coming ashore and attacking north behind the beach toward its original objective. Years later, General Omar Bradley was asked to name the single most heroic action he had ever seen in combat, and he replied, "Ted Roosevelt on Utah Beach."

Throughout World War II, Roosevelt suffered from health problems. He had arthritis, mostly from old World War I injuries, and walked with a cane. He also had heart trouble. On 12 July 1944, one month after the landing at Utah Beach, he died of a heart attack in France. He is buried at the American cemetery in Normandy next to his brother, Lt. Quentin Roosevelt. (Quentin had been killed in France during World War I and buried at Chambery, but was exhumed and moved to the Normandy Cemetery.) When Ted Roosevelt died, he had already been selected by General Dwight D. Eisenhower for promotion to Major General and orders had been cut placing him in command of the 90th Infantry Division. Originally recommended for the Distinguished Service Cross by General Barton, the award was upgraded at higher headquarters to the Medal of Honor which Roosevelt was posthumously awarded on 28 September 1944.

Theodore Roosevelt, Sr. and Theodore Roosevelt, Jr. are one of only two sets of fathers and sons to have been awarded the Medal of Honor. The other set is Arthur and Douglas MacArthur.

Brigadier General Norman D. Cota
Assistant Division Commander, 29th Infantry Division

Norman D. Cota was born 30 May 1893 at Chelsea, Massachusetts, and graduated from the United States Military Academy in April, 1917. An infantryman, he was first assigned to training duty in

the United States, and then as an instructor at the Military Academy, entirely missing overseas duty in World War I. From 1920 through 1924 he served principally as a finance officer. Cota graduated from the Army War College in 1936.



From 1938 to 1940, he taught at the Command and General Staff School. In November, 1940, he became executive officer of the 16th Infantry at Fort Jay, New York, followed in March of 1941 by assignment as G-2 of the 1st Infantry Division. In July of 1941, he became divisional G-3, a post he held until June of 1942. While assigned as G-3, he devised and carried out extensive amphibious training exercises for the division. He became division Chief of Staff in June of 1942, while the division was preparing for movement overseas.

In February of 1943, he was promoted to brigadier general and assigned to British Combined Operations Headquarters in London. Through the spring and summer of 1943, he represented the United States in a series of Anglo-American conferences on combined operations techniques and amphibious operations. In October of 1943, he became Assistant Division Commander of the 29th Infantry Division and

began training that division for the landings in France.

Cota distinguished himself through personal gallantry while serving as Assistant Division Commander of the 29th Infantry Division during the Normandy landings, and was decorated with both the Distinguished Service Cross and the British Distinguished Service Order.

A member of his Weapons Section while teaching at the Infantry School in 1930, Cota had known Bradley for years. For his part, Bradley considered Cota a good friend. After relieving Maj. Gen. Lloyd Brown from command of the 28th Infantry Division during the hedgerow fighting in France, Bradley assigned it to the ADC of the 9th Infantry Division, who was mortally wounded a few hours after taking command. His next choice, in August, was Cota, largely because of his heroism at Omaha Beach. In his postwar analysis, Bradley concluded that Cota led the 28th Infantry Division with great distinction, and that the division "soon became one of the toughest and most dependable in my command."

After the war, Cota brought the division back to the United States and was assigned in 1946 as commanding general of the Fourth Service Command at Fort Jackson. He retired as a major general in June, 1946. He died on 4 October 1971. (CK)

Brigadier General James M. Gavin **Assistant Division Commander, 82nd Airborne Division**

James Gavin enlisted in the Army at age 16, before finishing high school, but was recognized as a bright, talented young Soldier. He earned an "at large" appointment to West Point, graduating in 1929. He tried but failed to become a military pilot and then joined the 25th Infantry in

Arizona. During the 1930's he served in a succession of unit-level assignments and attended the Command and General Staff College. He then served as a Tactical Officer at West Point until 1941, when he returned to troop duty.



Gavin was among the first to attend jump school and by 1942 was a colonel commanding the 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment. He jumped with his troops in Sicily and Salerno, establishing a reputation for leading from the front. He maintained that reputation when he jumped with lead elements as Assistant Division Commander of the 82nd Airborne Division in Normandy after being promoted to brigadier general. He was promoted to major general and became Division Commander on the eve of Operation Market Garden and continued in command of the Division until the end of the war in Europe. He was serving as acting commanding general of XVIII Airborne Corps in mid-December 1944 in LTG General Ridgway's absence but led

his division in the heavy fighting after it deployed to the north shoulder of the Bulge.

Gavin served with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1949-51, and then returned to Europe, where he was Commanding General, VII Corps, 1952-54. He returned to the Pentagon to serve on the Army Staff, but retired in 1958 as a lieutenant general rather than have to continue to defend before Congress military programs he felt endangered American security. He became CEO of Arthur D. Little. He left private life briefly to become President Kennedy's Ambassador to France, and he was never completely comfortable in the private sector, engaging in debate over Vietnam policies and briefly considering a run for the Presidency. As one of his classmates noted, "He might often march to the beat of a different drummer, but he always marched with the flag."

Gavin published five books: *On to Berlin*, *Airborne Warfare*, *War and Peace in the Space Age*, *France and the Civil War in America*, and *Crisis Now*. (HN)

Major General Elwood Richard Quesada **Commanding General, IX Tactical Air Command**

Elwood Quesada was born in Washington, D.C., and educated in the Washington public schools and Wyoming Seminary Preparatory School in Pennsylvania. In 1924, he was a student at the University of Maryland when an Army Air Service pilot invited him to come to Bolling Field for a ride in an Army airplane. This led to his enlistment in the Army in 1924 and flight training at Brooks Field, the Army's primary flight school in San Antonio, Texas. He graduated from primary flight school in February 1925, a student of LT Nathan Twining, a future Air Force Chief of Staff. He then attended a pursuit course at Kelly Field for six months, where he became friends with Thomas White, another future Air Force Chief of Staff, and associated with Charles Lindberg, who was stationed there. Upon completing flight training in September 1925, he was commissioned a second lieutenant in the Army Reserve and released from active duty.

In 1927, he competed for one of a handful of Regular Army positions that opened in the Air Service and was selected. Assigned to Bolling Field in Washington, he became familiar with many types of aircraft, including amphibians, and became the pilot for Major General James E.



Fechet, Chief of the Air Corps. In April of 1928, he flew Fechet to the Labrador crash site of the German aircraft *Bremen*, the first airplane to cross the Atlantic from east to west. For a year thereafter, he served as Fechet's flying aide.

In January 1929, he joined the crew of the *Question Mark*, a Ford tri-motor under command of then-Major Carl Spaatz and then-Captain Ira C. Eaker for its record-setting endurance flight. Quesada served as assistant military attaché in Havana and flying officer for the U.S. Ambassador to Cuba from 1930 through 1932. He was promoted to 1LT in 1932 and became aide to the Assistant Secretary of War for Air, Trubee Davison, and then chief pilot for the New York-Cleveland airmail route in 1933-1934. In that year, he had a brief tour at the Infantry School, where he served as George C. Marshall's pilot and met then-Maj. Omar Bradley.

Later in 1934, he served on the staff of the GHQ Air Force and, in the fall, reported to Maxwell Field, Alabama, to attend the Air Corps Tactical School. Promoted to captain in 1935,

he then attended the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth. It was only when he left there in the spring of 1937 that Quesada got his first real operational flying assignment, as a flight commander in the 1st Bombardment Squadron at Mitchell Field, Long Island. In 1938, he was sent to Argentina to assist in developing its air force. He was an air observer in London in 1939 and was assigned to the War Department General Staff in 1940 with the rank of major.

In July, 1941, he assumed command of the 33rd Pursuit Group at Mitchell Field and was promoted to lieutenant colonel in January 1942, to colonel in March, and to brigadier general in December, when he assumed command of the 1st Air Defense Wing.

In early 1943, he went to North Africa to command the 12th Fighter Command and served as deputy commander of the Northwest African Coastal Air Force. In October, 1943, he reported to England, where he became commander of the IX Fighter Command of the 9th (Tactical) Air Force. He was promoted to major general in April of 1944 and commanded the IX Tactical Air Command in Europe until the end of World War II.


Quesada returned to the United States in June of 1945 as assistant chief of staff for intelligence. In March 1946, he commanded the Third Air Force at Tampa briefly, and then became chief of the Tactical Air Command. He was promoted to lieutenant general in October of 1947. He feuded with the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, Gen. Hoyt Vandenberg, about Vandenberg's decision to reduce the size and strength of Tactical Air Command, and finally retired from active duty in 1951.

Outspoken, occasionally to the point of rudeness, Quesada inspired either deep loyalty or total antagonism in his subordinates. As he matured as a commander, he increasingly won the respect and admiration of those who worked for him. He remained on the outside of the Air Force establishment because he did not subscribe to the strategic bombing doctrine that defined the

service. His determination to make close air support work made enemies among those officers who were primarily concerned with gaining independence for the Air Force. Ground force leaders thought highly of him, as might be expected. Bradley believed Quesada had contributed more to winning the war than had George Patton, and placed Quesada fourth in his listing of the thirty most important American generals, behind only Walter Bedell Smith, Spaatz and Courtney Hodges. Significantly, excepting only Spaatz, Bradley rated Quesada far above any other Air Force general. (CK)

British & Canadian Commanders

General Sir Bernard Law Montgomery Commanding General, 21st Army Group



Montgomery was born in 1887 and entered Royal Military College, Sandhurst, in 1907, commissioned into the Royal Warwickshire Regiment in 1908. He served in the First World War from 1914 onward, and was wounded in the First Battle of Ypres, after which he was promoted to captain and awarded the Distinguished Service Order. He was Brigade Major in the 112th Infantry Brigade in 1915 and general staff officer in the 33rd Division and at IX Corps in 1917. In 1918, he was promoted to brevet major and assigned as general staff officer in the 47th Division. Temporary promotion to lieutenant colonel followed. In 1918, he commanded the 17th Battalion, Royal Fusiliers, in action.

He attended Staff College at Camberley in 1920 and in 1921 became Brigade Major in the 17th Infantry Brigade, followed by assignment as Brigade Major in the 8th Infantry Brigade in 1922. In 1923, he was a general staff officer in the Territorial Army's 49th

Division. In 1925, he returned to his regiment to command A Company, 1st Battalion, Royal Warwicks. As a lieutenant colonel in 1926, he was on the directing staff at the Staff College at Camberley. In 1931, he commanded the 1st Battalion, Royal Warwicks, in Palestine and Egypt, followed in 1934 by a post as Senior Directing Staff at the Indian Army Staff College in Quetta and promotion to colonel.

As war neared, Montgomery remained in command positions. In 1937, promoted to Brigadier, he commanded the 9th Infantry Brigade in England. In 1938, he became a major general and took command of the 8th Division in Palestine. In August of 1939, he returned to the U.K. and

assumed command of the 3rd Infantry Division, which he took to France as part of the British Expeditionary Force. After returning to England in 1940, he was promoted to lieutenant general and took command of V Corps, followed by command of XII Corps in 1941. In August, he was called to Egypt to take command of Eighth Army, and was knighted in November of 1942 in recognition of his successes against the Afrika Korps. He was promoted to full general at the same time. He continued to operate in North Africa until Tunisia fell to Allied arms. He then led the British Eighth Army in the invasion of Sicily. In January of 1944, Montgomery took command of the 21st Army Group in England and began preparing for the invasion of Europe.

No one was neutral about Montgomery. He had a gift for irritating other officers—not only those that did not like him, but also those that did—and was often rude and nearly always overbearing. Evidently personally insecure, he had a mania for always being right, a trait that led him after the war to construct arguments about his plans for the D-Day attack on Caen that have since stirred immense controversy and passionate books by his detractors and defenders alike.

Montgomery's reputation as a brilliant battlefield commander stemmed from the western desert. In fact, however, he was a mediocre commander in an Allied setting, little understanding the demands of coalition warfare, as his smugness and narrowness of view testified. His frankly unbelievable arrogance and chronic tactlessness in dealing with Eisenhower throughout the campaign in western Europe underscored that failure, and very nearly led to his dismissal from command. By the time of the fighting in Normandy, he was not performing at his best, though he still believed that only he knew how to fight a battle properly. His innate caution and predilection for detailed preparation before a battle slowed his momentum to a plod and caused him to miss fleeting opportunities the rapidly changing situation offered. To be fair, the Commonwealth armies had been essentially tapped out on manpower since 1942, and Churchill had stressed to Montgomery the need to hold casualties to a minimum. Such a crucial political consideration obviously affected Montgomery's willingness to take risks in battle.

Infuriating as he frequently was, there was much to admire in Montgomery, and not least his tactical acumen and determination to stick to his own principles. His victories in North Africa had made him a hero to the British people and much of the British and Commonwealth armed forces, and soldiers admired him, trusted him, and were willing to fight for him, no small consideration. He was essential to the British Empire. Winston Churchill summed Montgomery up by saying of him: "In defeat, unthinkable; in victory, insufferable."

After World War II, Montgomery was showered with honors, including being made a Knight of the Garter and being granted a peerage as Viscount Montgomery of Alamein. From 1946 through 1948, he was Chief of the Imperial General Staff, following his mentor, Field Marshal Viscount Alanbrooke. As Carlo D'Este phrased it, the office went from arguably the best CIGS ever to a man who was equally arguably "the most undistinguished CIGS in memory." Montgomery squabbled with the other service chiefs and did not get along with the politicians at Whitehall. He did better as Deputy Supreme Commander of NATO under Eisenhower, and retired in 1958. He wrote a number of books, including a fulsome memoir that justified his conduct of the Normandy campaign. Montgomery died in 1976 at the age of eighty-eight. (CK)

General Sir Miles Dempsey Commanding General, Second British Army



Miles Dempsey was one of the original “Monty men,” having a relationship with Montgomery that reached back into the 1930s.

Dempsey was appointed a second lieutenant in the Royal Berkshire Regiment in 1915 and earned a Military Cross and Mention in Dispatches in France, where he was also wounded in action. In the interwar years, he served in Iraq and returned to the United Kingdom where he attended Staff College at Camberley. There, he was one of Bernard L. Montgomery’s students and made a favorable impression on him that Montgomery later described as frank admiration. In 1940 he was a Brigadier commanding the 13th Infantry Brigade in France and, unlike many, came out of the Battle of France with his reputation as a commander intact.

The consequence was an appointment to command of 13 Corps in North Africa after the Battle of Alamein and the opportunity for further distinction in the pursuit of Rommel’s Afrika Korps westward to Tunisia. In fact, Montgomery had specifically asked for Dempsey’s assignment to his command as soon as he took over Eighth Army. In 1944, Dempsey commanded Second British Army capably, his soldiers bearing the brunt of the battles around Caen.

After VE-Day, Dempsey took command of Fourteenth Army from Field Marshal Slim and commanded it through the liberation of Malaya. He remained in that theater as Commander in Chief, Allied Land Forces, Southeast Asia. In 1946 he was promoted to General and took over the Middle East Command. Dempsey retired from the Army in 1947 and died in 1969.

Like Crerar, who commanded First Canadian Army, Dempsey had little chance to stand in the limelight while under Montgomery’s command. In general, he is today regarded as a highly competent professional soldier, but not as a tactical genius. An ardent student of military history, Dempsey had an unusually retentive memory and a unique skill for reading maps and extracting tactical information from them. As Carlo d’Este reported, “Dempsey would soon leave his army staff in awe over his ability to remember everything he saw on a map, to bring a landscape literally to life in his mind even though he had never actually seen it. This talent proved particularly important during the crucial battles around Caen in June and July 1944.” Many in the British Army regarded Dempsey as the leading expert on combined operations. Others, however, regarded Dempsey as simply colorless and introverted, and thought he lacked the ruthlessness and drive required of an Army commander. The American verdict, as enunciated by George Patton, was that Dempsey was just a “yes man” for Montgomery. (CK)

Lieutenant General Sir John Tredinnick Crocker Commanding General, 1 Corps



John Crocker was born in 1896. He enlisted in the Army as a private soldier in 1915 and served in the Artists Rifles, a famous Territorial Army unit. In January of 1917, he won a temporary commission as a lieutenant in the Machine Gun Corps, and received the Military Cross in the Third Battle of Ypres in 1918. During the German offensive of March 1918, he was decorated with the Distinguished Service Order, an exceedingly rare distinction for a second lieutenant. Crocker returned to civilian life in August of 1919 but returned to the Army in 1920 with a regular appointment in the Middlesex Regiment. In 1922, he served with the Tank Corps and was assigned to the Royal Tank Corps when it was permanently established in 1923.

In 1934, Crocker became Brigade Major (with the rank of captain) to Brigadier P. C. S. Hobart, commanding the army's first permanent tank brigade, and later became G.S.O.1 in the army's first armored division in 1937, serving under Gen. Alan Brooke. His promotion was swift; he received brevets as major in 1934 and as lieutenant colonel in 1935. In April of 1940, Crocker took command of one of that division's two tank brigades and took it to France in May, arriving after the German breakthrough. His 3rd Armored Brigade took part in the fighting along the Somme and escaped across the Seine. Eventually, he extricated the remnants of his force from Cherbourg in the middle of June. His "cool and competent" handling of the retreat led to his appointment to command the 6th Armored Division. In 1942, he was in command of 9 Corps.

Crocker then commanded his corps in the Western Desert, serving under Montgomery in the Eighth Army. In Tunisia the U.S. Army's 34th Infantry Division had been attached to Crocker's provisional 9 Corps at Fondouk. When it failed in a frontal attack, Crocker criticized the Americans to the press. The resulting flurry of charges and countercharges did nothing to improve his standing with Eisenhower or Bradley. He gave up command of 9 Corps to Horrocks shortly before the final push on Tunis, having been injured during the demonstration of a new mortar.

He arrived in Britain at the end of the Tunisian campaign and took command of 1 Corps, ultimately assigned to First Canadian Army. Gen. Henry Crerar wanted to sack Crocker immediately to give the command to a Canadian officer, but Montgomery wouldn't allow it. He thought highly of Crocker and in fact, after the war, recommended Crocker as his successor as Chief of the Imperial General Staff.

Crocker was one of the Army's veteran armored corps commanders and was widely known as a stern and humorless officer, but regarded as the ideal commander of a tank-heavy corps. After returning from Africa and taking over corps command for the invasion, he attempted to

overcome the tendency of the soldiers under his command to dig in prematurely, a trait noticed by a number of British commanders, though with little success.

Crocker was the first officer of the Royal Tank Regiment to command a corps in combat and the first to become a commander in chief, a job he held in the Middle East after the war. A leading candidate for appointment as Chief of the Imperial General Staff in succession to Montgomery, he instead became Adjutant General of the Forces and a member of the Army Council until 1953. Earlier, in 1948, he had been honored through an appointment as Colonel-Commandant of the Royal Tank Regiment. From 1948 through 1951, he was an Aide de Camp to King George VI. In 1957, he was vice chairman of the Imperial War Graves Commission and served as a member of the Battle Honours Committee. In 1961, he was appointed Her Majesty's Lieutenant for the County of Middlesex. In addition to his other decorations, he received the Grand Cross of the Order of the Bath and a Knighthood of the Order of the British Empire. He died in 1963. (CK)

Lieutenant General G. C. Bucknall **Commanding General, 30 Corps**



Bucknall was a graduate of Sandhurst with long service before World War II. He commanded the 5th Infantry Division in Sicily and Italy, where he so impressed Montgomery that Montgomery brought him back to England to command 30 Corps in the invasion of Europe. He proved to be one of Montgomery's few poor selections. Field Marshal Alan Brooke was surprised at this choice and thought Bucknall was unsuitable for a corps command, considering him "weak". Early evidence supported this judgment. It appears that Bucknall did not choose to attend the final OVERLORD briefing, instead doing some shopping in London that afternoon.

He seemed to do well during the landings themselves, but subsequently performed poorly as a corps commander. His chief of staff, the very capable Brigadier Harold Pyman, remarked that the fighting behind the beach seemed beyond his capabilities because "open warfare was not nearly so much up his street. He kept getting out of position." Worse yet, 30 Corps was the most battle-experienced in the British Army; veteran staff officers and commanders were accustomed to firm and inspirational leadership that Bucknall simply could not provide. He performed very poorly in the fight at Villers-Bocage, where a small German armored force halted the Allied attack, and failed to seize and exploit fleeting opportunities on the battlefield.

Bucknall was not bold, decisive or resourceful, as the fight at Villers-Bocage illustrated. He was, both by temperament and experience, conventional and cautious and was unable to adapt to the style of fighting forced on the British in the bocage by the much more experienced Germans. Dempsey, the Second British Army commander, decided not to relieve Bucknall after Villers-


Bocage, but asked Montgomery to fire him in early August for, in the opinion of Brigadier Pyman, making “no effort to push hard or carry out” his orders. Montgomery replaced Bucknall with the dynamic Brian Horrocks on 4 August.

Bucknall served as General Officer Commanding, Northern Ireland, from 1945-1947, retiring in 1947. He died in 1981. (CK)



BG Theodore D. Roosevelt, Jr.

German Command Architecture



The simplicity of the chart belies its complexity. For a variety of reasons not at all related to the actual fighting, Hitler organized the defense of France in a set of stovepipes. Thus, von Rundstedt was the nominal commander-in-chief for all of France and the BENELUX countries. However, the primary defense forces were under the separate command of Rommel but even he had no direct command over the critical Panzer (armored and motorized) reserves which responded directly to Hitler's headquarters. Note that while *Oberkommando des Herres* (OKH – Army High Command) exercised command over units on the Eastern Front it did not control OB-West units, which were under direct command of OKW. Note also that there was no formal relationship between any of the ground commanders and the Air Force (Luftwaffe) (which included airborne troops and air defense troops) nor was there a formal relationship with the naval coast artillery, although in practice Rommel had assumed adequate control of these assets. Additional complexity was added by the existence of the *Waffen SS* as a parallel force to the Army. While SS units were often integrated into operational organizations, they were never under the full control of Army commanders.

**DETAILED ORDER OF
BATTLE FOR OB-WEST**

**JUNE
1944**

OBERBEFEHLSHABER WEST
(Commander in Chief, West)
Generalfeldmarschall Gerd von Rundstedt

HERRESGRUPPE G
(Army Group G)
Mediterranean Coast & South of France
Gen. Johannes Blaskowitz

FIRST ARMY
Atlantic Coast
Gen. Kurt von Chavallierie

NINETEENTH ARMY
Mediterranean Coast
Gen. Georg von Soderstern

HERRESGRUPPE B
(Army Group B)
Generalfeldmarschall Erwin Rommel


SEVENTH ARMY
Normandy
Gen. Friedrich Dollman


FIFTEENTH ARMY
Pas de Calais
Gen. Hans von Salmuth

LXXXVIII Korps
Netherlands
Gen. Hans Reinhard

PANZERGRUPPE WEST
*General der Panzertruppen Leo
Freiherr Geyr von Schweppenburg*


**NOTE: ALL ARMORED
UNITS WERE CONSIDERED
PART OF GERMANY'S
STRATEGIC RESERVE AND
THEIR USE WAS
CONTROLLED FROM
BERLIN, THOUGH THEY
WERE IN OB-WEST ORDER
OF BATTLE. BERLIN ALSO
DETERMINED WHEN
FIFTEENTH ARMY UNITS
WENT TO NORMANDY.**





German Order of Battle

June 1944



GERMAN TACTICAL ORGANIZATION AND CAPABILITIES

Infantry Organization: The Manpower-Firepower Tradeoff

Persistent manpower shortages drove the Germans to decrease the size of all units, but particularly the infantry division, which in 1944 was reduced from 13,656 to 12,769. This reduction was accomplished by reducing each of the division's three infantry regiments from three battalions to two and setting the standard company organization at two officers and 140 other ranks (as compared with the TOE of six officers and 187 other ranks in a U.S. infantry company). On the general theory that an army fighting a defensive battle had a diminished use for a reconnaissance battalion, the division also lost that unit, replacing it with a fusilier battalion. The fusilier battalion was organized much like an infantry battalion, except that one company was mounted on bicycles and the battalion had generally more transport, both mechanized and horse, than other battalions in the division. In practice, it was simply used as another infantry battalion. To compensate for less manpower, the German division began replacing the KAR 98 bolt-action carbine and GEW 98 bolt-action rifle with automatic weapons.

The Luftwaffe's paratroop units continued to be the best infantry organizations in every respect. Administratively under the Air Force but under Army tactical control, they were an elite arm that received the same priority for quality recruits, training, and equipment that the SS enjoyed. In Normandy, they were well-equipped, first rate infantry divisions, although they did have some shortages of heavy artillery and their transport was always a problem. The 6th Parachute Regiment had only 70 trucks, by way of example, and among those were 50 different models. The soldiers were young, aggressive, well-motivated volunteers with excellent leadership.

Assessments of Divisions under Seventh Army Control

77th Infantry Division. (*Generalmajor* Rudolf Stegmann). Formed in Poland in the winter of 1943-1944, some soldiers came from the disbanded 364th Infantry Division. The units assigned to Normandy in January and February of 1944 and located on the Cotentin Peninsula and Brittany. Isolated, the division attempted to break out of the peninsula and managed to get almost half of its strength out. The division commander was killed by U.S. air attack on 18 June 1944. The senior regimental commander, Oberst Rudolf Bacherer, took over and completed the breakout. The division was later almost completely destroyed near Dinard.

243rd Infantry Division. (*Generalleutnant* Heinz Hellmich). Organized in the summer of 1943 and sent to Brittany in October of 1943, the division was not up to strength in June of 1944. Only one of its three infantry regiments was motorized; one had bicycles; the third had horse-drawn transport. The division commander, a good and efficient combat leader, was killed by air attack on 16 June 1944. The division was engaged in the

defense of Cherbourg, where it was almost totally destroyed. The division was disbanded in August 1944.

265th Infantry Division. (*Generalleutnant* Walther Düvert). The division was organized at the Bergen-Hohne Training Area in the summer of 1943 from eastern front veterans. Sent to Brittany, the division exchanged some personnel with the 65th Infantry Division and then lost two battalions to Russia in late 1943. After D-Day, the division fought in Normandy and was literally destroyed. Some detached elements were in the siege of Brest, where they were also destroyed, and at Lorient, where they were cut off until the end of the war.

266th Infantry Division. (*Generalleutnant* Karl Spang). Organized in the summer of 1943 at the Müsingen Training Area from eastern front veterans and recruits from the east that were, according to Adm. Ruge, Rommel's naval liaison, "of very little combat value." Moved to France in 1943 for coastal duties, the division lacked vehicles and was cut off in the Brittany peninsula. Most of the division was captured by VII Corps units.

275th Infantry Division. Formed in late 1943 from the disbanded 223rd Infantry Division that had been destroyed at Kiev, the 275th arrived in Brittany in early 1944. The division was not completely formed when it arrived, consisting of the division staff, one regimental staff, one artillery battalion, two battalions of old men, and little else. Units drawn from other divisions filled out the 275th. The division also contained 27 companies of fortress cadre troops, seven battalions of eastern (i.e., Russian) infantry, one Russian bicycle detachment, and one Russian engineer company. A Russian cavalry regiment was loaned to the Normandy sector to emplace mines. The division entered the fighting in Normandy to replace the exhausted Panzer Lehr Division, but was virtually annihilated by Operation COBRA. The remnants were further reduced in the Falaise Pocket, after which the division was officially listed as destroyed in action.

319th Infantry Division. (*Generalleutnant* Rudolf Graf von Schmettow). Organized in late 1940, the division defended the Channel Islands of Jersey, Guernsey, Alderney, Sark, Herm, and Jethou in 1941, as well as St. Malo and the adjacent coast. Because Hitler was convinced the Allies would fight to take the Channel Islands, he reinforced the division to some 40,000 men, the strongest German division at any time in the war. Instead, the Allies bypassed the islands. Some few troops were moved to the Normandy front and fought on the Cotentin Peninsula. The main body surrendered, mostly without firing a shot in anger, on 9 May 1945.

343rd Infantry Division. (*Generalmajor* Erwin Rauch). Formed in October 1942 at Grafenwöhr Training Area, it was a static division with virtually no vehicles and lacking many other categories of equipment. Sent to France in early 1943, it was stationed near Brest and took part in the siege. The division's survivors surrendered on 19 September 1944.

352nd Infantry Division. (*Generalleutnant* Dietrich Kraiss). The 352nd was formed from elements of the 268th and 321st Infantry Divisions in late 1943 and assigned to the

eastern part of the Cotentin Peninsula, where it met the full force of the Allied landings. Just before the landings, it had only four battalions of infantry and four field artillery batteries ready for action. Still, the division fought well. By 7 June, it was at battle group strength. Its survivors were eventually absorbed by the 2nd Panzerdivision. The division commander was killed at St. Lô on 2 August 1944.

353rd Infantry Division. (*Generalleutnant* Paul Mahlmann). The division was formed in October of 1943 from cadres from the 328th Infantry Division and sent to Brittany. It was constantly in action throughout June and July and broke out of the Falaise Pocket with about half of its strength intact.

709th Infantry Division. (*Generalleutnant* Karl-Wilhelm von Schlieben). An understrength static division, the 709th was made up of men averaging 36 years old. The division was organized in April of 1941 and sent to Normandy at the end of that year, where it occupied a 220-kilometer front to the west of the 716th Infantry Division, between the Orne and Vire. Remnants of the division were sent to Cherbourg after D-Day and fought well in the defense.

716th Infantry Division. (*Generalleutnant* Wilhelm Richter). The division was formed in April of 1941 from older personnel and sent to occupy the Caen area. The division manned fortifications on a 90-kilometer stretch of channel coast, with two regiments forward. The division right sector had strong points sited for mutual support, averaging 600 to 1000 meters apart. On the left sector, however, strong points were from three to three and one-half kilometers apart. Adm. Friedrich Ruge thought the division lacked "a clear understanding of the dangerous situation and of the determined will to prevent the enemy from reaching land." Engaged in heavy combat on D-Day, the division sustained very heavy losses and was withdrawn from battle. After reconstitution, it was sent to Southern France.

2nd Parachute Division. (*Generalmajor* Hermann Ramcke; later, *Oberst* Hans Kroh). Formed from the 2nd Parachute Brigade that had fought in North Africa, the division was stationed in Brittany and then transferred to the Russian front in 1943, where its 6th regiment was almost totally wiped out. Withdrawn from Russia in May of 1944 and sent to Germany for a refit, it was returned to Brittany, less the 6th Parachute Regiment (attached to the 91st Air Landing Division) to be reconstituted. The division was destroyed in the defense of Brest.

3rd Parachute Division. (*Generalmajor* Richard Schimpf). Formed at Rheims in late 1943 with a cadre from the 1st Parachute Division, this unit had more than 17,000 men at full strength. It was committed to battle in Brittany as infantry and took heavy casualties. By 11 July, it was down to one-third of its original strength. Surrounded in the Falaise Pocket most of the remainder were captured. The division commander was badly wounded at Falaise.


5th Parachute Division. (*Generalmajor* Gustav Wilke). Formed at Reims in March of 1943 from the XI Air corps Demonstration Battalion, the 5th was assigned to Normandy,

where it was heavily engaged, then trapped in the Falaise Pocket and later almost completely destroyed.

91st Air Landing Division. (*Generalleutnant* Wilhelm Falley). The 91st was formed at the Baumholder and Bitsch Training areas from replacement center personnel and was sent to the Cotentin Peninsula to fight as infantry. From D-Day onward, it was engaged with the American 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions and took very heavy casualties in the first few days. By the end of one week of battle, it was down to below battle group strength. The division was later rebuilt and made a gallant stand at Rennes. The division commander was killed by American paratroopers before dawn on 6 June. The division was reinforced by the 6th Parachute Regiment from the 2nd Parachute division.

German Armored Division Organization, 1944

All German armored divisions were much larger than an American armored division, but all were also much weaker in tanks. German armored divisions varied so widely in strength that it is impossible to speak of a “type” division. Army panzer divisions ranged from around 12.7 thousand to 16.5 thousand soldiers. SS panzer divisions ranged from 17.6 thousand to 21.4 thousand. In general, Army panzer divisions had four mechanized or motorized infantry battalions, while SS panzer divisions had six. Each had a single tank regiment.



In fact, no German armored division in Normandy had that many tanks, and each armored division actually had an armored organization that varied more or less from the Panzer Regiment model. The German Army goal in 1944 was to convert both battalions of the Panzer Regiment to the PzKpfw. V "Panther," but they were a long way from accomplishing that when the Allies landed in June. In many cases, shortages of tanks were compensated for by supplying assault guns in their place. Thus, for example, the situation even in the SS Panzer Divisions, which tended to be the best equipped:

UNIT	INTENDED ARMAMENT	ACTUAL ARMAMENT
1 st SS Panzer Division	45 Assault Guns 21 PzKpfw. III 101 PzKpfw. IV 81 PzKpfw. V	45 Assault Guns 50 PzKpfw. IV 38 PzKpfw. V
2 nd SS Panzer Division	75 Assault Guns 7 PzKpfw. III 57 PzKpfw. IV 99 PzKpfw. V	33 Assault Guns 44 PzKpfw. IV 25 PzKpfw. V

Overall Tank Strength in France in April, 1944, was 1,608 German-made tanks and assault guns, of which 674 were PzKpfw. IV and 514 were PzKpfw. V. The planned total for the end of May was 1,994.

Lack of repair parts reduced the numbers that were operationally ready. In February of 1944, the German Army had 1,519 tanks operational, with 1,534 under repair. Only 145 damaged tanks were returned to units in the course of that month. In February, Gen. Heinz Guderian, inspector of the armored force, estimated that tanks awaiting repair equaled nine months' production of new tanks.

Assessments of Armored Divisions under Panzergruppe West Control

German commanders generally agreed that armor would be the key to defeating an Allied invasion. The problem was that they did not agree on how. Rommel, who had first-hand experience with trying to move forces where the Allies had aerial supremacy, argued that the armor should be close to the chore. On the other hand, von Rundstedt and Geyr von Schweppenburg, whose experience was on the Russian front, wanted to retain the armor inland so as to move it to the Allied main effort. Hitler tended to side with von Rundstedt, but kept armor under his own control, with the effect that none of it was available when needed on June 6-7.

There were ten panzer divisions and one panzergrenadier division in the west, and the cumulative tank strength was in excess of 1,500. This amounted to nearly 30 percent of the total German armored strength. Of the divisions in the first week of June, some were refitting and recuperating from being depleted on the eastern front and three had no combat experience at all. The average tank strength per division was 75, as compared

with 263 in an American armored division. The types of tanks varied widely from the Panther through the PzKpfw IV to various types of Czech and French tanks.

The Panzer Divisions varied considerably in equipment. Their tank strength did not begin to compare with the Allied armored divisions. On a tank versus tank basis, however, the Germans far overmatched every allied tank, particularly when they employed the much-feared PzKpfw VI, the Tiger, with its 88-mm cannon. Most of the Tiger tank variants were sent to the eastern front, and American forces encountered very few of them until the Battle of the Bulge. Instead, the Germans made heavy use of the PzKpfw V, the Panther, a very effective tank. The most commonly used tank in the west, the Panther had a long-barreled high-velocity 75-mm gun that out-ranged most of the Allied tank cannon. There is a frankly unbelievable story (though cited in the U.S. Army official history volume on the Ordnance Corps as fact) that a Panther killed a T-34 tank in Russia at a range of 7,224 meters with a first-round hit. The Panther also incorporated many lessons from the eastern front, including the use of sloping armor to deflect shot. The frontal armor on the Panther was invulnerable to any Allied tank in Normandy. The Panther was, however, in relatively short supply, even in the SS divisions, and had their number made up by the PzKpfw IV. The main limitation was that there was a universal and persistent shortage of spare parts. Because Hitler was entranced with numbers, German armament production officials gave absolute priority to building complete tanks. That focus on the end item meant a low priority on repair parts, and tank unit readiness suffered accordingly. The other hitch was that the Panther was much more complicated than the relatively simple Sherman and needed specialized repair and maintenance organizations to keep it running.

One variant of the Panther was the Jagdpanzer, a tank destroyer that mounted an 88-mm gun in the hull and that carried 57 rounds of ammunition. A few of those (only 382 were built) appeared in France. The tank destroyer and assault gun designs were indicative of problems in the German armaments industry, since building a tank without a turret was far less complex and therefore faster.

Only one Panzergrenadier Division was stationed in France, the 17th SS Panzergrenadier Division. It was, like all SS units, stronger than its Army counterpart, but this particular division was not at full strength. It had two rifle regiments with three battalions each. One regiment was supposed to be motorized and have one armored battalion. In reality, four battalions had whatever trucks could be found and the other two had only bicycles. The tank battalion, which should have had 42 assault guns, had 37. It had no tanks. The anti-tank battalion had one company of its authorized three and manned nine 75mm and three 76.2mm anti-tank guns, the latter captured Russian weapons. The anti-aircraft battalion had 80 percent of its authorized manpower. At the start of the campaign, the division had 17,321 of an authorized 18,354 end strength.

Only six of these divisions were within the Army Group B AOR:

1 st SS Panzer Division (refitting)	Panzer Lehr Division
2 nd Panzer Division	21 st Panzer Division
12 th SS Panzer Division	116 th Panzer Division.

The divisions were under command of various armored corps:

XLVII Panzer Korps (General der Panzertruppen Hans Freiherr von Funck)

I SS Panzer Korps (SS Oberstgruppenführer Josef "Sepp" Dietrich)

II SS Panzer Korps (SS Oberstgruppenführer Paul Hausser)

2nd Panzer Division (*Generalleutnant* Heinrich Freiherr von Lüttwitz)

Formed in 1935, the 2nd Panzer was one of the first German armored divisions to be created. It fought in Poland and in France, the Balkans, and Russia, taking heavy losses at Kursk. It was moved to France for refitting. The division broke out from the Falaise pocket, again after taking heavy losses.

1st SS Panzer Division (*Leibstandarte* Adolf Hitler) (*SS Gruppenführer* (MG) Theodor Wisch). Formed in 1934 as a bodyguard regiment for Hitler and expanded to become a motorized infantry division in 1941, the division fought in Poland, France, and the Balkans before taking part in the invasion of Russia in 1941. Suffering heavy losses in 1941-1942, it was sent to northern France to refit as a panzer grenadier division. It took part in the occupation of Vichy France and returned to the eastern front in the spring of 1943, suffering heavy casualties at Kursk and Kharkov. It was reconstituted as an armored division in northern Italy and returned to Russia for battles at Kiev, Tarnopol, and in the Dnieper. Again taking heavy losses, it rebuilt in Belgium to a strength of 21,400 men. It fought at Caen and at Mortain and was surrounded at Falaise, following which it was down to 30 tanks.

2nd SS Panzer Division (*Das Reich*) (*SS Obergruppenführer* (LTG) Heinz Lammerding; *SS Standartenführer* (COL) Karl Kreutz). The 2nd SS Panzer Division was organized in the winter of 1940-1941 and took part in the Balkans campaign and then in Russia at Smolensk, Kiev, and the battle of Moscow, losing almost ten thousand men in the winter campaign. It was sent to France in the summer of 1942 to refit, took part in the occupation of Vichy France in November of 1942, and then returned to the Russian front to fight at Kharkov, Kursk, and Kiev, again suffering heavy casualties. Sent to the Toulouse area to refit, it was ordered to Normandy after D-Day and was used as a "fire brigade," usually being employed in separate combat groups. In this action, Lammerding was wounded. After taking part in the counterattack at Mortain, the division was surrounded at Falaise. It broke out with a strength of 450 men, fifteen tanks, and six guns. By September, the division had only three tanks left.

9th Panzer Division (*Generalmajor* Harald Baron Gustav von Elverfeldt). The 9th Panzer was organized as the 4th Light Division and took part in the invasion of Poland. After that campaign, it was converted to an armored division and redesignated the 9th Panzer. It took part in the invasion of France in 1940 and in the Balkans, both in Greece and Yugoslavia. In 1941 it was part of Army Group South in Russia and attacked toward Kiev. It was heavily damaged at Kursk and sent to southern France to rebuild. In late August of 1944 it was sent to Normandy to help the

disintegrating Seventh Army, just in time to be trapped at Falaise. It broke out of the pocket with a strength of one infantry battalion, one artillery battalion, and about a dozen tanks.

12th SS Panzer Division (*Hitlerjugend*) (*SS Gruppenführer* Fritz Witt [KIA 16 June]) followed by *SS Gruppenführer* Kurt Meyer). The division was formed in 1943 from members of the Hitler Youth, and the average age of the division in that year was 17. It fought bravely, fanatically, in Normandy, but with very heavy casualties, escaping from Falaise with only 300 soldiers and a handful of tanks.

Panzer Lehr Division (also known as 130th Panzer Division) (*Generalleutnant* Fritz Bayerlein). One of the strongest, best equipped, and best manned of all the panzer divisions, the Panzer Lehr had more than 100 tanks, 40 assault guns, and 600 half-tracks. It stopped the British-Canadian advance at Caen, but lost more than forty percent of its strength in the process. It was stationed at St. Lô at the time of the breakout.

21st Panzer Division (*Generalleutnant* Edgar Feuchtinger). Formed in Normandy in 1943 and bearing the name of a famous Afrika Korps division. The only armored division over which Rommel exercised any control prior to the invasion, it was stationed just south of Caen. The division had a few Afrikakorps veterans but had poorly equipped light tanks, many of foreign manufacture, and was not rated as fit for service on the eastern front.

116th Panzer Division (*Generalleutnant* Graf Gerhard von Schwerin). Formed by combining the remnant of the 16th Panzer Grenadier Division, which had been savaged in Russia, with the 179th Reserve Panzer Division in France. Stationed on the north bank of the Seine, it was not committed until late July. Broke out from the Falaise Pocket with just over 500 men and 40 tanks.

17th SS Panzergrenadier Division (*SS Brigadeführer* (BG) Werner Ostendorf). The division was in Army Group G's AOR but was assigned to Army Group B. Formed in France in 1943, it was drawn from German, Belgian, Romanian, and Volksdeutsche troops and was stationed north of Poitiers as part of the OKW reserve. Rushed to Normandy on 11 June, it was in heavy action against the American airborne divisions at Carentan. It was almost annihilated at St. Lô and the remnants were temporarily absorbed into the 2nd Panzer Division

TAB K
German Biographies



Hitler & von Rundstedt

German Biographies

Generalfeldmarschall Karl Rudolf Gerd von Rundstedt Oberbefehlshaber-West (Commander-in-Chief, West)



Born 12 December 1875 at Aschersleben in the Harz mountains and a graduate of the prestigious *Hauptkadettenanstalt* at Gross-Lichterfelde, von Rundstedt began active military service 22 March 1892 and earned a commission as lieutenant in the 83d Royal Prussian Infantry Regiment on 17 June 1893. After ten years of regimental service he passed the entrance examination for the *Kriegsakademie* in Berlin. After graduating, he was appointed to the Great General Staff, on which he served until 1909. He then served on General Staff with troops as a captain in a corps headquarters.

Just finishing a tour of command of an infantry company when war broke out in 1914, he was assigned as operations officer in the 22d Reserve Infantry Division, which participated in the great attack across France with the First German Army. In 1915 he was promoted to major and sent to the eastern front as a division chief of staff. The fighting

along the Narew River line in the summer of 1915 resulted in mobile warfare, and von Rundstedt got a taste of maneuvering troops in an advance that extended more than 250 miles. Before the end of the war, he had also served as a corps chief of staff.

He remained in the 100,000-man German army at the end of the war, commanding the 18th Infantry Regiment as a colonel (his first troop command since 1914). As a major general, he was chief of staff of a military district. Promoted to lieutenant general, he commanded the 2nd Cavalry Division. In 1934, as general of infantry, he commanded 1st Army Group. In 1938, he led the Second Army in the occupation of the Sudetenland.

He resigned from the army in 1938 in protest against Hitler's policies, which he thought would lead to a war for which Germany was grossly unprepared. He retired as a colonel-general and was appointed colonel-in-chief of the 18th Infantry Regiment, a distinction he valued highly. As a field marshal, he customarily wore his marshal's rank insignia on the uniform of a colonel of the 18th Infantry Regiment. With the invasion of Poland in 1939, he accepted recall to active duty and commanded army groups with distinction in Poland, Belgium, and France. Hitler promoted him to field marshal after the fall of France in 1940. In 1941 he commanded Army Group South in Operation BARBAROSSA, the invasion of Russia. Hitler relieved him of command in Russia at the end of 1941, although von Rundstedt gave impaired health (he had a heart attack in early November) as the reason. In March 1942, he was appointed commander-in-chief, west, with headquarters in France. By 1944, however, Hitler had given actual command of the army groups

in France to von Rundstedt's subordinates and himself retained command of the operational reserve. The old man joked that his sole military prerogative was to change the guard at his headquarters. In July 1944, Hitler once again relieved him, but again reappointed him C-in-C West on 5 September. His professional reputation did as much as his abilities to bring order out of the chaos of the German forces on the west and, aided by the Allies' supply difficulties, von Rundstedt stabilized the front. He remained in command through the Battle of the Bulge, which was not his plan and in which he had no faith, and was finally dismissed from command in March of 1945. He died in Celle on 24 February 1953.

A soldier for more than half a century, von Rundstedt learned the lessons of World War I well and insisted on increasing fire support and mobility for the infantryman. He approved of tanks but did not envision the kind of rôle for them that such advocates as Heinz Guderian pressed for. Fluent enough in French to have passed the army's interpreter examination, he could also speak English. Stiff, formal, dedicated to his profession, he led a simple life and was indifferent to money or possessions. Yet he was affable to subordinates, extravagantly polite to women, smoked too much, and enjoyed an occasional drink.

Unlike men such as Rommel and Guderian, he preferred to command from a headquarters, rather than from the front line. He felt that commanders at the front risked becoming so involved in the local fight that they lost perspective on the entire battle (a failing to which Erwin Rommel was occasionally prone). He refused to become immersed in details and preferred to work from a 1:1,000,000 map, from which he could take in the entire situation at a glance. Thus he depended heavily on his chief of staff, who happened to be Erich von Manstein early in the war. It was a particularly successful professional relationship.

Almost seventy years old in 1944, von Rundstedt was a soldier of the old school, widely admired by the German officer corps. Hitler disliked him intensely, partly because of the social class of officers he represented and partly because he knew that von Rundstedt referred to the Fuehrer in private as "the Corporal." By the fall of 1944, his age was showing. Many of his associates saw him for what Hitler intended him to be—a figurehead.

At SHAEF headquarters, it was Rundstedt "whom we always considered the ablest of the German generals," as Eisenhower later said. Even Bernard Montgomery, rarely given to praising other generals, said "I used to think that Rommel was good, but my opinion is that Rundstedt would have hit him for six. Rundstedt is the best German general I have come up against."

***Generalfeldmarschall* Erwin Johannes Eugen Rommel** **Commanding General, Army Group B**

Erwin Rommel was born at Heidenheim, in Swabia, in 1891. He joined the 124th Infantry Regiment (6th Württemberg) as an officer cadet in 1910 and then attended the cadet school at Danzig in 1911. He was commissioned a Lieutenant in 1912. He was assigned to the 19th Field Artillery Regiment when World War I started. World War I made him famous. He received the Iron Cross, Second Class, during the early battles on the western front in 1914, when the decoration really meant something, and the First Class the next year. In October of

1917, he was awarded the Order Pour le Mérite, one of the few junior officers to be so recognized, for the capture of Monte Matajur in the Battle of the Isonzo. In 1918, he was promoted to captain.



After the war, he was taken into the Reichswehr and spent the remainder of the decade as a company officer. Not a graduate of the Kriegsakademie, officers who had that distinction looked down on him, and in the normal course of events the lack of that diploma, despite his brilliant war record, would have kept him a regimental officer the rest of his career. He commanded a company of the 13th Infantry Regiment in Stuttgart for almost eight years after 1921. In 1929, however, he was assigned to the Kriegsschule in Dresden as an instructor in tactics. Promoted to major in 1933, he took command of the 3rd Battalion, 17th Infantry Regiment, a mountain infantry unit stationed at Goslar. As a lieutenant colonel in 1935, he became an instructor at the War College in Potsdam. In 1937, he was promoted to colonel, and to major general in 1939. In 1937 he wrote a book about his experiences in World War I, *Infanterie greift an!* (*Infantry Attacks!*), a volume that much impressed Hitler.

In 1939, Rommel commanded Hitler's headquarters troops and, probably as a reward for his services, was given command of the 7th Panzer Division, which he led in the Battle of France, starting on 10 May 1940. A highly original and very personal commander, Rommel led from the front and was frequently out of touch with his staff. Consequently, he developed to an even greater degree than normal in the German Army the habit of relying on his chief of staff as an alter ego.

Sent to North Africa in early 1941 to retrieve the situation after the British had defeated the Italian Tenth Army, Rommel worked wonders with two divisions. He was shortly promoted to lieutenant general and, over succeeding months, pushed the British from Cyrenaica back over the Egyptian frontier. He was promoted to Colonel General and given an enlarged command, Panzergruppe Afrika, in reward. He was promoted to Field Marshal in June of 1942 after he captured Tobruk. A steadily worsening supply situation and Allied penetration of his communications with Berlin turned the tide, however, along with an aggressive new British Eighth Army commander, Bernard L. Montgomery. Hitler sent him on leave in March of 1943, just before the surrender of German forces in Africa.

Rommel served briefly in northern Italy and then in November 1943 was sent to study the defenses of the Atlantic and Channel coasts of France. In December of 1943, he became Army Group B commander, nominally under von Rundstedt, but with direct access to Hitler, a privilege he regularly exercised. Rommel was responsible for the considerable strengthening of the German defenses along the Calvados coast in the spring of 1944. He was never able to

convince the other German commanders in France, however, to accept his ideas on the correct employment of armor to defeat a landing, and part of his legacy to the battle in France was that there was no agreed-upon German strategy for defeating an invasion.

Rommel commanded in Normandy only until 17 July, when he was seriously wounded by an Allied fighter-bomber and invalided back to Germany. He had been unable to stop the steady, if slow, Allied advance into France that developed into the breakout after he was wounded and no longer on the scene. Although the debate continues about whether he was actually involved in the plot against Hitler, he was implicated by a conspirator's list that mentioned him. Hitler sent emissaries to offer him the choice between court martial and suicide. On 14 October 1944, he committed suicide by poison and was subsequently given a state funeral.

As a commander, Rommel was characterized by boldness, a willingness to accept risks, and an intuitive feel of the battlefield. He shared many characteristics with George Patton, whom he never met in battle: personal charisma and courage, drive and will power, technical expertise and willingness to gamble. Both attracted a large public following. Also like Patton, he was more a commander and a doer than a thinker or a theorist.

General der Panzer Truppen Leo Freiherr Geyr von Schweppenburg ***Commanding General, Panzergruppe-West***



Born in Potsdam in 1886, Leo *Freiherr* Geyr von Schweppenburg was a page in the court of King Wilhelm II of Württemberg. He entered the Army in 1904 and was promoted to Lieutenant in the 26th Regiment of Light Dragoons the following year. Following service in World War I, he was selected to serve in the 100,000-man Reichswehr. Educated and cultivated, and a friend and protégé of old guard generals such as Beck and von Fritsch, he spoke Russian, English, and French. He was Military Attaché in London, followed by Brussels and the Hague from 1933 through 1937. His frank reports from London about Germany's increasing isolation among the European nations were unwelcome in Berlin and led to his recall. Nonetheless, he was promoted to Major General in 1935 and Lieutenant General in 1937, and finally advanced to General of Armored Troops on 1 April 1940. Geyr commanded the 3rd Panzer Division from 1937 to 1939 and took

part in the occupation of the Sudetenland in 1938.

He commanded XXIV Panzer Korps in the early days in Russia and made a reputation as a tough and brave leader. In 1942, he took over XL Panzer Korps in the drive toward the

Caucasus. A holder of the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross, he was a brave and highly experienced armor officer. He had previously commanded three corps (XXIV, XL, and LVIII Panzer Korps) before being assigned as Inspector General of Armored Troops in 1943. He was appointed to command armored forces in the west in 1944, reporting directly to Colonel General Heinz Guderian on matters of organization and training, and to Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt operationally. His combat experience was on the eastern front, and he did not understand what it was to try to maneuver under conditions of total enemy air supremacy. He disagreed fundamentally with Rommel on employment of armor and thoroughly disliked Rommel's chief of staff, Gen. Hans Speidel.

On 9 June, he narrowly escaped death when his headquarters was wiped out by an RAF attack. His one counterattack against the British on 8 June 1944 did not succeed. On 5 July, Rommel informed him that Hitler had ordered him relieved of his command as of 2 July, along with von Rundstedt, for seconding von Rundstedt's request to make a strategic withdrawal from Caen so as to stabilize the defense of France. General Heinrich Eberbach succeeded him in command. Geyr served until the end of the war as inspector general of armored troops. After the war, Geyr became a noted military historian. He died on 27 January 1974 in Irschenhausen.

Generaloberst Friedrich Dollman **Commanding General, Seventh Army**



Friedrich Dollman was born in Würzburg in 1882 and entered the German army in 1899. He served as an artilleryman in World War I, when he was also a regimental adjutant and staff officer, and was taken into the Reichswehr in 1919. An acknowledged expert in long-range artillery, he served as Inspector of Artillery in 1933, the year he was promoted to Major General. He was promoted to General of Artillery in 1936 and Colonel General in 1940. Dollman took over command of Wehrkreis IX in 1935 and, the same year, command of IX Army Corps in Kassel, with the rank of Lieutenant General. From 1936 through 1939, he held the same command, with the rank of General of Artillery. He was appointed to command of Seventh Army in October of 1939 at age 57. At that time he was the eighth senior ranking officer in the German army.

Dollman's war experience was frankly unspectacular. By 1944, it was frankly antiquated. He had last commanded in combat in the crossing of the upper Rhein River in 1940, the subsequent attacks on the Maginot Line, and the breakthrough at Belfort. None of those operations were tactically demanding. He was promoted

to Colonel General (4-star) in the rash of self-congratulatory promotions following the fall of France, rather than for specific achievements on the battlefield. After the armistice, Seventh Army was stationed in France as an occupation force, and Dollman remained there in command.

Dollman's static infantry divisions were largely destroyed in the invasion and subsequent month's fighting, and he played no real role in the operations surrounding the Allied breakout from the beachhead. In fact, he had no scope for making important decisions, and his lack of real operational experience did not make him inclined to be adventurous. In any case, his task was to hold the shoreline, and little finesse was possible in accomplishing that mission. His principal error while in command was ordering Lieutenant General Fritz Bayerlein's Panzer Lehr Division to march toward the coast in daylight, which resulted in huge casualties in that unit. That aside, there is no particular reason to regard him as inept. The verdict on his military abilities must remain simply unproven. He died at his headquarters at Le Mans on 29 June 1944, days after Hitler had demanded his dismissal because Cherbourg had fallen to VII U.S. Corps. Although his chief of staff reported that the cause of death was a heart attack, it seems that he actually committed suicide. He was succeeded in command by an SS officer, Colonel General of the Waffen SS Paul Hausser, who had until then been in command of II SS Panzerkorps.

SS Oberstgruppenführer Joseph "Sepp" Dietrich **Commanding General, I SS Panzerkorps**



Dietrich was born 28 May 1892 in Bavaria and apprenticed in the hotel business. In 1911 he volunteered in the 4th Bavarian Field Artillery Regiment and attended an NCO school in 1912. He went to war in 1914 with the 6th Reserve Field Artillery Regiment and was a corporal in the 10th Infantry in 1916-1917, being further assigned to the elite *Sturm*, or assault, troops in 1917.

In January 1918, Dietrich was posted to the 13th Assault Tank Detachment. At St. Quentin, on 21 March, he commanded a tank in the first tank attacks the German army ever conducted. He later fought in tank actions at Villers-Cotterets in July 1918. At the end of the war he was a highly decorated sergeant, having won both first and second classes of the Iron Cross and medals from Austria and Bavaria as well.

He was a member of the *Freikorps* irregular military formations that proliferated after the fall of the monarchy, and fought in Silesia in 1921. In 1928 he

joined the SS and began a rapid rise through the ranks of that organization to command of the *SS Wachtbataillon Berlin*, later named the *Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler*. He was well acquainted with Hitler and saw him often through the 1930s.

When war came, he led the *Leibstandarte* at regimental strength in Poland; at brigade strength in the attack on Greece; and at division strength in France and in Russia. Unlike his counterparts in the German army, Dietrich did not have a formal military education. His was the direct leadership style of the NCO. Army officers who formed a positive impression of the man attempted to help him improve his military education. General Baron von Fritsch, commander-in-chief of the German Army by 1938, helped Dietrich by lending his war-college notes, and also personally instructed him. At the invitation of the Army, Dietrich took part in many planning exercises in the late 1930s as well.

A successful division commander, Dietrich rose to corps command in Russia and France and finally to army command on the western front. By 1944, he had begun to have doubts about Hitler's quality as a military commander and had started to distance himself from the Führer. His chief military virtue was his tenacity and determination. He exemplified the self-taught noncommissioned officer; rough in personality and manners, in contrast to the aristocrats who dominated the German army. All agreed that he was a great natural fighter and front-line leader of men, although von Rundstedt, among others, considered him simply stupid.

Nicolaus von Below, Hitler's military adjutant, said of Dietrich: "Unpretentious, not erudite but equipped with common sense, he commanded everyone's respect because of his honest character." F. W. von Manteuffel, who observed Dietrich's leadership in Russia, wrote that he "was undeniably a most courageous fighting soldier," but "could never have held high command without the backing of well-trained staff officers from the regular army." Otto Skorzeny, himself a bold SS soldier and leader of many special operations, said of Dietrich that "He gave to the Waffen SS a style and an *esprit de corps* which may possibly be compared only with Napoleon's Imperial Guard."

Dietrich was arrested in 1945 and tried by the Allied tribunal for war crimes. Convicted in 1946, he was sentenced to life imprisonment. He was paroled in 1955 but was rearrested by German authorities two years later and tried for manslaughter as a result of his involvement in the purge of the SA (the "Röhm Purge") of 1934. He was sentenced to a further eighteen months' imprisonment. Dietrich died in Ludwigsburg in 1966.



*Generalfieldmarschall von Rundstedt visits the 12th SS Panzer-Division
Hitler Jugend: (l to r) Rundstedt, Kurt Meyer, Fritz Witt, & Sepp
Dietrich of I SS Panzer Korps*



Rommel inspects the Atlantic Wall

TAB L Casualties



Casualties

Casualties on June 6 were surprisingly light. Severe fighting, as was experienced on Omaha Beach, had been expected on all the beaches. Losses from naval and air attacks also had been less than expected. Overall, Allied casualties on June 6 were about 9,000 among the approximately 125,000 that landed. Approximately one-third of those were killed or missing; the remainder wounded. German losses for June 6 are not known precisely, but were probably less than Allied losses. By comparison, losses at Antietam (September 1862) were 12,500; at Gettysburg, 23,000. As the German Army responded, fighting to stay ashore was intense. In the three months that it took to secure the initial lodgment (an area approximately 100 kilometers square) and set up conditions for the capture of Paris and the campaigns into Germany, over 600,000 soldiers, airmen, and sailors were killed, wounded, captured, or missing. (The figures below are from Carlo D'Este, from a variety of sources.)

Category	Killed	Wounded	Missing	Total
21st Army Group (British, Canadian, Polish)	15,995	57,996	9,054	83,045
United States (Ground Forces)	20,838	94,881	10,128	125,847
Royal Air Force (Commonwealth and Allied Nations)	8,178 ¹			8,178
United States Army Air Forces	8,536 ²			8,536
Estimated loses in preparatory operations	12,000 ³			12,000
German Casualties	200,000 ⁴			200,000
German Prisoners of War				200,000 ⁵
Totals				637,606

Estimates of casualties among French civilians and Resistance fighters are not available.

¹ Killed and Missing

² Killed and Missing

³ Primarily airmen, killed and missing

⁴ Killed and Missing

⁵ POW numbers are estimated. POW accounting was such that it is not possible to precisely recapitulate them on a campaign basis.

B. ARMY CASUALTIES


1. The actual casualties sustained during the period D through D + 10 as shown in the following table were much less severe than had been estimated :

Day	Actual Cumulative Daily Casualties					Estimated Cumulative Daily Casualties		
	Killed	Wounded	Missing	Captured	Totals	Total Battle	Sick & non Battle	Totals
D	1465	3184	1928	26	6603	12363	111	12474
D + 1	1867	4423	2094	31	8415	17680	260	17940
D + 2	2148	5501	2227	36	9912	22195	451	22646
D + 3	2432	6526	2453	38	11449	29936	677	30613
D + 4	2716	7756	2542	44	13058	32192	925	33117
D + 5	3083	9226	2612	48	14969	33437	1203	34640
D + 6	3576	10542	2779	49	16946	34917	1517	36434
D + 7	3932	11775	2886	55	18648	36655	1876	38531
D + 8	4215	12841	2913	56	20025	37957	2259	40216
D + 9	4537	13776	3019	57	21389	39250	2663	41513
D + 10	4771	14745	3087	57	22660	40482	3104	43586

It should be noted that the greatest disparity between estimated casualties and actual casualties occurred during the first four days. At the end of the fourth day, the actual casualties were 19,194 less than had been anticipated. This was due to the extremely light losses sustained in crossing the English Channel and in landing on VII Corps Beach. Subsequent to the fourth day of the operation, the estimated daily losses and the actual daily losses are roughly the same.

(Extracted from First US Army After Action Report)

Tab M
Comparative Ranks



Comparative Military Officer Ranks

Jargon	What they do	British	US	German
				<i>Reichsmarschall</i>
Five Star ¹	Command very large formations such as Army Groups or Expeditionary Forces	Field Marshal	General of the Army	<i>Generalfeldmarschall</i> or <i>Reichsführer-SS</i>
Four Star	Command Field Armies subordinate to Army Groups or Expeditionary Forces	General	General	<i>Generaloberst</i> or <i>SS Oberstgruppenführer</i>
Three Star	Command Corps (usually three divisions) or serve on very high level staffs	Lieutenant General	Lieutenant General	<i>General (der Inf, Art, etc.)</i> or <i>SS Obergruppenführer</i>
Two Star	Command divisions (about 20,000 soldiers) or serve on very high level staffs	Major General	Major General	<i>Generalleutnant</i> or <i>SS Gruppenführer</i>
One Star	Assist division commanders, command separate formations (smaller than divisions)	Brigadier	Brigadier General	<i>Generalmajor</i> or <i>SS Brigadeführer</i>
				<i>SS Oberführer</i>
Colonel	Command regiments	Colonel	Colonel	<i>Oberst</i> or <i>SS Standartenführer</i>
Lieutenant Colonel	Command battalions (three to a regiment)	Lieutenant Colonel	Lieutenant Colonel	<i>Oberstleutnant</i> or <i>SS Obersturmbannführer</i>
Major	Staff officer, executive officer of a battalion	Major	Major	<i>Major</i> or <i>SS Sturmbannführer</i>
Captain	Command companies	Captain	Captain	<i>Hauptmann</i> or <i>SS Hauptsturmführer</i>
First Lieutenant	Staff officer, executive officer of a company	Lieutenant	First Lieutenant	<i>Oberleutnant</i> or <i>SS Obersturmführer</i>
Second Lieutenant	Platoon Leader	Second Lieutenant	Second Lieutenant	<i>Leutnant</i> or <i>SS Untersturmführer</i>

¹ At this point in the war, there were no five star level officers in the field in the British or American Armies although the British have several at the Chiefs of Staff level. In the German Army in France, both von Rundstedt and Rommel were "five stars".

TAB N Equipment



Equipment

American and British Armies shared many classes of equipment and between them equipped all of the French and Polish forces engaged on the continent. The United States Army was far more lavishly equipped than the German Army, but in almost every category of weaponry, the Germans had superior hardware. Tanks are the best example. Until 1935 in American doctrine, the tank was essentially a machine-gun carrier that accompanied the Infantry. Experiments with mounting heavy guns in tanks did not get very far, the Chief of Infantry in 1938 declaring that a 75-mm. gun was useless in a tank. In 1940, both the rival armies fought the Battle of France with tanks armed to a 75-mm standard, and the Germans had already experimented with the 88-mm gun in a turret. In June 1940, the U.S. adopted the 75-mm gun for tanks. In the spring of 1944, as Anglo-American armies prepared for the invasion of Europe, the largest standard gun on an operational American tank was still a short-barreled, low-muzzle-velocity 75-mm, the standard armament of the then-standard M4 Sherman tank. Some models of the M4, and particularly the British Firefly variant, carried higher velocity weapons, notably the 76-mm gun. At the same time, however, Germany's Panther tanks carried long-barreled, high-muzzle-velocity 75s, and the Tiger carried the 88-mm gun. To kill tanks, American doctrine relied on the tank destroyer, a fast, heavily-gunned, lightly-armored vehicle standardized as the M10 in 1942. It mounted a 3-inch, high-muzzle-velocity, flat-trajectory gun on a Sherman chassis. The need for more power to cope with German tanks brought the M18, with a 76-mm gun, into service in 1944. The M18 had a shallow open turret and was mounted on a M24 light tank chassis. The M36, an M10 redesigned to accommodate a 90-mm gun, came into service about the same time. On none of these vehicles was the armor comparable to that of German tanks. Tank destroyers, appropriately armed to be "killer tanks," lacked the armor to stand up to German tanks for the fight.

Anti-tank weapons were a similar case. The American 2.36-inch rocket launcher, or "bazooka," lacked the power to penetrate the front armor of German tanks and demanded careful aim against soft spots. This was no easy chore for an exposed, nervous infantryman when a massive German tank loomed so close that he could hear the squeak of the bogies. The Germans adopted an 88-mm Panzerfaust, a rocket-propelled shaped-charge grenade that was about twice as powerful as the American bazooka. When James M. Gavin was a colonel commanding the 505th Parachute Infantry, his men tried out the bazooka in Sicily and found it disappointing. Gavin later wrote that "As for the 82nd Airborne Division, it did not get adequate antitank weapons until it began to capture the first German panzerfausts. By the fall of '44 we had truckloads of them. We also captured German instructions for their use, made translations, and conducted our own training with them. They were the best hand-carried antitank weapon of the war." The U.S. did not even initiate a project for a more powerful, 3.5-inch rocket until August 1944, and distribution of that weapon was not widespread even at the time of the Korean War.

In two areas, however, the United States had a distinct advantage. The Garand .30-caliber M1 semi-automatic rifle was the best standard infantry shoulder arm of the war. No other rifle matched its combination of accuracy, rate of fire, and reliability. In artillery, too, the American Army had the edge. It was not that the artillery was qualitatively better than German equipment,

although the U.S. 105-mm howitzer was at least the equal of its German counterpart of the same caliber. The effectiveness of American artillery was multiplied by the best equipment and techniques of any army for fire direction, observation, and coordination. "I do not have to tell you who won the war," George Patton said in 1945. "You know our artillery did." General George C. Marshall agreed when he wrote that "We believe that our use of massed heavy artillery fire was far more effective than the German techniques," concluding that "our method of employment of these weapons has been one of the decisive factors of our ground campaigns throughout the world."

American soldiers entered battle with uniforms not well suited to field duty, a fact that became even more evident in bad weather and when winter came. Overshoes or galoshes were never in adequate supply, and the consequence was a higher rate of non-battle casualties caused by frostbite and trench foot. A brief flirtation with a camouflage utility uniform was quickly ended when Americans discovered that the SS used a field uniform almost identical in design. American load-bearing equipment was little changed from the First World War. Many soldiers quickly rid themselves of what they saw as pointless encumbrances, among them the gas mask and the bayonet.

ALLIED EQUIPMENT

U.S. Army Infantry Weapons

	Caliber	Weight	Rate of Fire	Range***	Crew
M1 Carbine	.30	5.5 pounds	40-50 rpm	300 m	-
M1 Garand	.30	9.5 pounds	30-50 rpm	460 m	-
BAR	.30	19.4 pounds	550 rpm**	600 m	-
Thompson	.45	10.5 pounds	700 rpm**	170 m	-
.30 cal MG	.30	33 pounds*	400-500 rpm**	1100 m	3
.50 cal M2	.50	84 pounds*	450-550 rpm**	2200 m	3
Bazooka M9	2.36-inch	16 pounds	10	300 m	2

*Weight without tripod or other mount.

**Cyclic rate of fire.

***Maximum effective range.



.30 cal Heavy Machine Gun



Bazooka



Rifle Grenade



Weapons, left to right: Soldier is holding a .45-cal. Thompson submachine gun M1928A1. 60mm Mortar M2; British Anti-Tank Gun; .30-cal. U.S. Rifle M1 with Bayonet M1; .30-cal. Browning light Machine Gun M1919A4; hand grenades; .45-cal. M1911A1 pistol; .30-cal. U.S. Rifle M1903 with grenade launcher M1; .30-cal. Browning Automatic Rifle M1913A2.

U.S. Army Mortars

Mortar	Weight	Rate of Fire	Range	Crew
60 mm M2	42 pounds	18 rpm	1800 m	3
81 mm M1	136 pounds	18 rpm	2900 m	3
4.2-inch M24	650 pounds	20 rpm	5400 m	7



60mm Mortar



81mm Mortar



4.2-inch Mortar ("4-Deuce")

M-1 57mm Anti-Tank Gun



Range	9,230 m maximum
Muzzle Velocity	2800 ft/sec
Weight	2810 pounds
Penetration	82mm of armor at 500 m
Mount	towed

M-7 105mm Self-Propelled Howitzer (Priest)

Chassis	M4A3 Tank
Howitzer	M2A1 105mm howitzer
Range	10,980 m
Shell Weight	33 pounds
Rate of Fire	8 rpm
Crew	6
Notes	Armored division artillery



M-2A1 105mm Towed Howitzer

Caliber 105mm
Range 10,980 m
Shell Weight 33 pounds
Rate of Fire 8 rpm
Crew 6
Notes Infantry division artillery



M-1 155mm Howitzer

Caliber 155mm
Weight 12,000 pounds
Range 14,700 m
Shell Weight 95 pounds
Rate of Fire 2 rpm
Crew 6
Notes Infantry Division Artillery



M-1A1 155mm Gun

Caliber 155mm
Weight 30,600 pounds
Range 22,860 m
Shell Weight 95 pounds
Rate of Fire 1 rpm
Crew 6
Notes Corps artillery




M-2 8-inch Howitzer

Caliber	8-inch
Weight	31,700 pounds
Range	16,660 m
Shell Weight	200 pounds
Rate of Fire	1 rpm
Crew	6
Notes	Corps artillery



Cromwell Tank


Weight	30.8 tons
Speed	27 mph maximum
Range	173 miles
Armament	75 mm gun
Secondary	2 x .30-cal. Machine gun
Armor	76 mm maximum in turret; 63 mm maximum in hull
Crew	5



Churchill Tank

Weight	40 tons
Speed	12.5 mph
Range	
Armament	75 mm gun
Secondary	2 x .30-cal. Machine gun
Armor	152 mm maximum
Crew	5

Infantry Tank Mk. IV, Churchill Mk. VII



Original Drawing © Copyright The Tank Museum 1983

M4A1 Sherman



Combat Weight	30,300 kg
Speed	34 km/h
Range	412 km
Armament	75mm Gun M3 90 rounds
Secondary	2 x .30 caliber MG 1 x .50 caliber MG
Armor	Maximum 76mm Minimum 13 mm
Crew	5



Sherman "Firefly" M4 Variant

Combat Weight	32,700 kg
Speed	40 km/h
Range	451 km
Armament	76.2mm ROQF 17-pounder Mk IV or VI with 77 rounds
Secondary	1 x .30 caliber MG
Armor	Maximum 76mm Minimum 13 mm
Crew	5

Cruiser Tank Sherman VC
"Firefly"




Original Drawing by D.P. Dyer
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Light Tank Stuart M5A1

Combat Weight	15,500 kg
Speed	58 km/h
Range	161 km
Armament	37mm Gun M6
Secondary	3 x .30 caliber MG
Armor	Maximum 64mm Minimum 10 mm
Crew	4



3 inch Gun Motor Carriage M10




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Allied Tactical Aircraft

Aircraft	Maximum Speed	Maximum Range	Armament	Ordnance Load	Service Ceiling	Number in Service
Spitfire Mk XIV	440 mph	850 miles	2 x 20mm cannon; 2 x .50-cal. MG	500 pounds	43,000 feet	960
Typhoon	412 mph	510 miles	8 x 20mm cannon	2,000 pounds or 8 rockets	35,200 feet	3,270
P-38J Lightning	410 mph	2,250 miles	1 x 20mm cannon; 4 x .50-cal. MG	3,200 pounds	44,000 feet	6,780
P-47D Thunderbolt	430 mph	590 miles	6 x or 8 x .50-cal. MG	2,500 pounds or 10 rockets	42,000 feet	12,560
P-51D Mustang	440 mph	2,100 miles	6 x .50-cal. MG	2,000 pounds or 6 rockets	41,900 feet	7,970




Spitfire



P38



P47



P51

Landing Craft

The variety of mass-produced landing craft that had ramps in the bow to permit rapid unloading of troops and equipment was crucial to American and Allied operations in both the European and Pacific theaters of operations.

The United States had no purpose-designed landing craft before the war and built landing ships and landing craft based on British designs fabricated in the early years of the war and on landing craft the Japanese were using in the 1930s. Eventually, the British and Americans had over sixty distinct types of landing ships and landing craft. The most important British contribution was the Landing Ship, Tank. The most important American contribution was the so-called "Higgins Boat," designed by a Louisiana entrepreneur and capable of carrying 36 infantrymen or four tons of cargo. Recognizing the importance of the Landing Craft Vehicle, Personnel (LCVP), Dwight D. Eisenhower once referred to Andrew Higgins as the man who won the war. The British built the LCVP and called it the Landing Craft, Assault (LCA).

Higgins also designed the Landing Craft, Mechanized (LCM) to land tanks, producing a prototype in 1941. The Navy designed the Landing Craft, Infantry (Large) during the war, which could carry essentially half an infantry battalion (about 200 troops) on a 48-hour passage. The LCI did not use a bow ramp, but instead had two gangways on either side of the bows.

In 1940, the British designed and manufactured the Landing Craft, Tank (LCT), which could carry up to six medium tanks and was first used in the raid at Dieppe.

Specialized landing craft performed a variety of other tasks. The LCT (R) carried rockets that could be launched in a barrage to support a landing. Another version of the LCT was modified to allow it to launch amphibious tanks in deep water.

Other landing craft were actual warships that provided fire support for landing infantry and armor. Such vessels included the LCG(L), which mounted two 4.7-inch naval guns in order to engage fortified beach defenses with direct fire; LCT(R)s, landing craft mounted with 792 5-inch (127-millimeter) rockets, which were to accompany assault waves in to about 600 yards (550 meters) from shore and then take part in drenching fire on the beach (the shock power of one LCT(R) was stated to be two and one-half times the salvo power of a battleship); LCS(M), landing craft converted to carry machine guns, mortars, and smoke generators, which were positioned on the flanks of leading waves and provided fire "on order" to beach defenses; LCS(S), landing craft mounted with multiple rocket projectors in order to provide drenching fire from 1,000 yards offshore until troops reached the beach; LCT(SP), landing craft loaded with self-propelled howitzers, which commenced fire when range and visibility permitted and ceased fire when the lead boat wave was 1,000 yards from the beach, and then turned back out to sea and circled until their designated landing time; and LCT(A), landing craft loaded with two tanks, which proceeded directly to the beach so that the tanks could disembark and support the assault.

Transport Landing Craft

LCVP
landing craft, vehicle,
personnel



DUKW
amphibious
truck


LCT(Mk6)
landing craft, tank
(Mark 6)



LCI(L)
landing craft, infantry
(large)



LST
landing ship, tank



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Fire Support Landing Craft





LCT(R)(Mk3)
landing craft, tank (rocket) (Mark 3)



LCG(L)(Mk3)
landing craft, gun (large) (Mark 3)

LCVP; Landing Craft, Vehicle, Personnel




The most common landing craft of World War II; thousands were built.

Troop capacity: 36




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DUKW; Amphibious Truck



Renowned for their excellent land mobility, DUKWs continued in service in military and civilian roles for decades after the war.

Troop capacity: 25



DUKW


A 2.5-ton, six-wheel amphibious truck used during amphibious operations in World War II by the U.S. Army and Marine Corps. Its primary use was to ferry ammunition, supplies, and equipment from supply ships in transport areas offshore to supply dumps and fighting units at the beach. The DUKW (an acronym based on D-model year 1942, U-amphibian, K-all wheel drive, W-dual rear axles), called "duck," was shaped like a boat. It had a hollow airtight body for buoyancy and used a single propeller for forward momentum. It was designed according to



Army criteria and was based on the Army's 2.5-ton truck. The vehicle was capable of carrying 25 soldiers and their equipment, an artillery piece, or 5,000 pounds of general cargo. At sea the vehicle could maintain a speed of 5 knots, and on land it could go 50 miles (80 kilometers) per hour. The United States produced 20,000 DUKWs during World War II. Through lend-lease the British were provided 2,000 of the trucks. The vehicle was first used in "Operation Husky," the invasion of Sicily in 1943.


In the Normandy Invasion of 1944, DUKWs were used by the infantry, engineers, rangers, artillery, and service support units. By ferrying weapons, troops, ammunition, and supplies to the beaches, they played a vital role in the overall success of the landing. Due to the high seas and to the overloading of vehicles, a number of accidents occurred. At Omaha Beach, for instance, the 1st Infantry Division attempted to deploy its 105-millimetre howitzers, gun crews, ammunition, and sand bags in DUKWs; 12 of the 13 DUKWs of the 111th Field Artillery Battalion sank. Six howitzers from the 7th Field Artillery and five howitzers belonging to the 16th Infantry Cannon Company also went to the bottom of the English Channel. These accidents caused a considerable loss of life. Still, the DUKW was a successful amphibious vehicle. The Engineer Special Brigades at Normandy used the DUKWs to great effect in the race to build-up forces and material. In the Pacific, both the Marine Corps and the Army also successfully employed the DUKW.

LCI(L); Landing Craft, Infantry (Large)




Infantry would descend from the deck using ramps located on either side of the bow. Some 250 LCIs participated in the Normandy landings.

Troop capacity: 200 (388 maximum)



LCT(Mk6); Landing Craft, Tank (Mark 6)




LCTs were built in a variety of sizes, the largest being 203 feet. Many LCTs were modified for close-in fire support. Over 900 LCTs, in their various forms, participated at D-Day.

Tank capacity: 4 Sherman tanks



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LST; Landing Ship, Tank



Although the LST was nicknamed "Large Slow Target," only 26 of the 10,520 American-built vessels were lost to enemy action during World War II.

The LST ranks with the aircraft carrier and submarine as being one of the most significant ships of the war.

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Cargo


1 LCT



18 Sherman tanks



160 troops




Fire Support Landing Craft

Both of these vessels are modified LCT Mark 3s. The advantage of using landing craft for shore bombardment is in their ability to get closer to the beach than warships.


The LCT(R) carried 1,066 five-inch rockets and fired them in salvos of 24. The rocket tubes were attached to the deck; aiming was accomplished by steering the craft into proper firing position.

25 LCGs and 36 LCT(R)s participated in the Normandy landings.


LCG(L)(Mk3) landing craft, gun (large) (Mark 3)



LCT(R)(Mk3) landing craft, tank (rocket) (Mark 3)




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"Amphibious" M4 Sherman Tank Duplex Drive (DD)

GERMAN EQUIPMENT

Gewehr 98 and Karabiner 98



Shown w/Grenade Launcher ("Schiessbecher")


Caliber	7.92mm
Operation	bolt action rifles
Construction	Mauser design; wooden stock
Magazine	five round clip
Weight	9 pounds
Range	800 meters maximum

Schiessbecher

Rifle Grenade Device for the GEW98

Types of Grenades	HE, AP, smoke, illumination
Firing Positions	prone, kneeling, standing
Range	250 meters in horizontal fire; maximum range 400 meters. When used as a mortar, 25 to 75 meters.
Grenadier Load	10 HE and 5 AT grenades.
Remarks	The Germans characteristically used it as a squad mortar and anti-tank weapon. One grenadier per rifle squad.

Maschinenpistole 40 (MP40)



Caliber	9mm
Operation	blowback operated machine pistol
Construction	metal and plastic with folding stock
Magazine	32 rounds
Rate of Fire	500 rpm (cyclic) or 180 rpm (normal)

Maschinenpistole 44 (MP44)



Caliber 7.92mm
Magazine 35-38 round magazine
Range 600 meters maximum effective range
Remarks Issued principally to airborne units.

Maschinengewehr 42 (MG42)



Caliber 7.92mm
Rate of Fire cyclic-up to 1,400 rpm; practical-250-500 rpm, depending on the mount
Ammunition 50-round metallic-link belt
Range effective range of 2000 to 2500 yards as HMG; 600-800 yards on bipod.
Mounts Vehicle, tripod (heavy MG), bipod (light MG)
Remarks Introduced new, simple locking system and easy barrel changing method.

Maschinengewehr 34 (MG34)



Caliber 7.92mm
Rate of Fire cyclic- 900 rpm; practical- 100-120 rpm (light), 300 rpm (heavy)
Ammunition 50-round metallic-link belt or by drums
Range effective range of 2000 to 2500 yards as HMG; 600-800 yards on bipod.
Mounts Vehicle, tripod (heavy MG), bipod (light MG)
Remarks Largely replaced by the MG42 in infantry units by 1944

Stielhandgranate 24



Weight 1.36 pounds
Length 14 inches
Delay 5 seconds
Charge .365 pounds TNT

Eihandgranate 39



Weight 8 ounces
Delay 5 seconds
Charge 4 ounces TNT

Panzerfaust 30




Length 41 inches
Weight 11 pounds
Charge shaped charge anti-tank grenade
Range 30 meters optimum
Penetration 200 mm of armor at 30 meters

Raketenpanzerbüchse 54 (also known as the **Panzerschreck**)



Length 5.5 feet
Weight 20 pounds
Charge 88mm shaped charge (7 pounds)
Range 115 meters optimum
Penetration 200 mm of armor

Leichter Granatenwerfer 36 (50 mm Mortar)




Caliber 50mm
Weight 31 pounds
Range 570 yards
Rate of Fire 12-20 rpm

Schwerer Granatenwerfer 34 (81mm Mortar)




Caliber 81mm
Weight 124 pounds
Range 2625 yards maximum
Rate of Fire 10-12 rpm

Granatenwerfer 42 (120mm Mortar)




Caliber 120mm
Weight 616 pounds
Range 6600 yards maximum
Rate of Fire Rate of fire and overall fire support comparable to 105mm howitzer

Leichte Feld Haubitze 18




Caliber 10.5 cm
Weight 4320 pounds
Range 13,480 yards maximum
Ammunition HE, smoke, sabot, incendiary, illuminating
Remarks Standard divisional direct support artillery

Feld Haubitze 18/40



Caliber 15 cm
Weight 12,096 pounds
Range 14,630 yards maximum
Ammunition HE, AP, smoke, anti-concrete
Remarks Standard divisional general support artillery

Mörser 18 (210mm Howitzer)




Caliber 21 cm
Weight 36,740 pounds
Range 18,300 yards maximum
Ammunition HE, anti-concrete

Panzerabwehrkanone 40 (PAK 40)



Caliber 75 mm
Weight 3136 pounds
Range 1000 yards maximum
Ammunition AP
Remarks Penetration at maximum effective range – 102mm of armor; pictured is the 97/38 variant with Solothurn muzzle brake

Panzerabwehrkanone 43/41C (PAK 43/41C Antitank/Antiaircraft Gun)



Caliber 88 mm
Weight 9660 pounds
Range 16,200 yards horizontal
Ammunition AP, AA
Rate of Fire 15-20 rpm
Remarks Penetration at 1500 yards – 130mm of armor

Nebelwerfer 41



Caliber 150mm
Weight 1,195 pounds
Range 7,330 yards maximum
Rate of Fire 6 rounds/90 seconds

Sturmgeschütz III (Stu.G. III)



Weight	26.35 tons	Engine	Maybach, 295
Length	22.5'	Range	124 miles (62 miles cross-country)
Height	7'	Speed	20 mph (15 mph cross-country)
Width	9'8"	Crew	4
Armor		Main gun	7.5 cm Stu.K.40 L/48 with 49 rounds
	Maximum 81 mm	Secondary	1 x MG34
	Minimum 20 mm	Penetration	84mm of armor at 500 yards; 72mm of armor at 1000 yards


Remarks The vehicle was based on the PzKpfw. III chassis. The Stu.G.IV, also found in Normandy, was based on the PzKpfw. IV chassis, used the same gun and had a similar performance.

Sturmgeschütz 38t (Stu.G. 38t)




Weight	16.65 tons	Engine	Czech EP4, 150 hp
Length	20.7'	Range	124 miles (62 miles cross-country)
Height	6'10.5"	Speed	23 mph (15 mph cross-country)
Width	8'7.5"	Crew	4
Armor		Main gun	7.5 cm Pak 39 L/48 with 41 rounds
	Maximum 60 mm	Secondary	1 x MG34
	Minimum 10 mm	Penetration	84mm of armor at 500 yards; 72mm of armor at 1000 yards
Remarks	The vehicle was based on the Czech 38t light tank chassis.		

Schwerer Panzerspähwagen 8 Rad (Sd.Kfz. 231)



Weight	8.35 tons	Engine	8-cylinder, 155 hp
Length	19'1"	Speed	51 mph maximum
Height	7'10"	Crew	4
Width	7'3"	Range	110 miles cross country, 190 miles on roads
Armor		Armament	1 x 2cm KwK36; 1 MG 34 machine gun.
	Maximum 15mm		
	Minimum 8mm		
Remarks	This is typical of the variety of light armored fighting vehicles and reconnaissance vehicles used in German armored divisions.		

PanzerKampfwagen IV, Ausf. G



Weight	26 tons	Engine	Maybach, 295bhp
Length	19'4"	Range	130 miles (80 miles cross-country)
Height	8'6"	Speed	20 mph maximum (15 mph cross-country)
Width	9'7"	Crew	5
Armor		Main gun	7.5 cm KwK 40 L/43 with 79 rounds
Maximum	60 mm	Secondary	2 x 7.92 mm MG34
Minimum	20 mm		

PzKpfw V, Ausf. D (Panther)



Weight	43 tons	Engine	Maybach, 700 bhp
Length	22'	Range	124 miles (62 miles cross-country)
Height	9'4"	Speed	20 mph (15 mph cross-country)
Width	10'9"	Crew	5
Armor		Main gun	7.5 cm KwK 42 L/70 with 79 rounds
Maximum	100 mm	Secondary	2 x 7.92 mm MG34 or MG42 machine gun
Minimum	16 mm		

PzKpfw VI (Tiger)



Weight	60 tons	Engine	Maybach 12-cyl gasoline, 700 bhp
Length	27'	Range	121 miles
Width	12'3"	Speed	24 mph (11 mph cross-country)
		Crew	5
Main Gun	88mm w/92 rounds	Secondary	2 x 7.92mm MG34
Effective Range	3000m AP, 5000 m HE		
Produced	1,350, July 1942 - August 1944		

Utah Beach, 9 June 1944



TAB O
Suggestions for Further Reading



Caen

Suggestions for Further Reading

There is a vast literature on the war in northern Europe, 1944-1945. The books and selected chapters provided as background reading for the staff ride identify many of the issues worthy of professional consideration. To pursue some of those topics, begin by referring to these books.

GUIDEBOOKS

For reading and reminiscing, nothing beats Insight Guides *Normandy* (Houghton Mifflin), edited by Roger Williams. This is a fairly new series that tries to give readers a sense of place through the use of excellent photographs accompanying well-written essays on history and culture. The D-Day events that are the center of our attention are just a minor part of this 400 page guidebook, but the treatment of that moment in Normandy's history is handled deftly, along with Calvados, Norman lace, and Impressionist painters.

If you return as a tourist, you would probably prefer the Michelin *Normandy, Cotentin, Channel Islands* Green Guide (Michelin Tires). It offers an adequate background on culture and history (including D-Day), but its strength is in practical directions, brief descriptions of key sites, and adequate maps to ease travel.

If you seek a souvenir guidebook focused on Normandy in World War II, the Gallimard *Battle of Normandy* (Gallimard Publishing) would be a good choice. It covers the entire campaign, is nicely illustrated, and includes a bit of local history and culture.

If you come back with a rental car and want to focus on D-Day, you might enjoy using Brian Olof's *D-Day and the Liberation of Normandy* (Easiguides). It's specifically designed for tourists coming from the UK by ferry to Caen, but it works almost as well if you drive up from Paris. The history in this guide is very basic, and it's devoted to World War II. But the directions for a driver are also very basic, and it allows plenty of choices. (Harold Nelson)

OFFICIAL HISTORIES AND MAJOR STUDIES

Ambrose, Stephen. *Band of Brothers: E Company, 506th Regiment, 101st Airborne From Normandy to Hitler's Eagle's Nest.* NY: Simon and Schuster, 1992.

Well-written company level perspective on training, organization, and combat in the European Theater of Operations. (HN)

Ambrose, Stephen. *D-Day June 6, 1944*. NY: Simon and Schuster, 1994.

If you are willing to focus on ground combat from the American perspective while getting a sense of life and death on the beaches, Stephen Ambrose, *D-Day June 6, 1944* (Simon & Schuster), is first-rate. He uses oral history very effectively and writes carefully. The effect is powerful. (HN)

Beevor, Anthony. *D-Day: The Battle for Normandy*. NY: Penguin, 2009.

In this latest work from Beevor, the best-selling historian of the campaigns for Stalingrad (1998) and Berlin (2002), he turns his considerable analytic and writing skills to the critical battle that allowed the western allies to get established ashore and ultimately head for Germany. As always, Beevor provides a great depth of insight into the great events of June 1944. For the British, he also demonstrates how an over-stretched army can lose its edge. For the Americans, their frequent unpreparedness destroys the assertion that they could have succeeded with an invasion in 1943. Beevor also portrays a sharp contrast between the Allied foot soldiers and their German counterparts. The most fanatical of the latter, especially those in the SS, had been brainwashed by Nazi propaganda to believe that the fate of the fatherland was in their hands, and they fought with that uppermost in mind. His evidence on the German Army's general level of competence demonstrates how close-run the campaign really was. He adds a civilian dimension, pointing out that more French civilians died during the period he discusses than any of the combatants. It is a dramatic, important and instructive story, and Beevor tells it very well. It is not, however, a new story. Beevor adds little beyond that already available from Carlo d'Este, Max Hastings, or John Keegan. (Andy Morris)

Blumenson, Martin. *The Battle of the Generals*. New York: Quill, 1993.

The mature reflections of one of the preeminent historians of the war in western Europe, Blumenson makes judgments in this book that he was not prepared to offer in his official history volume. Concise and readable, the book addresses all of the major issues in the campaign. (Charles Kirkpatrick)

Blumenson, Martin. *Breakout and Pursuit*. THE UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963.

Despite its age, this book remains indispensable to study of the subject and has formed the basis of many subsequent secondary studies. The principal shortcoming is that, because of security restrictions at the time it was written, Blumenson's study does not consider the part that ULTRA played. Superb maps back up a discussion of operations at a level of understanding that few other studies can claim. Despite publishers' hyperbole and the intellectual arrogance of contemporary authors—particular authors of popular histories—the Army's official history series in general remain the best books on the subject. Their analysis and conclusions have been supplemented, rather than supplanted, by later work. (CK)

Carafano, James J. *After D-Day: Operation Cobra and the Normandy Breakout*. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publisher, Inc., 2000.

This book considers leadership as the one of the principal issues in the campaign, arguing that field grade officers and junior officers, as well as NCOs and privates, took the initiative and took the decisive action that allowed the U.S. Army to exploit fleeting opportunities on the battlefield. Carafano also argues that the things to which success have traditionally been attributed in Normandy, including air power and technical innovation by combat units, have been much overrated. He also offers carefully considered criticisms of senior American commanders and points out the heretofore little-noticed contributions by such innovative division commanders as Edward Brooks. A thoughtful, balanced, and well-written account. (CK)

Cosmas, Graham, and Cowdrey, Albert E. *Medical Service in the European Theater of Operations*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992.

The best account of the medical aspects of the war in Europe, it provides a superb account of the establishment and growth of the medical services in the ETO. The discussion of medical operations in support of OVERLORD and the breakout and pursuit is well done. (Scott Wheeler)

D'Este, Carlo. *Decision in Normandy*. New York: E. P. Dutton, Inc., 1983.

An excellent, if highly critical, account of the operations in Normandy, the last third of this book focuses on the controversy over Montgomery's plan, the delays in the capture of Caen and the critical terrain to the south of that city, and the debate about the extent of the envelopment at Falaise and the reasons the operation was not more successful in trapping the German Seventh Army in Normandy. D'Este also aptly summarizes the major weaknesses in the Allied armies and is particularly critical of British and Canadian formations at that stage of the war. (CK)

My favorite [D-Day history]. It is a full account of the planning and conduct of the entire Normandy campaign. Carlo is an American, and he actively addresses some claims by Montgomery and his admirers that had galled American servicemen. Carlo has a good sense of the leaders (he recently published excellent biographies of Eisenhower and Patton), and this adds value to his narrative. (HN)

Ehrman, John. *Grand Strategy, vol V*. HM STATIONERY OFFICE, August 1943-September 1944.

The British official histories are equally impressive. The "big picture" is set forth masterfully in Ehrman's *Grand Strategy*, Vol V. Since the British were still the senior partners in the alliance at this stage of the war, his treatment of planning conferences and basic war aims is an important supplement to American views. (HN)

Ellis, L. F. *Victory in the West, vol II*. HM STATIONERY OFFICE.

British ground forces look to Ellis for their official history of the buildup, planning, and conduct of operations in Normandy. While many unofficial histories have come in the wake of this

volume, it is still the best link to unit records and other important primary sources concerning events on SWORD and GOLD beaches. (HN)

English, John A., and Gunther E. Rothenberg. *The Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign*. New York: Praeger, 1991.

English, relying in part on Field Marshal Montgomery's personal papers, presents a portrait of a poorly trained Canadian Army that the British command attempted to turn into an effective fighting force throughout 1943. The author is highly critical of Canadian operations in Normandy, and particularly the failure of the Canadian forces to close the Falaise Gap. (CK)

Harrison, Gordon. *Cross-Channel Attack*. Washington, D.C.: U.S Government Printing Office, 1951.

Most of us are content with a history that leaves high-level direction in the background while focusing on the operational detail. For Normandy, we turn to Gordon Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack. We find enough strategic information, planning evolution, and staff growth there to satisfy our curiosity, and the many pages of narrative covering troop preparation and the conduct of the operation provide substantial new insights. The commercial histories all owe a major debt to this volume, and its maps are especially useful. (HN)

Hart, Russell A. *Clash of Arms: How the Allies Won in Normandy*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2001.

This is a unique book devoting almost half of its coverage to the period 1919 to 1944 and analyzing the experience of the United States, Britain, Canada, and Germany before providing an overview of the Normandy campaign. The pattern then repeats, with detailed treatment of the U.S., British, Canadian, and German conduct in the campaign. It's an excellent start for analysis of "lesson learning." (HN)

Hastings, Max. *Overlord: D-Day and the Battle for Normandy*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984.

This is a classic treatment of the entire campaign with full coverage of the planning and execution from the Allied perspective. Execution is often found wanting. This is balanced by a careful examination of the strengths demonstrated by the German defenders based on extensive interviews. (HN)

Hogan, David. *A Command Post at War: First Army Headquarters in Europe, 1943-1945*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2000.

A very useful book for understanding the organization and operation of First Army Headquarters in Europe, 1943-1945. Hogan gives us interesting insights into the personalities and actions of

the army commanders (Bradley and Hodges) and of the key staff officers who ran the headquarters. (SW)

Keegan, John. *Six Armies in Normandy: From D-Day to the Liberation of Paris*. New York: Viking Penguin, 1994.

Keegan's account considers the Normandy battles from the British perspective and allows a fuller understanding of the problems the Empire forces faced in terms of manpower and materiel and the wider political considerations that drove British military policy. (CK)

John Keegan works to bring participants to life. Lots of personal detail and some good short essays on key leaders far beyond Normandy's shore. The "six armies" approach (American, British [treated as English and Scots], Canadian, French, German and Polish) gives good treatment of action all across the front and carries the story through the entire campaign. (HN)

Kent, Roberts Greenfield. *American Strategy in World War II: A Reconsideration*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1963.

The mature reflections of one of the principal authors of the U.S. Army's official histories of World War II, this book is the key to understanding Eisenhower's application of the American strategy for winning the war. This short book is probably the best summary of the eight key elements of American strategy, the differences between the British and American approaches to the war, and the Allied use of combined arms—and preeminently the interrelationship of ground maneuver with air power—to achieve victory. (CK)

Matloff, Maurice. *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.

Of course there was a higher authority that picked Eisenhower and directed his efforts. The story at the highest level is ably told in Maurice Matloff, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare (Government Printing Office). If you want to know more about the famous meetings between Roosevelt, Churchill, and their military advisors, this book has no equal. (HN)

McManus, John C. *The Americans at D-Day*. New York: Forge Books, 2004.

Every major anniversary of the landings brings a new round of books. This is one of the best in the current set. It relies heavily on rank and file memories, but these are woven together into a readable narrative with reasonable balance. (HN)

Pogue, Forrest. *The Supreme Command*. THE UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1954.

This official history volume is useful for the mechanics of command. It provides excellent overviews of pre-D-Day organizational and planning evolutions. Chapter XI is central to the breakout, and Chapters VIII, "Relations with the Occupied Countries"; XII, "Relations with the

French, June-September"; and XV, "Command Reorganization, June-October" can all be helpful. The biographical sketches that precede Chapter I are handy for reference purposes. (CK)

The start point for the Normandy campaign is *The Supreme Command*. It tells the story of General Dwight D. Eisenhower's Headquarters from its earliest days through V-E Day. This was the Headquarters that planned the D-Day landings, so this volume is a handy place to start when you are interested in "shaping the future." (HN)

Ruppenthal, Roland G. *Logistical Support of the Armies*. Vol. 1. THE UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1953.

This is one of the best and most overlooked books in the official history series. Particularly see "The Logistics of Rapid Movement, August-Mid-September 1944," including chapters on the Breakout and Pursuit, "Frantic Supply," and Transportation in the Pursuit. This volume assesses the negative aspects of the "Transportation Plan" during the exploitation after the breakout, presenting a conclusion that the tactically desirable operation may have been essential to the success of the landings, but that it also probably extended the war by six months to a year by restricting the pace of operations after July of 1944. (CK)

Ryan, Cornelius. *The Longest Day*. SIMON AND SCHUSTER.

We all like dramatic narrative, and nothing beats Cornelius Ryan, *The Longest Day*, if that is the prime criterion for evaluation. Ryan ignores planning, pays little attention to the "big picture," and focuses entirely on D-Day. But he makes participants come to life, and the book is far better than the movie of the same name in evoking the complexity of D-Day. (HN)

Stacey, C. P. *Canada's Battle in Normandy*. THE CANADIAN ARMY AT WAR. Ottawa, 1946.

The Canadian official history of the Normandy campaign.

Towne, Allen. *Doctor Danger Forward: A World War II Memoir of a Combat Medical Aidman, First Infantry Division*. Jefferson, N.C., 2000.

This is an invaluable account of a doctor with the Big Red One who served with the Division from Africa to Germany. The narrative provides insights into the tough job of the front line medical units and the men who worked to save their comrades' lives. It gives the staff ride leader detailed information about aid station locations as well. (SW)

Vignerat, Marcel. *Rearming the French*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Gov't Printing Office, 1989.

This is the essential book for understanding Anglo-American-French relations in the war in France. It gives us insight into the French military personality and national self-image. It also details the way in which the Allies re-created the French Army. (SW)

Weigley, Russell F. *Eisenhower's Lieutenants: The Campaigns of France and Germany, 1944-1945*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981.

Heavily based on the U.S. Army official history of the war, *Eisenhower's Lieutenants* is a highly readable and concise summation of the European theater volumes of that series. Weigley covers the fighting in the Bocage, Operation COBRA, the breakout at Avranches, the fight at Mortain, and the battle of the Argentan-Falaise Pocket in chapters 7 through 10. (CK)

If you are primarily interested in the U.S. effort on D-Day and hope to place it in a larger context, there's nothing better than *Eisenhower's Lieutenants*. He explains weapons, tactical doctrine, and leadership concepts as they existed at the time, and he carries his campaign history through to the defeat of Germany. If you see the Normandy trip as a natural starting point to read about the remainder of the war, this would be a good book for you. (HN)

Weinberg, Gerhard. *A World at Arms*. CAMBRIDGE.

If you want to put the Allied effort at Normandy into the broadest context, nothing surpasses *A World At Arms*. It's appropriately subtitled "A global history of World War II." At nearly 1200 pages, it stretches to be a single-volume history, but it is by far the best in that category. (HN)

UNIT HISTORIES

Balkoski, Joseph. *Beyond the Beachhead: The 29th Infantry Division in Normandy*. Mechanicsburg, Pa.: Stackpole Books, 1989.

Balkoski contests two points of view he sees as pervasive in British accounts of the Normandy fighting: that the U.S. Army was a homogeneous organization, the regiments of which had no sense of tradition; and that the Army in Normandy had no grasp of basic tactics. His study concerns division operations from Omaha Beach through St. Lô, almost exclusively against the German 352nd Infantry Division, and is based on the first-hand accounts of veterans of the division, heavily buttressed by the divisional records and after action reports in the National Archives. (CK)

Colby, John. *War From the Ground Up: The 90th Division in WWII*. Austin, Texas: Nortex Press, 1991

An able discussion of the operations of the 90th Infantry Division, which Brig. Gen. James L. Collins called "the lowest of the low, a target for disbandment and for its personnel to be used as replacements," but that "stood at the top of the heap" at the end of the war. Particularly in the Normandy chapters, this book outlines how leadership can overcome misfortune and early incompetence to retrieve the morale and fighting ability of a division. (CK)

Cooper, Belton Y. *Death Traps: The Survival of an American Armored Division in World War II*. Novato, California: Presidio Press, 1998.

A memoir of service by an Ordnance officer in the 3d Armored Division from the invasion to Germany. It is first rate and has a lot of detail about the division's early battles in Normandy and Cobra. (SW)

Ewing, Joseph. *Twenty-Nine Let's Go!* Washington, D.C.: Infantry Journal Press, 1948.

A useful account of the 29th Infantry Division's operations in World War II and one of the better divisional histories. (CK)

Hewitt, Robert L. *Workhorse of the Western Front: The Story of the 30th Infantry Division*. Washington, D.C.: Infantry Journal Press, 1946.

One of the best and most highly-regarded division histories and a generally reliable guide to unit maneuver in Normandy and Northern France. (CK)

Wheeler, James Scott. *The Big Red One: America's Legendary 1st Infantry Division from World War I to Desert Storm*. Lawrence, KS, 2007.

"An exceptionally fine work of scholarship, written with a storyteller's verve. The Big Red One is not just a vivid account of the nation's most venerable division, but a compelling yarn for anyone interested in the history of the U.S. Army." Rick Atkinson, author of *An Army at Dawn* and *In the Company of Soldiers*: "A rousing battle history of the Army's most renowned major combat unit and the best history to date of any of the Army's active duty combat divisions."

THE COMMAND PERSPECTIVE

Ambrose, Stephen. *Eisenhower, vol I*. SIMON AND SCHUSTER.

An excellent biography, written by an outstanding biographer who handles policy issues and tactical operations with equal facility. (HN)

Blumenson, Martin (ed.). *The Patton Papers 1940-1945*, v. II. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1974.

In chapters 27, 28, and 29, Blumenson offers Patton's uncensored comments on the breakout from the Normandy lodgment area. (CK)

Bradley, Omar N. *A Soldier's Story*. New York: Henry Holt, 1951.

Like Eisenhower's memoir, Bradley's 1951 book offers few criticisms of other Allied commanders and focuses on operations as seen from First Army and subsequently Twelfth Army Group level. *A General's Life*, written with Clay Blair in 1983, should be used with considerable caution, since it was begun when Bradley was quite old and unwell and finished after his death, with considerable input from Mrs. Bradley. It remains unclear how much of the later book represents the general's actual recollections. (CK)

Virtually every senior leader and many junior participants wrote about their experiences on D-Day. All of the senior political and military leaders have had one or more biographers. General Bradley even published two autobiographies, so he may provide the best starting point. His first book, *A Soldier's Story*, is a useful account of his career and accomplishments--appropriately modest. The second, *A General's Life*, published after most of his senior colleagues were dead, is a sad "last shot" in the battle of the memoirs. It's best left for specialists who can unravel the efforts to burnish or smear the reputations of colleagues. (HN)

D'Este, Carlo. *Patton: A Genius for War*. New York: Harper Collins, 1995.

One of a number of biographies of the Third Army commander, D'Este's book ably summarizes Patton's operations, and his attitudes about those operations, from Avranches through the closing of the Falaise envelopment. See chapters 39 and 40. (CK)

Eisenhower, David. *Eisenhower at War, 1943-1945*.

David Eisenhower's is a useful biography for those of us starting from Normandy and working out. His treatment of Eisenhower in the many controversies surrounding the planning and conduct of the campaign is "lawyerlike" in the best sense: What did Ike know and when did he know it? What did he do and how did he explain his actions? (HN)

Eisenhower, Dwight D. *Crusade in Europe*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, 1948.

Eisenhower's memoir is generally noted more for what it did not say than that which it did—a consequence of his post-war decision that no useful purpose would be served by dwelling on discord among the Allied generals. With that limitation in mind, his remarks in Chapter 15 about the problems posed during the breakout from the Normandy lodgment area still help to inform any discussion of the issues. (CK)

Eisenhower discusses D-Day in *Crusade in Europe*. It's a careful, non-controversial account built on his official report. He published this account before he ran for President, and it helped broaden his appeal as a military man with a broad understanding of the larger issues that had shaped the war. (HN)

Greenwood, John T., Editor. *Normandy to Victory: The War Diary of Courtney H. Hodges and the First U.S. Army*. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2008.

This is an edited version of the war diary maintained for General Hodges by his aides, Major William C. Sylvan and Captain Francis G. Smith. It begins with deployment to the port of embarkation on 2 June 1944 and ends with the end of active operations on the continent of Europe on 7 May 1945. The daily entries are succinct and useful for anyone studying the First Army's campaigns. (HN)

Hamilton, Nigel. *Master of the Battlefield: Monty's War Years, 1942-1944*. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1983. And Nigel Hamilton, *Master of the Battlefield: The Field Marshal, 1944-1976*. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1981.

Fair consideration of the debate about operations in Normandy demands a careful review of Field Marshal Montgomery's plans, expressed intentions, and subsequent explanation of what happened. The best and most literate account of this subject—including Montgomery's own several memoirs—is Hamilton's. It is unabashedly a partisan account. (CK)

Hastings, Max. *Winston's War: Churchill, 1940-1945*. New York: Alfred Knopf, 2010.

This is the best treatment of Prime Minister Churchill's relationships with the leaders he needed to influence as he shaped strategy in World War II. President Roosevelt and the U.S. chiefs of staff come on the scene well into the story—long after Churchill has built his relations with his cabinet and the British chiefs of staff. Readers get an excellent discussion of Churchill's preference for "summit meetings" and his mastery of those encounters. The tight focus of this masterful analysis is superior to the usual full-scale Churchill biography for our purposes on staff rides. (HN)

Montgomery, Sir Bernard Law. *Memoirs of the Field-Marshal the Viscount Montgomery of Alamein*. London: WORLD.

The source of many of the controversies was Montgomery. His *Memoirs* is far more self-serving than most American memoirs and did much to inflame the ardor of historians on both sides of the Atlantic. His most influential biographer was Hamilton, whose two-volume *Montgomery* (see above) attempted to support every favorable contention in the Memoirs. Montgomery is a fascinating character, so time spent with him or his biographer is always entertaining as well as a source of useful insights into the difficulties involved in team building at high levels. (HN)

Smith, Walter Bedell. *Eisenhower's Six Great Decisions: Europe 1944-1945*. New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1956.

Smith, the SHAEF Chief of Staff, had constant access to the Supreme Commander and was in a position to understand both his decision-making process and the rationale that underlay Eisenhower's decisions on the conduct of the war. Obviously an *ex parte* account, Smith's book nonetheless offers crucial insights into the operation of the supreme headquarters at six key

points in the war. Chapter 2 details Eisenhower's decision to exploit the situation in Normandy in July and the problems associated with the fight at Falaise. (CK)

CAPABILITIES OF THE GERMAN ARMY

DiNardo, R. L. *Mechanized Juggernaut or Military Anachronism? Horses and the German Army of World War II*. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1991.

This book debunks the myth of German mechanization and demonstrates the fact that most of the German army in the west lacked the capability for tactical maneuver because it was largely horse-drawn. Taken together with other books demonstrating the impact of Allied air power on German maneuver, this book aptly explains the Allied ability to achieve mass in Normandy despite not having a substantial manpower advantage. (CK)

Luck, Hans von. *Panzer Commander: The Memoirs of Colonel Hans von Luck* New York: Praeger Publishers, 1989.

A discussion of the author's command of the 125th *Panzer Grenadier Regiment*, the memoir throws into high relief the German difficulties in maneuver and resupplying the Norman battlefield in the face of overwhelming Allied aerial supremacy. (CK)

Speidel, Hans. *We Defended Normandy*. London: Herbert Jenkins, 1951.

Speidel, Chief of Staff to Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, discusses the Allied operations in Normandy from his perspective in chapters 12 through 16. While the account should be used with some caution, it does illustrate the constraints, and particularly the political constraints, under which German commanders labored. (CK)

THE U.S. ARMY IN THE NORMANDY CAMPAIGN

Balkoski, Joseph. *Omaha Beach: D-Day. June 6, 1944*. Mechanicsburg: Stackpole Books, 2004.

Balkoski started out as the historian of the 29th Division but broadened his scope dramatically for this monograph. It provides solid scene-setting context at the operational and strategic levels, but its main strength is its detailed presentation of the execution of the plan. Extensive direct quotes from veterans make up the bulk of the text. Maps and sketches render the detail easier to understand. (HN)

Balkoski, Joseph. *Utah Beach: D-Day, June 6 1944*. Mechanicsburg: Stackpole Books, 2005.
Same formula applied to the "other" beach. (HN)

Doubler, Michael D. *Closing With the Enemy: How GIs Fought the War in Europe, 1944-1945*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1994. And: Mansoor, Peter R. *The GI Offensive in Europe: The Triumph of American Infantry Divisions, 1941-1945*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas 1999.

These two books detail how the U.S. Army fought the war in Europe and specifically address long-standing questions of the quality of American soldiers; the adequacy of American training, tactics, and doctrine; the combat effectiveness of American units; and the way American units applied the lessons of battle to the on-going campaigns. Both are important studies that significantly revise received wisdom on these issues. The Doubler book is a development of his earlier Leavenworth Paper, *Busting the Bocage* (1988). (CK)

Lewis, Adrian R. *Omaha Beach: A Flawed Victory*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001.

This is a well-researched study that focuses on the most dramatic combat action fought by the amphibious forces on D-Day. Lewis brings an Army officer's perspective to questions of doctrine, planning, and execution. Most of his chapters provide useful additional details on events that shaped the action on Omaha Beach, and his coverage of the battle, which opens the narrative, is well written. (HN)

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

Hesketh, Roger. *Fortitude: The D-Day Deception Campaign*. London: St. Ermin's Press, 1999.

An important new book that is a detailed, accurate, and substantive account of the deception operations that were integral to the landings in Normandy and the subsequent breakout, this study was actually written in 1945 as an after action report by the British officer who devised and executed the plan. The report remained classified until 1976. It makes clear that strategic deception remained important throughout the breakout campaign in July and August of 1944. (CK)

Lewin, Ronald. *Ultra Goes to War: the First Account of World War II's Greatest Secret Based on Official Documents*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978.

There are other books on Ultra, notably the official account by F. H. Hinsley in the multi-volume *British Intelligence in the Second World War: It's Influence on Strategy and Operations* (1979 et seq.). However, Lewin's is the best and most comprehensive secondary account. (CK)

Masterman, John. *The Double-Cross System of the War of 1939-45*. London: Pimlico, 1995.

This book details the other half of the strategic deception plan for the landings in Normandy and subsequent break out from the lodgment area. It explains the successes of British counter-intelligence in identifying every German agent in the United Kingdom and using some of them to feed misleading information back to the German high command. (CK)

AIRPOWER

Craven, Wesley and Cate, James, editors. *The Army Air Forces in World War II, vol III, Europe: ARGUMENT to V-E Day, January 1944-May 1945*. UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS, 1951.

The U.S. Air Force's official history isn't so voluminous, but it is equally definitive. Air power played a key role in the intelligence build-up for D-Day, isolating the battlefield through long-range bombardment, transporting airborne troops and their equipment, and supporting ground forces with close-in attacks on enemy positions and formations. All of these stories receive excellent coverage in Craven and Cate. (HN)

Hughes, Thomas Alexander. *Overlord: General Pete Quesada and the Triumph of Tactical Air Power in World War II*. New York: The Free Press, 1995.

A first-rate account of the crucial role tactical air power played in the Normandy campaign; of the development of tactical air power in an Air Force that did not particularly want that mission; and of the close relationship among Quesada, his subordinates, and the Army commanders they supported. An excellent springboard for discussion of enduring issues that the Army and Air Force have repeatedly addressed, but never really resolved, since the end of the Korean War. (CK)

McFarland, Stephen L., and Wesley Phillips Newton. *To Command the Sky: The Battle for Air Superiority over Germany, 1942-1944* (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1991). And Williamson, Murray. *Luftwaffe* (Baltimore, Md.: The Nautical & Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1985).

These two books particularly stress the importance of the attrition war that the Allied air forces waged against the Luftwaffe in the course of the strategic bombing campaign and detail the impact of the destruction of the German fighter arm on ground operations in western Europe. (CK)

Richards, Denis and Saunders, Hilary. *Royal Air Force: 1939-1945, vol II*. HM STATIONERY OFFICE.

The story of aviation support for the invasion in British official history is found in Richards and Saunders. As in the U.S. case, the story has many parts and is ably told. (HN)

Webster, Charles and Frankland, Noble. *The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany, 1939-1945, vol III*. HM STATIONERY OFFICE.

The British airmen were the senior partners in long-range bombing as well, so this book is useful to anyone who seeks a full treatment of the theory and practice of strategic bombardment in the first war in which technology allowed large-scale use of this instrument of destruction. (HN)

NAVAL OPERATIONS

Morison, Samuel Eliot. *History of U.S. Naval Operations in World War II, vol XI, The Invasion of France and Germany, 1944-45*. LITTLE BROWN.

The U.S. Navy's history was supervised by Samuel Eliot Morison, a gifted scholar and writer. His *History of U.S. Naval Operations in World War II* is magisterial in its presentation of the stories of supply build-up, the assembly of the transport fleet, the efforts of the naval escorts, and the continued work of fleet assets in sustaining operations ashore. (HN)

Ramsey, Admiral Sir David. *Report by Allied Naval Commander-in Chief Expeditionary Force on Operation NEPTUNE*. HM STATIONERY OFFICE.

For British naval history, we still prefer Admiral Ramsey. It was published before war's end, so it lacks detailed discussion of intelligence, but this is a flaw generally shared by all official histories. (HN)



Carentan



The Artificial Harbor at Arromanches

Glossary

AAA	Antiaircraft Artillery
AAF	Army Air Forces (US)
AAR	After Action Report
ABC	American-British Conversations (January-March 1941)
Abn	Airborne
ACofS	Assistant Chief of Staff
AD	Armored Division
Adm; Admin	Administrative
ADO	Assistant Directorate of Organization (US)
ADSEC	Advance Section, Communications Zone
AEAF	Allied Expeditionary Air Force
AEF	Allied Expeditionary Force
AF	Air Force
AFHQ	Allied Force Headquarters
AFSC	Air Force Service Command
AFV	Armored Fighting Vehicle
AG	Adjutant General
AGF	Army Ground Forces (US)
A Gp	Army Group
AIS	Allied Information Service
Ammo	Ammunition
AMSO	Air Minister for Supply and Organization
ANCXF	Allied Naval Commander Expeditionary Force
Anlage	Appendix or Annex
Anzio	Site of Anglo-American amphibious assault, January 1944, on the West coast of Italy
AP	Armor piercing
APC	Armored Personnel Carrier
Armd	Armored
Arty	Artillery
ASF	Army Service Forces
ASP	Ammunition Supply Point
ASW	Anti-submarine warfare; Assistant Secretary of War
AT	Antitank
ATS	(Women's) Auxiliary Territorial Service
Avgas	Aviation Gasoline
Axis, The	Alliance of Germany and Italy, later including Japan and other nations, that opposed the Allies in World War II

Bailey Bridging	Military bridging designed by British engineers
Bangalore	Explosive charge used for clearing barbed wire and detonating land mines
BAR	Browning automatic rifle
Bazooka	American shoulder-fired antitank rocket launcher
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
BC	Bomber Command (British)
BCC(L)	BOLERO Combined Committee (London)
BCC(W)	BOLERO Combined Committee (Washington)
Bd	Board
Bde	Brigade
Beachmaster	Person who directed troop and equipment movements onto and off the beaches
BEF	British Expeditionary Forces
Belgian Gates	Steel gates used either as barricades or underwater beach obstacles. Constructed of steel angles and plates on concrete rollers. Also known as Element "C"
BLE	<i>Bataillon de Légion Étrangère</i> (Foreign Legion Battalion), French
Blitzkrieg	German offensive operations characterized by rapid-moving tank attacks supported by dive bombers, artillery, and mounted infantry
Bn	Battalion
Bocage	Hedgerow country in Normandy characterized by small fields bounded by embankments overgrown with trees and shrubs
Br	Branch; British
Br COS	British Chiefs of Staff Committee
BSCC	BOLERO-SICKLE Combined Committee
BUCO	Buildup Control Organization
CA	<i>Corps d'Armée</i> (Army Corps), French
CAO	Chief Administrative Officer
CAD	Civil Affairs Division
CATOR	Combined Air Transport Operations Room
Cav	Cavalry
Cbl	Cable
CCA, CCB, CCR	Combat Command A, B, and Reserve in a US Armored Division
CCS	Combined Chiefs of Staff (US-British)
CCAC	Combined Civil Affairs Committee
CG	Commanding General
Chespaling	A wood and wire matting laid on beaches wherever needed to provide footing for vehicles
CIGS	Chief of the Imperial General Staff (British)
CinC	Commander in Chief
C-in-C	Commander-in-Chief (British usage)
Cir	Circular
Classes of Supply	
I	Rations
III	Fuels & lubricants such as gasoline & coal

V	Ammunition & Explosives
II & IV	All other supplies and equipment for which allowances may (Class II) or may not (Class IV) be established, as, for example, clothing, weapons, construction, and fortification materials
CNO	Chief of Naval Operations
CO	Commanding Officer
Co	Company
CofEngrs	Chief of Engineers
CofS	Chief of Staff
CofT	Chief of Transportation
Com	Committee
Combined	Involving forces of more than one nation
Comd	Command
Comdr	Commander
COMZ	Communications Zone – that portion of a theater of operations behind the Combat Zone
Conf	Conference
COS Com	British Chiefs of Staff Committee
COSSAC	Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander (Designate)
CP	Command Post
CPS	Combined Staff Planners
CWS	Chemical Warfare Service
DB	<i>Division Blindée</i> (Armored Division), French
DCofS	Deputy Chief of Staff
DD	Duplex Drive (land and water propulsion) and flotation system fitted on various vehicles – especially tanks – in amphibious landings
D-Day	Exact day for the beginning of an operation
DFL	<i>Division Français Libre</i> (Free French (Infantry) Division)
DI	<i>Division d'Infanterie</i> (Infantry Division), French
DIA	<i>Division d'Infanterie Algérienne</i> (Algerian Infantry Division), French
DIA (27th)	<i>27th Division d'Infanterie Alpine</i> (Alpine Infantry Division), French
DIC	<i>Division d'Infanterie Coloniale</i> (Colonial Infantry Division), French
Dieppe Raid	Amphibious assault by British and Canadian troops on the coast of France in August 1942 – repelled with heavy losses
DIM	<i>Division d'Infanterie Marocaine</i> (Moroccan Infantry Division), French
Dir	Directive; Director
Div	Division
DMM	<i>Division Marocaine de Montagne</i> (Moroccan Mountain Division), French
DOD	Department of Defense (US)
DQMG(L)	Deputy Quartermaster General (Liaison) (British)
DSC	Distinguished Service Cross
Dtd	Dated
DUKW	2 ½ ton 6x6 Amphibian Truck (“Duck” in Army slang)
Dumb Barge	An unpowered barge that could be beached

Dunkerque	Seaport in northern France from which British and Allied forces were withdrawn in a last minute escape after defenses collapsed in the face of German attacks, May 1940
DZ	Drop zone for paratroopers and air-dropped supplies
EACS	European Allied Contact Section
Ech	Echelon
EM	Enlisted men
Eng; Engr	Engineer
ETO	European Theater of Operations
ETOUSA	European Theater of Operations, United States Army
EUCOM	European Command, successor to USFET
Exec	Executive; Executive Officer
Ex O	Executive Officer
FA	Field Artillery
FAAA	First Allied Airborne Army
Falaise Gap	Opening between US and British advances north and south of the town of Falaise (south of Caen) through which many German soldiers escaped in August 1944
FCNL	French Committee of National Liberation
FECOMZ	Forward Echelon, Communications Zone
FFI	<i>Forces Françaises de l'Intérieur</i> (French Forces of the Interior), the 'Maquis' Resistance
Fifth column	Subversive organization working in a country for an invading army
Flail	Tank fitted with heavy chains on a revolving drum that beat the ground in front of the tank to clear mines
FLAK	Antiaircraft artillery fire or gun
FO	Field Order
Fuehrungsgruppe	Operations Group
Fuehrungsstab	Operations Staff
Funnies	Special armored assault teams developed under Major General Sir Percy Hobart that operated unusual vehicles such as flail tanks (also "Hobart's Funnies")
FUSA	First US Army
FUSAG	1 st US Army Group
G-1	ACofS for personnel - the staff office responsible for personnel matters (US & Combined Headquarters)
G-2	ACofS for intelligence - the staff office responsible for intelligence on enemy operations and capabilities (US & Combined Headquarters)
G-3	ACofS for operations - the staff office responsible for plans and operations (US & Combined Headquarters)
G-4	ACofS for supply - The staff office responsible for logistics (US & Combined Headquarters)

G-5	ACofS for civil affairs - the staff office responsible for civil affairs (US and Combined Headquarters)
G-6	Short-lived division of SHAEF which dealt with public relations and psychological warfare
Gen Bd Rpt	General Board Report
Gen. St. d. H.	<i>Generalstab des Heeres</i> (General Staff of the Army)
GFRS	Ground Force Replacement System
GHQ	General Headquarters
GO	General Order
Gooseberry	Harbor constructed of sunken ships used to shelter small craft
Goum	A Moroccan infantry company-sized unit (made up of <i>Goumiers</i>)
Goumier	Ethnic Berber Moroccan mountain infantrymen
Gp	Group
GPA	General Purchasing Agent
Grand Alliance	World War II coalition of the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union
Green Books	Works in the official history of the U.S. Army in World War II
Grenadier	Honorific for German infantry
GTM	<i>Groupement de Tabors Marocains</i> (Group of Moroccan <i>Tabors</i>). A <i>GTM</i> is roughly equivalent to a regiment. It comprises 3 <i>Tabors</i> (1 <i>Tabor</i> = 1 Battalion) & each <i>Tabor</i> comprises 3 <i>Goums</i> (1 <i>Goum</i> = 1 Company)
HE	High Explosive
Hedgehog	Portable obstacle, made of three crossed angle irons
Heeresgruppe	Army Group
H-Hour	Exact minute for the beginning of a military operation
Hist	Historical; Historian
HQ; Hq	Headquarters
ID	Infantry Division
Incl	Inclosure
Ind	Indorsement
Inf	Infantry
Int; Intel	Intelligence
Interdiction	Cutting an enemy's line of communication by firepower (including aerial bombardment) to impede enemy operations
Interv	Interview
ISS	Identification of Separate Shipments to Overseas Destinations
Jabo	German slang for <i>Jagdbomber</i> (fighter-bomber)
Joint	Including elements from more than one service.
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff; Leaders of all services meeting to resolve issues and make decisions affecting more than one service (US)
Jedburgh Team	Small, specially trained teams of Allied officers and men dropped behind enemy lines to aid resistance groups
JIC	Joint Intelligence Committee

JPS	Joint Staff Planners
JSM	Joint Staff Mission (British mission to Washington)
Jt	Joint
<i>Kampfgruppe</i>	German equivalent of task force; combat team
<i>KTB</i>	<i>Kriegstagebuch</i> (war diary)
LBV	Landing Barge, which was capable of carrying either supplies or vehicles and could be beached
LCI(L)	Landing Craft, Infantry (Light)
LCM	Landing Craft, Mechanized
LCT	Landing Craft, Tank
LCVP	Landing Craft, Vehicle & Personnel
LD	Line of Departure
Lend-Lease	Act passed March 1941 allowing President Roosevelt to sell, transfer title to, exchange, lease, lend, or otherwise dispose of equipment to any country on which US defense was thought to depend
Liberty Ships	Mass-produced US cargo vessels of approximately 10,000 tons which were designed for speedy construction early in the war and served as the work-horse in ocean shipping
Ln	Liaison
Lobnitz pierheads	Huge steel structures towed to the Normandy beaches to provide the unloading facilities for LCTs, LSTs and coasters in the Mulberries
Log	Logistical
LSD	Landing Ship, Dock
LST	Landing Ship, Tank
Ltr of Instr	Letter of Instructions
<i>Luftwaffe</i>	German air force
LVT (1)	Landing Vehicle, Tracked, Unarmored (Mark I) "Alligator"
M1 (Garand)	US Semiautomatic infantry rifle
M4 (Sherman)	US Medium Tank
M5 (Stuart)	US Light Tank
M10	US Tank Destroyer with 3-inch gun
M29	"Weasel" tracked cargo carrier
<i>Maquis</i>	Guerilla fighter in the French resistance
MG	Machine gun
Midway	Key naval battle between the US Pacific Fleet and Japan's Combined Fleet, 4 June 1942
Mil Mission Moscow	US Military Mission to Moscow
Min	Minutes
(-) (Minus)	Understrength, or with components detached
MOI	Ministry of Information (British)
Mov & Tn Br	Movements & Transportation Branch
MOVCO	Movement Control
MSR	Main Supply Route

MT Ship	Liberty Ship converted for maximum vehicle-carrying purposes
MT80	Motor Transport gasoline, 80-octane
MTB	Motor Transport Brigade
Mtg	Meeting
MTS	Motor Transport Service
Mulberry	Artificial harbor built of sunken ships and concrete caissons, forming a breakwater within which floating docks were assembled
NAAFI	Navy Army Air Force Institute (British)
NATO; NATOUSA	North African Theater of Operations; North African Theater of Operations, US Army
Naval Gruppe West	German coastal artillery located in Normandy
NCO	Noncommissioned Officer
Nebelwerfer	German multiple rocket projector
NOIC	Naval Officer in Command
NUSA	Ninth US Army
NYPOE	New York Port of Embarkation
OB	Order of Battle--organization and composition of a military force
Oberkommando	Headquarters of an army or higher military organization
OB WEST	<i>Oberbefehlshaber West</i> (Headquarters, Commander in Chief West [France, Belgium, and the Netherlands]), highest German ground headquarters of the western front
OCofEngrs	Office, Chief of Engineers
OCofT	Office, Chief of Transportation
OCMH	Office, Chief of Military History
OKH	<i>Oberkommando des Herres</i> (Army High Command)
OKL	<i>Oberkommando der Luftwaffe</i> (Air Force High Command)
OKM	<i>Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine</i> (Navy High Command)
OKW	<i>Oberkommando der Wehrmacht</i> (Armed Force High Command)
OP	Observation Post
OPD	Operations Division, War Department
Opn	Operation
OQMG	Office of the Quartermaster General
ORC	Organized Reserve Corps
Ord	Ordnance
OSS	Office of Strategic Services, forerunner of the Central Intelligence Agency
Ost battalions	Non-German volunteer troops from east-European countries
OWI	Office of War Information
P&O	Plans & Operations Division, War Department, successor to OPD
Panzer	Armor (German)
Panzer Division	German Armored Division
Panzerfaust	German handheld antitank rocket launcher
Panzergrenadier	German mechanized or semi-armored infantry organization, or infantry soldiers within such an organization

<i>Panzergruppe West</i>	Control headquarters for armored forces established by the Germans in November 1943 to control those decisive forces in any large-scale counterattack against Allied landings along the Channel coast
PC&R Gp	Port Construction and Repair Group
Pillbox	Low-roofed concrete emplacement for machine gun or antitank gun
Plng	Planning
(+) (Plus)	Overstrength, or with attached units
PLUTO	From "pipeline under the ocean" – a cross-Channel underwater pipeline planned for bulk POL deliveries to the far shore
PMS&T	Professor of Military Science & Tactics
POINTBLANK	Allied long-range bombing program (Combined Bomber Offensive) from Britain against Germany
POL	Petroleum (gasoline or diesel fuel), Oil, and Lubricants
POW	Prisoner of War
POZIT	US proximity fuze for artillery and antiaircraft
Precht	Parachute
PRD	Public Relations Division, SHAEF
Prep	Prepared; preparation
PROCO	Projects for Continental Operations, as system of requisitioning supplies and equipment for special operations
PSO	Principal Staff Officers
PWE	Political Warfare Executive
PzD	Panzer Division – German Armored Division
Q(L)	Quartermaster (Liaison)
QM	Quartermaster
RA	Regular Army
RAF	Royal Air Force (UK)
RAP	ROUNDUP Administrative Planners
Rations--C, D, K	C was a balanced meal in a can; D was a fortified chocolate bar; K was a box meal more nourishing and palatable than C rations
RCA	<i>Régiment de Chasseurs d'Afrique</i> (Regiment of African Chasseurs), French
RCP	<i>Régiment de Chasseurs Parachutistes</i> (Regiment of Parachute Chasseurs), French
RCT	Regimental Combat Team
Rec	Records
Rgt	Regiment
Rhino ferry	A barge constructed of bolted ponton units and propelled by an outboard motor
RI	<i>Régiment d'Infanterie</i> (Infantry Regiment), French
RIC	<i>Régiment d'Infanterie Coloniale</i> (Colonial Infantry Regiment), French
RICM	<i>Régiment d'Infanterie Coloniale du Maroc</i> (Moroccan Colonial Infantry Regiment – the reconnaissance regiment of the 9 th DIC), French
RMLE	<i>Régiment de Marche de la Légion Étrangère</i> (Foreign Legion), French

RSAR	<i>Régiment de Spahis Algériens de Reconnaissance</i> (Regiment of Algerian Reconnaissance <i>Spahis</i>), French
RSM	<i>Régiment de Spahis Marocains</i> (Regiment of Moroccan <i>Spahis</i>), French
RTA	<i>Régiment de Tirailleurs Algériens</i> (Algerian <i>Tirailleurs</i>), French
RTM	<i>Régiment de Tirailleurs Marocains</i> (Moroccan <i>Tirailleurs</i>), French
RTO	Rail Transportation Officer
RTS	<i>Régiment de Tirailleurs Sénégalais</i> (Senegalese <i>Tirailleurs</i>), French
RTT	<i>Régiment de Tirailleurs Tunisiens</i> (Tunisian <i>Tirailleurs</i>), French
S1	Personnel and administrative staff officer, or adjutant, of a brigade or smaller unit
S2	Intelligence staff officer of a brigade or smaller unit
S3	Operations staff officer of a brigade or smaller unit
S4	Logistics staff officer of a brigade or smaller unit
SAC	Supreme Allied Commander
SACMED	Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater
SCAEF	Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force
Second Front	Invasion of Europe by Anglo-American forces to relieve the Eastern (first) Front
SFHQ	Special Force Headquarters
SGS	Secretary, General Staff
SHAEF	Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force
Sitrep	Situation Report
SO	Special Operations
SOE	Special Operations Executive
Sommerfeld track	A matting made of wire netting reinforced with steel, used in the same manner as chespaling
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
SOS	Services of Supply
SP	Self-propelled
Spahi	French colonial reconnaissance soldier
SPOBS	Special Observer Group
SS	<i>Schutzstaffel</i> (Elite Guard) Nazi unit originally created to serve as Hitler's bodyguard; later expanded to oversee intelligence and security and to provide large combat organizations (<i>Waffen-SS</i>) that fought alongside German Army formations
Stf	Staff
SUP	Single Unit Pack, a method of crating vehicles
Svc	Service
T	Towed
Tabor	A Moroccan battalion-sized unit, made up of company-sized <i>Goums</i> , French
Tac	Tactical
TAC	Tactical Air Command
Tactical Air Force	Generic name for the Allied ground support air forces and air commands

T/BA	Tables of Basic Allowance
TC	Transportation Corps
TCC	Troop Carrier Command
TD	Tank Destroyer
T/E	Tables of Equipment
Tel	Telegram; teletype
Teller Mine	A German land mine
Tetrahedra	Pyramid-shaped obstacles made of angle iron
TF	Task Force
Tirailleur	Literally, 'sharpshooter', French colonial infantryman
TIS	Theater Intelligence Section
TO&E; T/O&E	Tables of Organization & Equipment
Todt Organization	German organization for military construction (e.g. the Atlantic Wall and West Wall defensive lines)
TOT	Time On Target; a method of timing artillery fire from various points to fall on a given target simultaneously
TUP	Twin Unit Pack, a method of crating vehicles
TURCO	Turn-Round Control
TUSA	Third US Army
TWX	Teletype message
U-boat	German submarine
UNRRA	United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration
USAAFUK	US Army Air Forces in the United Kingdom
USAFBI	US Army Forces in the British Isles
USANIF	US Army Northern Ireland Force
USFET	US Forces in the European Theater, successor command to ETOUSA
USSBS	US Strategic Bombing Survey
USSTAF	US Strategic Air Forces
VGD	German Volksgrenadier Division
VT	US proximity ("variable time") fuze
V-weapons	German secret weapons planned as revenge for the bombing of Germany-- the V-1 "buzz bomb" was a primitive cruise missile; the V-2 was the first operational ballistic guided missile
Wacht am Rhein	"Watch on the Rhine"; German code name for 1944 Ardennes counteroffensive (Battle of the Bulge)
Waffen-SS	Combat arm of the SS (<i>Schutzstaffel</i> , Elite Guard); Military formation of the Nazi Party, in effect a partial duplication of the German Army
WD	War Department
Wehrmacht	German Armed Forces – land, sea, and air – not including the <i>Waffen-SS</i>
WO	War Office
WPD	War Plans Division, War Department, predecessor of OPD

TAB Q

Code Names

UTAH



"Our war starts here!"

*BG Theodore Roosevelt, Jr.
4th Infantry Division*


**"Two kinds of people are staying
on this beach – the dead and
those who are going to die. Now
Let's get the hell out of here!"**

*COL George Taylor
16th Infantry Regiment*

OMAHA




GOLD




**"Get off the beach –
off the beach, off the
bloody beach, get
forward lads and
give the buggers hell!"**

*A Green Howards
Platoon Commander
at GOLD Beach*

SWORD



JUNO



Code Names

ABC-1	The agreements resulting from the Anglo-American military staff conversations held in Washington in January – March 1941
ABERDEEN	Chindit stronghold near Manhton, Burma
ACHSE	German plan for the defense of northern Italy
ALACRITY	Plan for the entry of a British force into the Azores, October 1943
ALAMO	Code for US Sixth Army while operating as a special ground task force HQ directly under GHQ SWPA
ALPHA	US 3d Infantry Division force for Operation DRAGOON, and 3d Infantry Division landing beaches in the Cavalaire-St. Tropez area
ALPHA	Plan to defend Kunming and Chungking
ANAKIM	Plan for recapture of Burma
ANVIL	Plan for the Allied invasion of southern France, finally executed as Operation DRAGOON in August 1944
ARCADIA	First of the major US-British staff conferences following US entry into the war, held in Washington, December 1941-January 1942
ARGONAUT	Yalta Conference, February 1945
ARGUMENT	USSTAF air operations against German aircraft factories, Feb '44
AVALANCHE	Invasion of Italy at Salerno
AXIOM	Mission sent by SEAC to Washington and London in Feb '44 to urge CULVERIN
BACKHANDER	Task force for operations on Cape Gloucester, New Britain
BARBAROSSA	German offensive against USSR, 1941
BARCLAY/MINCEMEAT	Deception operations aimed at misleading Axis forces as to the actual date & location of the Allied landings on Sicily
BARRISTER	Plan for capture of Dakar (formerly BLACK and PICADOR)
BAYTOWN	British invasion of Italy on Calabrian coast
BAZAAR	Plan for American air support of USSR in event of Japanese attack on Soviet Union. Also code name for US survey project of air facilities in Siberia
BEAVER	Training exercise held in the Slapton Sands area in England in March 1944, employing elements of the VII Corps and simulating the later assault on UTAH beach
BENEFICIARY	Plan for breaking out of the Normandy lodgment by means of a combined airborne-amphibious attack on St. Malo
BETA	Plan to open port on coast of China
BIGOT	Special security category and procedure to protect the OVERLORD plan
BIRCH	Christmas Island
BLACK	Plan for capture of Dakar (later PICADOR and BARRISTER)

BLACKCOCK	British XII Corps operation to clear enemy salient between the Meuse and Roer-Wurm Rivers from Roermond southward
BLACKPOOL	Chindit roadblock on railroad near Namkwin, Burma
BLEACHER	Tongatabu
BLOCKBUSTER	Canadian II Corps offensive in Calcar-Udem-Xanten area
BOBCAT	Borabora
BODYGUARD	Allied deception plans designed to cloak the timing and location of OVERLORD while drawing German attention to the Pas de Calais
BOLERO	Buildup of US troops and supplies in the United Kingdom in preparation for the cross-Channel invasion
Bombardons	Cruciform structures designed for mooring off the Normandy beaches to provide floating breakwaters in deep water
BRADDOCK II	Dropping of small fuze incendiaries to European workers for use in sabotage operations
BRAID	Cover name for General Marshall during Casablanca Conference
BRASSARD	Operations against the island of Elba
BREWER	Operations in the Admiralties
BRIMSTONE	Plan for capture of Sardinia. Cancelled
BROADWAY	Drop site for Chindits, about 50 miles northwest of Indaw, Burma
BUCCANEER	Plan for amphibious operation in Andaman Islands. Cancelled
BUFFALO	VI US Corps breakout from Anzio beachhead, May 1944
BULLFROG	Plan for operation against Arakan (Burma) coast
BUTTRESS	British operation against toe of Italy
CAMEL	US 36 th Infantry Division force for Operation DRAGOON, and 36 th Infantry Division landing beaches in the Frejus-St. Raphael area
CANNIBAL	Unsuccessful British offensive against Akyab (Burma) in 1943
CAPITAL	Attack across the Chindwin River to Mandalay
CARBONADO	Revised BETA
CARPETBAGGER	Project to drop supplies and agents to the French resistance
CARTWHEEL	Converging drives on Rabaul by S. Pacific and SWPA forces
CASANOVA	US 95 th Infantry Division diversionary action during operations against Metz
CATCHPOLE	Operations against Eniwetok and Ujelang Atolls, Marshall Islands
CAUSEWAY	Operations against Formosa
CHAMPION	Late 1943 plan for general offensive in Burma
CHATTANOOGA CHOO CHOO	AEAF operations against enemy train movements in France and Germany
CHARNWOOD	British operation to seize Caen, launched 8 July 1944
CHASTITY	Plan for the construction of an artificial harbor in the Quiberon Bay area on the southern coast of Brittany
CHESTNUT	Advanced air drop on Sicily by 2 SAS to disrupt communications, 12 July 1943
CLEANSLATE	Invasion of Russell Islands
CLIPPER	British XXX Corps offensive to reduce Geilenkirchen salient

COBRA	First US Army operation to break out of the Normandy lodgment, launched 25 July 1944
COCKADE	Diversionary operations in 1943 to pin down German forces in the west
COMET	British plan, not carried out, for an air drop on 7 September 1944 in the Arnhem-Nijmegen area
CORKSCREW	Allied invasion of the Italian island Pantelleria, 10 June 1943
COTTAGE	Invasion of Kiska, 1943
CRICKET	Malta portion of ARGONAUT conference
CROSSBOW	A general term used by the Allies to refer to the German long-range weapons program and to Allied countermeasures against it
CUDGEL	Planned small scale operation on Arakan coast, Burma. Cancelled
CULVERIN	Plan for assault on Sumatra
CYCLONE	Task force for Noemfoor
DELTA	US 45 th Infantry Division force for Operation DRAGOON, and 45 th Infantry Division landing beaches in the Ste. Maxime area
DEXTERITY	Operations against Cape Gloucester, New Britain
DIADEM	Allied spring offensive and advance on Rome, May-June 1944
DIRECTOR	Task force for invasion of Arawe, New Britain
DIXIE	Mission of US observers to Chinese communists
DRACULA	Plan for attack on Rangoon, 1944
DRAGOON	The Allied invasion of southern France in August 1944. Name changed from ANVIL due to concern that the name had been compromised
DUCK I, II, III	First in the series of training exercises held in the Slapton Sands area in England, during January-February 1944, to test all aspects of amphibious operations, including mounting, assault, and logistic support. Involved mainly elements of the V Corps simulating the later assault on OMAHA beach
ECLIPSE	Name given in November 1944 to posthostilities plans for Germany
ELKTON	Plan for seizure of New Britain, New Guinea, and New Ireland area
END RUN	Task force of GALAHAD survivors used in drive on Myitkyina, Burma
EUREKA	Tehran conference, November – December 1943, where Western allies agreed to Stalin's appeal for a Channel crossing to open the 'second front' in the spring of 1944
FABIUS I-VI	A series of final rehearsals for the cross-Channel operation, involving the US V Corps and British forces, April-May 1944
FANTAN	Fiji Islands
FIREBRAND	Invasion of Corsica, 1943

FISCHFANG	February 1944 German counteroffensive against VI US Corps in Anzio beachhead
FLAX	Air operation to disrupt flow of German air transports from Italy to Sicily and Tunisia
FLINTLOCK	Operations in the Marshall Islands
FORAGER	Operations in the Marianas
FOREARM	Kavieng
FORTITUDE	Allied deception operations designed to convince the Germans of an invasion of Western Europe in the Pas de Calais area
FORTUNE	Planning group located in Algiers (July 1942)
FOX	Last major training exercises conducted by V Corps, March 1944
FRANTIC	Allied shuttle bombing of Axis-controlled Europe from bases in UK, Italy, and USSR
FRY	Occupation of four islands in Lake Comacchio, Italy
FUSTIAN	Airborne landing at Primasole Bridge, 13-14 July 1943
GALAHAD	American long range penetration groups (Burma)
GALVANIC	Operations in Gilbert Islands
GARDEN	see MARKET-GARDEN
GOBLET	Invasion of Italy at Cotrone. Cancelled
GOLD	Normandy beach assaulted by British 30 Corps, 6 June 1944
GOLDFLAKE	Movement of Canadian I Corps from Italy to ETO
GOODWOOD	British attack to break out of the Normandy lodgment in late July 1944, coinciding with US Operation COBRA
Gooseberries	Partial breakwaters formed off the Normandy beaches by the sinking of blockships known as Corncocks , to shelter small craft
GRANITE	Plan for operations in POA in 1944
GRAY	Plan for capture and occupation of the Azores
GREENLIGHT	One of the special OVERLORD supply procedures designed to expedite the delivery of ammunition and engineer fortification material in lieu of scheduled shipment of other supplies in the first phases of the cross-Channel operation
GREIF	German deception operation in support of the Ardennes counteroffensive, 1944
GRENADE	21 Army Group large-scale offensive from the Roer to the Rhine
GRENADE	Ninth Army supporting attack for Operation VERITABLE
GYMNAST	1941 plan for invasion of North Africa
HABAKKUKS	Artificial landing fields made of reinforced ice
HALPRO	Halvetrson Project – bombing detachment for China-Burma-India
HANDS UP	Plan for breaking out of the Normandy lodgment by means of a combined airborne-amphibious attack on Quiberon Bay
HARDIHOOD II	Aid to Turkey, Phase II
HARLEQUIN	British exercise in September 1943 to establish marshaling and embarkation procedures for a cross-Channel operation
HERCULES	German plan to invade Malta. Cancelled

HOLLY	Canton Island
HURRICANE	Assault force for Biak, New Guinea
HUSKY	Allied invasion of Sicily in July 1943
ICEBERG	Invasion of the Ryukyu Islands
ICHIGO	Japanese operation to take US air bases in east China
INDEPENDENCE	Plan for First French Army attack against German garrisons on French coasts, December 1944
INDIGO	Plan for movement of troops to Iceland
INTERLUDE	Rehearsal for Morotai operation
JUNO	Normandy beach assaulted by Canadian 3d Division, 6 June 1944
JUPITER	Plan for operations in northern Norway
LADBROKE	Glider landing at Syracuse, 9 July 1943
LEVER	Operation to clear area between Reno and southwest shore of Lake Comacchio, Italy
LIGHTFOOT	British offensive operations in Libyan Desert, launched from El Alamein, October 1942
LINNET I	Planned airborne drop at Tournai, Belgium, September 1944
LINNET II	Planned airborne drop at Aachen-Maastricht Gap, September 1944
LONDON	XVIII Airborne Corps phase line near Wesel, Germany
LUCKY STRIKE	21 Army Group plan calling for an eastward drive and the capture of the Seine ports as an alternative to plans for the earlier capture of Brittany, considered by planning staffs in May and June 1944
MAGNET	Plan that superseded RAINBOW-5 after US entry into the war, providing for the shipment of American forces to Northern Ireland
MAGNETO	Yalta portion of ARGONAUT Conference
MAILFIST	Capture of Singapore, 1945
MALLORY MAJOR	Air offensive against Po River bridges, Italy
MANNA	British occupation of southern Greece
MARKET-GARDEN	Airborne & armored operation intended to establish a bridgehead across the Rhine in the Netherlands, September 1944. Operation MARKET involved seizure of bridges in the Nijmegen-Arnhem area, and Operation GARDEN was to open a corridor from Eindhoven northward toward Germany
MARS	US task force (5332d Brigade (Provisional)), CBI
MATTERHORN	Plan for operating B29s from Cheng-tu against Japan
MERCANTILE	Manus Island
MICHAELMAS	Task force for seizure of Saidor, New Guinea
MILEPOST	Project to build up stocks in the Far East in preparation for the entry of the USSR into the war against Japan
MINCEMEAT/BARCLAY	Deception operations aimed at misleading Axis forces as to the actual date & location of the Allied landings on Sicily

MODICUM	Party sent to London to present Marshall Memorandum, April 1942
Mulberries	The artificial harbors constructed off the Normandy beaches
MUSKET	Projected landing on heel of Italy near Taranto, 1943
NABOB	Northern Island
NARCISSUS	Commando raid on a lighthouse near the main Sicily landings, 10 July 1943
NEPTUNE	Operation to transport assault troops and equipment across the Channel to Normandy
NEST EGG	Plan for occupation of Channel Islands in case of German collapse or surrender
NEW GALAHAD	American long-range penetration groups (Burma)
NEW YORK	XVIII Airborne Corps phase line in Ringenberg-Krudenberg area, Germany
NOBALL	Term used by the air forces in referring to target sites in their attacks on long-range weapons
NORDWIND	German counterattack in Alsace, January 1945
OCTAGON	Second Quebec Conference, September 1944
OLIVE	Attack on Gothic Line, Italy
OLYMPIC	Plan for March 1946 invasion of Kyushu, Japan
OMAHA	Normandy beach assaulted by US V Corps, 6 June 1944
ORANGE	Prewar plan of operations in event of war with Japan
OVERLORD	The invasion of northwest Europe in the spring of 1944
PANTHER	British 10 Corps drive across the Garigliano River, Italy
PARIS	XVIII Airborne Corps phase line west of Erle, Germany
PERSECUTION	Assault force for Aitape operations, New Guinea
Phoenixes	Concrete caissons towed across the English Channel and sunk to form the main breakwaters for the artificial harbors
PICADOR	Plan for capture of Dakar (formerly BLACK, later BARRISTER)
PICCADILLY	Drop site for Chindits, Burma
PIGSTICK	Limited operation on south Mayu Peninsula. Cancelled
PLOUGH, PLOUGH FORCE	Project for training US and Canadian volunteers for snow operations in northern Norway
PLUNDER	Montgomery's northern crossing of the Rhine, March 1945
POINTBLANK	The Combined Bomber Offensive from Britain against Germany
PRICELESS	Post-HUSKY Mediterranean operations
PROVIDENCE	Occupation of Buna area, New Guinea, 1942. Cancelled
PUGILIST	Attack on Mareth Line, Tunisia, 1943
QUADRANT	The first Quebec Conference, August 1943
QUEEN	12 th Army Group operation on Roer Plain between Wurm and Roer Rivers

RAINBOW Various plans prepared between 1939 and 1941 to meet Axis aggression involving more than one enemy

RAINBOW-5 US military plan designed to implement that portion of ABC-1 which applied to the UK in the event of US entry into the war

RAINCOAT Assault on Camino hill mass, Italy

RANKIN I, II, III Plans for return to the Continent in the event of deterioration of the German position

RASHNESS Revised CARBONADO plan

RAVENOUS IV Corps plan for recapture of northern Burma

RECKLESS Assault force for Hollandia operation

REDLINE Radio circuits set up in September 1944 for messages to and from the Supreme Commander

RENO SWPA plans for operations in the Bismarck Archipelago, along northern coast of New Guinea and thence to Mindanao, P.I.

RHUMBA Plan for reversing BOLERO and transferring US forces, supplies, and logistic structure from the United Kingdom to the Continent

RO Japanese air operation to augment Rabaul air forces and delay Allied offensives

ROAST Operation to clear Comacchio Spit, Italy

ROGER Capture of Phuket Island, off Kra Isthmus, Burma

ROMEIO French commando force landing at Cap Nègre during Operation DRAGOON

ROMULUS Arakan part of CAPITAL plan

ROOSTER Operation to fly Chinese 22d Division to Chihchiang

ROSE Ruhr pocket, April 1945

ROSES Efate

ROSIE French naval force landing southwest of Cannes, Operation DRAGOON

ROUNDHAMMER Original codename for OVERLORD. Cross Channel operation intermediate in size between SLEDGEHAMMER and ROUNDUP

ROUNDUP Various 1941-43 Anglo-American plans for a cross-Channel attack

RUGBY Airborne force dropped to rear of southern France assault beaches in Operation DRAGOON

SATIN Plan for US II Corps operation against Sfax, Tunisia. Cancelled

SATURN Establishment of British forces in Turkey prior to Turkey's entry into the war

SAUCY Limited offensive to reopen land route from Burma to China

SEA LION Planned German invasion of UK. Cancelled

SEXTANT The Cairo Conference of November 1943

SHARPENER Supreme Commander's advance command post at Portsmouth, May 1944

SHELLBURST SHAEF advance headquarters at Tournières

SHINGLE Amphibious operation at Anzio, Italy

SHIPMATE Enlarged SHAEF forward headquarters near Portsmouth, replacing SHARPENER

SHO	Japanese plan to counterattack US forces in western Pacific
SICKLE	Name which in 1943 was given to the US air force buildup in the United Kingdom to distinguish it from the ground and service force buildup, known as BOLERO
SITKA	Force taking islands of Levant and Port Cros, Operation DRAGOON
SLAPSTICK	Airborne drop at Taranto, Italy
SLEDGEHAMMER	Plan for a limited-objective attack across the Channel in 1942, designed either to take advantage of a German collapse or as a sacrifice operation to aid the Soviets
SOAPSUDS	Early code name for TIDAL WAVE
SPOONER	New Zealand
SPRING	Canadian attack, July 1944, coinciding with Operation COBRA
STARKEY	Threat directed in 1943 against the Pas de Calais
STALEMATE	Invasion of the Palaus
STATESMAN	Early code name for TIDAL WAVE
STRANGLE	Air operations to destroy German rail, road, and sea communications south of the Pisa-Rimini line, March-May 1944
SUMAC	Australia
SUPERCHARGE	British 30 Corps breakout, Egypt, 1942
SUPERCHARGE	Revised plan of assault on Mereth Line, March 1943
SUPER-GYMNAST	Plan for Anglo-American invasion of French North Africa, combining US and British plans and often used interchangeably with GYMNAST
SWORD	Normandy beach assaulted by troops of British 3d Division, 6 June 1944
SWORDHILT	Plan for a combined airborne-amphibious operation to seize the area east of Brest, August 1944
SYMBOL	Casablanca Conference, January 1943
TALISMAN	Early name for posthostilities plans for Germany
TALON	Akyab part of CAPITAL plan
TARZAN	India-based portion of general offensive in Burma
TED	Task force in Aitape area, New Guinea
TERMINAL	Potsdam Conference, July 1945
THUNDERBOLT	Offensive in Metz area
TIDALWAVE	Low-level heavy bomber attack on Ploesti, Romania, 1943
TIGER	The final rehearsal for the UTAH Beach assault by units of the VII Corps
TINDALL	Threat directed against Norway in 1943
TOGO	Second phase of ICHIGO operation
Tombola	A flexible 6-inch underwater pipeline designed to discharge POL tankers anchored offshore at Ste. Honorine-des-Pertes
TOPFLIGHT	Signal for release of press information on D-Day in Normandy
TORCH	The Allied invasion operation in North Africa, November 1942
TOREADOR	Airborne assault on Mandalay

TORNADO	Assault force for Wakde-Sarmi area, New Guinea
TOTALIZE	Post-COBRA attack in France
TRACTABLE	Post-COBRA attack in France
TRADEWIND	Force for Morotai
TRANSFIGURE	Plan for airborne operation to capture and control important road nets in Paris-Orléans area, 16-17 August 1944
TRIDENT	Washington Conference, May 1943
TULSA	First outline plan for operations directed at the capture of Rabaul
TWILIGHT	Plan to base B-29s in CBI
TYPHOON	Task force for Sansapor-Mar operation, New Guinea
ULTRA	British operation to intercept and decrypt German radio communications (ENIGMA)
UNDERTONE	Seventh Army operation to breach the West Wall and establish a bridgehead over the Rhine in the Worms area, March – April 1945
UTAH	Normandy beach assaulted by US VII Corps, 6 June 1944
VARSITY	FAAA operation in support of Operation PLUNDER
VERITABLE	21 Army Group plan for a Canadian attack between the Maas and the Rhine, January – February 1945
VICTOR I	Panay and Negros Occidental operation
VICTOR II	Cebu, Bohol, and Negros Oriental operation
VICTOR III	US Eighth Army operations against Palawan
VICTOR IV	US Eighth Army operations against Sulu Archipelago and Zamboanga area of Mindanao
VICTOR V	US Eighth Army operations against western Mindanao
VULCAN	Final ground offensive to clear Tunisia, 1943
<i>Wacht am Rhein</i>	“Watch on the Rhine”; German 1944 Ardennes counteroffensive (Battle of the Bulge)
WADHAM	Threat directed against the Cotentin Peninsula in 1943
WEBFOOT	Rehearsal for SHINGLE
Whale	Flexible steel roadway, made of bridge spans and resting on pontoons, forming the piers for the artificial harbors
WHITE POPPY	Nouméa, New Caledonia
WIDEWING	SHAEF headquarters at Bushy Park, near London
X	Australia
YOKE	All US organizations working with Y-Force, CBI
ZEBRA	US-sponsored Chinese divisions in east China
ZIPPER	Plan for assault on Malaya, 1945

TAB R Maps



OVERLORD AREA



- RAILROADS, TWO OR MORE TRACKS
- MAIN HIGHWAYS

ELEVATIONS IN METERS



THE FINAL OVERLORD PLAN


-  DROP ZONES
-  D DAY PHASE LINE
-  INUNDATED AREA



DEVELOPMENT OF THE LODGMENT

21 Army Group Forecast of Operations


as of 26 February 1944



SEALING OFF THE BATTLEFIELD

THE INTERDICTION PLAN

○ BRIDGE SITE






ORDER OF BATTLE OB WEST

6 June 1944

- STATIC AND RESERVE DIVISIONS
- X ATTACK INFANTRY DIVISIONS
- P PANZER GRENADIER DIVISIONS
- D PANZER DIVISIONS

Divisions in process of formation or rehabilitation are indicated by minus sign (-).





ALLIED ASSAULT ROUTES

6 June 1944




R. Limbach

THE AIRBORNE ASSAULT

6 June 1944


- DROP ZONE
- AIRBORNE DIVISIONS' OBJECTIVE LINE
- INUNDATED AREA
- AXIS OF GERMAN COUNTERATTACK
- GERMAN DEFENSES:
 - RESISTANCE NEST
 - BATTERY, FOUR 152 MM HOWITZERS
 - UNOCCUPIED BATTERY POSITION

Contour interval 10 meters




101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION DROP PATTERN 6 June 1944

- DROP ZONE
 - ACTUAL LANDINGS
 - DROP ZONE 'A' UNITS: 502d Prcht Inf, 377th Prcht FA Bn
 - DROP ZONE 'C' UNITS: 3d Bn 501st Prcht Inf, 1st and 2d Bns 506th Prcht Inf, Div Hq
 - DROP ZONE 'D' UNITS: 1st and 2d Bns 501st Prcht Inf, 3d Bn 506th Prcht Inf, Co C 326th Abn Engr Bn
 - LANDING BEYOND THE MAP LIMIT
 - 82d AIRBORNE DIVISION DROP ZONE
- Note: Each dot represents one stick (one plane load)





82D AIRBORNE DIVISION DROP PATTERN 6 June 1944


- DROP ZONE
 - ACTUAL LANDINGS
 - DROP ZONE 'T' UNITS: 507th Prcht Inf
 - DROP ZONE 'O' UNITS: 505th Prcht Inf, Div Hq and 6 sticks of miscellaneous troops
 - DROP ZONE 'N' UNITS: 508th Prcht Inf and 15 sticks of miscellaneous troops
 - ← LANDING BEYOND THE MAP LIMIT
 - 101st AIRBORNE DIVISION DROP ZONE
- Note: Each dot represents one stick (one plane load)



V CORPS D-DAY OBJECTIVES

-  OBJECTIVES, ASSAULT BATTALIONS
-  OBJECTIVES, FOLLOW-UP REGIMENTS
- GERMAN DEFENSES:
-  RESISTANCE NEST
-  STRONG POINT







LEGEND

- PLANNED LANDING SECTORS
- ACTUAL LANDINGS, FIRST WAVE
- MAIN INITIAL PENETRATIONS
- AXIS OF ADVANCE, ASSAULT REGIMENTS
- AXIS OF ADVANCE, FOLLOW-UP REGIMENTS
- POSITIONS, END OF D DAY
- GERMAN COASTAL DEFENSES
- GERMAN RESISTANCE, END OF D DAY
- CLIFFS
- ROCKY CLIFFS
- SLOPES
- ROCKS

**OMAHA BEACH ASSAULT
(INFANTRY)**
6 June 1944




R. Johnston



THE SECOND BRITISH ARMY ON D DAY

- K, N, V, W, X, Y LANDING AREA
- ⊙ GLIDER LANDING AND DROP ZONES
- ⊙ SMALL GLIDER FORCE TO CRASH LAND ON MERVILLE BATTERY
- X BRIDGE DEMOLISHED BY AIRBORNE TROOPS
- FRONT LINE, 2400, 6 JUNE
- GERMAN DEFENSES:
- ⊙ RESISTANCE NEST
- ⊙ STRONG POINT

ELEVATIONS IN METERS




GERMAN COUNTERMEASURES

6 June 1944



LEGEND



-  STATIC DIVISION
-  CORPS RESERVE
-  ARMY RESERVE
-  ARMY GROUP B RESERVE
-  OKW RESERVE
-  DIRECTION OF MOVEMENT
-  KAMPFGRUPPE
-  MAIN RAILROADS
-  HIGHWAYS



© Lindbergh

V CORPS 7-8 JUNE 1944


-  FORWARD POSITIONS, EVENING 6 JUNE
-  FORWARD POSITIONS, EVENING 7 JUNE
-  ADVANCE 8 JUNE
- GERMAN UNITS AS OF 8 JUNE



V. Barnett

VII CORPS ON D+1

- D-DAY OBJECTIVE LINE
 - BEACHHEAD END OF D DAY
 - POCKET OF GERMAN RESISTANCE, NIGHT 6/7 JUNE
 - AXIS OF ATTACK, 7 JUNE
 - POSITION ESTABLISHED EVENING, 7 JUNE
 - AXIS OF GERMAN COUNTERATTACK, 7 JUNE
- Contour interval 10 meters





BATTLE FOR CARENTAN AND JUNCTION OF THE BEACHHEADS

8-12 June 1944

-  AXIS OF ATTACK, 8 JUNE
-  FORWARD POSITIONS, EVENING 9 JUNE
-  AXIS OF ATTACK, 10 JUNE
-  FORWARD POSITIONS, EVENING 11 JUNE
-  AXIS OF ATTACK, 12 JUNE
-  FORWARD POSITIONS, EVENING 12 JUNE
-  GERMAN UNITS AS OF 12 JUNE

Contour interval 10 meters






KAMPFGRUPPE HEINTZ


6-11 June 1944

- RAILROAD, TWO OR MORE TRACKS
- RAILROAD, SINGLE TRACK
- ⊗ RR CUT BY BOMBING OR SABOTAGE, D DAY TO 12 JUNE *
- 🚂 TROOP TRAIN

* Information from captured German documents

10 0 10 20 30
MILES






ATTACK TO CUT THE PENINSULA

10 - 18 June 1944

- FORWARD POSITIONS, EVENING 9 JUNE
- FORWARD POSITIONS, EVENING 13 JUNE
- FORWARD POSITIONS, EVENING 16 JUNE
- POSITIONS REACHED NIGHT 17/18 AND EARLY MORNING 18 JUNE
- GERMAN UNITS AS OF 18 JUNE

ELEVATIONS IN METERS





Cap de la Hague



THE ADVANCE NORTH
19 - 21 June 1944

- FRONT LINE, NIGHT 18/19 JUNE
- POSITIONS REACHED 19 JUNE
- POSITIONS REACHED 20 JUNE
- FRONT LINE, EVENING 21 JUNE
- GERMAN DEFENSE PERIMETER (FROM CAPTURED DOCUMENT)





THE ATTACK ON CHERBOURG
22-26 June 1944

NIGHT POSITIONS REACHED BY FORWARD ELEMENTS
 21 JUNE 22 JUNE 23 JUNE
 24 JUNE 25 JUNE

GERMAN DEFENSE PERIMETER FROM CAPTURED MAP DATED 14 MARCH 1944

- ⊗ RESISTANCE NEST
 - ⊠ STRONG POINT
- Artillery emplacements were fortified for all-around defense
- ① ARSENAL
 - ② GARE MARITIME
 - ③ CITY HALL
 - ④ UNDERGROUND SHELTER (VON SCHLIEBEN'S CP)

Elevations in meters
 1000 0 1 2
 YARDS MILES

THE ADVANCE INLAND

6 June - 1 July 1944


- FORWARD POSITIONS, EVENING 6 JUNE
- FORWARD POSITIONS, EVENING 1 JULY

ELEVATIONS IN METERS



R.N. Hanson

TAB S Cemeteries




the grave of those of the Jewish faith, a Latin cross all others. The precisely aligned headstones against the immaculately maintained emerald green lawn convey an unforgettable feeling of peace and serenity.

The plantings. The cemetery is surrounded on the east, south and west by heavy masses of Austrian pine, interplanted with Laurel, Cypress and Holly oak. The lawn areas of the Garden of the Missing are bordered with beds of polyantha roses, while European ash trees grow in the lawn areas.

The architects for the cemetery's memorial features were Harbeson, Huogh, Livingston & Larson of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The bronze urns as well as the bronze statue are the work of Donal De Lue of Leonardo, New Jersey. The landscape architect was Markley Stevenson, also of Philadelphia.


Construction of the cemetery and memorial was completed in 1956 and the dedication ceremony was held on July 18, that same year.



Pointe du Hoc Federal Monument

Located on a cliff 8 miles west of the cemetery, this monument was erected by France to honor elements of the 2d Ranger Battalion under the command of LTC James E. Rudder which scaled the 100-foot cliff. It

consists of a simple granite pylon atop a concrete bunker. Turned over to the American government in 1979, this 30-acre battle-scarred area remains much as it was left on 8 June 1944.




Utah Beach Federal Monument

This monument commemorates the achievements of the American Forces of the VII Corps who fought in the liberation of the Cotentin Peninsula from 6 June to 1 July 1944. It consists of a red granite obelisk surrounded by a small, developed park overlooking the historic dunes of Utah Beach, on of the two American landing beaches used during the Normandy Invasion of June 1944.

Normandy American Cemetery
"Omaha Beach"

14710 Colleville-sur-Mer - France
Tel: 02.31.51.62.00
Fax: 02.31.51.62.09




- LEGEND**
- | | | |
|--|------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| 1 : U.S. ARMORED MONUMENT | 5 : 6th ENG. SPECIAL BRIGADE | 9 : PLAQUE 5th RANGER BN. |
| 2 : 1st DIVISION MONUMENT | 6 : FIRST TEMPORARY CEMETERY | 10 : PLAQUE 11th PORT |
| 3 : 5th BRIGADE MONUMENT | 7 : NATIONAL GUARD MONUMENT | 11 : PLAQUE 81st CHEMICAL MORTAR BN. |
| 4 : PROVISIONAL ENG. BRIGADE
and 2nd INF. DIV. MONUMENT | 8 : 58th ARMORED FA BN. | 12 : 29th INF. DIV. MONUMENT |

The American Battle Monuments Commission Normandy American Cemetery

The American Battle Monuments Commission (ABMC), established by law in 1923, is an independent agency of the Executive Branch of the US Government. The Commission is responsible for commemorating the services and achievements of United States Armed Forces where they have served since April 6, 1917 (the date of US entry into World War I) through the erection of suitable memorial shrines; for designing, constructing, operating and maintaining permanent US military cemeteries and memorials in foreign countries; for controlling the design and construction of US military monuments and markers in foreign countries by other US citizens and organizations, both public and private; and encouraging the maintenance of such monuments and markers by their sponsors.

This cemetery, 172.5 acres in extent, is one of fourteen permanent American World War II cemeteries constructed on foreign soil. Free use as a permanent burial ground was granted by the government of France in perpetuity without charge or taxation.




General Layout. The cemetery is rectangular in shape. Its main paths are laid out in the form of a Latin cross.

Inside, beyond the Visitors' Building, filling most of the eastern end of the cemetery is a beautiful semi-circular memorial with a memorial garden and Tablets of the Missing to its rear. Facing west, the memorial overlooks a large reflecting pool, two flagpoles, from which the American flag flies daily, the graves areas and the chapel.

The memorial consists of a semi-circular colonnade with a loggia housing battle maps at each end and a large bronze sculpture in the open arc formed by its arch. The loggias and colonnade are of a limestone from the Côte d'Or region of France, the plinths and steps are of a granite from Brittany.

Centered in the open arc of the memorial facing toward the graves is a 22-foot bronze statue, "The Spirit of American Youth Rising from the Waves." Inset in the floor directly behind the statue are two curved garden plots.



On the interior walls of the loggias are maps engraved in stone and embellished with colored enamels. These maps are entitled: "The Landings on the Normandy Beaches and the Development of the Beachhead," "Air Operations over Normandy March-August 1944," "6 June 1944 the Amphibious Assault Landings," and "Military Operations in Western Europe, 6 June 1944 - 8 May 1945."

Inset in a rectangular aperture in the east and west walls of each loggia is a large bronze urn on which are sculptured two different scenes in high relief. While the scenes are the same in both loggias, their emplacement is such that the scenes facing into the loggias are different.

The chapel in the graves area is constructed of Vaurion limestone. On entering the chapel, one's attention is drawn immediately to the altar of black and gold Pyrenees Grand Antique marble and the inscription: I GIVE UNTO THEM ETERNAL LIFE AND THEY SHALL NEVER PERISH, engraved across its front. Behind the altar, a tall window with a translucent amber coating illuminates with a soft yellow light.

The colorful mosaic ceiling symbolizes America blessing her sons as they depart by sea and air to fight for freedom, and a grateful France bestowing a laurel wreath upon American Dead who gave their lives to liberate Europe's oppressed peoples.

The Garden of the Missing is located behind the memorial structure. Its semi-circular wall, contains the names and particulars engraved on stone tablets of the 1,557 Missing in the region who gave their lives in the service of their country but whose remains have not been recovered or positively identified. An asterisk identified those subsequently recovered or identified. Included among these are twin brothers. They came from 49 of the 50 States of the Union, the District of Columbia and Guam. The tablets are separated on the wall by large sculptured laurel leaves.

The graves area contains ten grave plots, five on each side of the main mall. Interred within them are the remains of 9,386 servicemen and women. Three hundred and seven of which are Unknowns (whose remains could not be identified), three Medal of Honor recipients, and four women. A Star of David marks

THE AMERICAN BATTLE MONUMENTS COMMISSION

NORMANDY AMERICAN CEMETERY AND MEMORIAL

The Normandy American Cemetery site was chosen because of its historical location on top of a cliff overlooking famous Omaha Beach which was the scene of the greatest amphibious troop landing in history. The cemetery site covers 172 acres. The maintenance of the cemetery and memorial is the responsibility of the American Battle Monuments Commission. Construction of this cemetery and Memorial was completed in 1956 and dedicated on 19 July of that year. The architects for the cemetery were Harbeson, Hough, Livingstone @ Larson of Philadelphia, Pa. The landscape architect was Markley Stevenson, also of Philadelphia.

There are 9,386 American War Dead buried here. 307 of the headstones mark the graves of "Unknowns". The remains of approximately 14,000 others originally buried in this region were returned home at the request of their next of kin.

The Memorial consists of a semi-circular colonnade with a loggia at each end. On the platform is a 22 foot bronze statue, the "Spirit of American Youth", a tribute to those who gave their lives in these operations. Around its base is the inscription "MINE EYES HAVE SEEN THE GLORY OF THE COMING OF THE LORD". The sculptor was Donald De Lue of New York City. On the walls within the south loggia are 3 battle maps engraved in the stone and embellished with colored enamels. These maps were designed by Robert Foster of New York City from data furnished by the American Battle Monuments Commission. They were executed by ceramic by Gentil & Bourdet of Paris. The panels in the ceiling of the loggias are of blue large bronze urns, also designed and sculptured in high relief by Donald De Lue and cast by Marinelli foundry of Florence, Italy.

On the east side of the Memorial is the semi-circular Garden of the Missing. Inscribed on its walls are the names, rank, organization and State of 1,557 of our Missing. They gave their lives in the service of their country but their remains have not been identified, or they were buried at sea in this region.

The circular Chapel, whose mosaic ceiling, designed and executed by Leon Kroll of New York City, symbolizes America who gives her farewell blessing to their sons as they depart by sea and air to fight for her principles of freedom. Over the altar, a grateful France bestows a laurel wreath upon Dead who gave their lives to liberate Europe's oppressed peoples. The return of Peace is recalled by the Angel, the dove and the homeward bound ship.

At the western end of the main axis of the cemetery are 2 Italian granite (Baveno) figures by Donald De Lue representing the United States and France.

At the Memorial one can descend a flight of granite steps to an overlook parapet on which is situated an orientation table that indicates the various landing beaches. In the early morning hours on 6 June 1944, three Airborne Divisions, the U.S. 82nd and 101st, the British 6th, dropped behind the beaches to destroy enemy forces and to cover the deployment of seaborne assault troops. At 6:30 hours, under the cover of intense naval and air bombardment, six U.S., British and Canadian divisions landed in the greatest amphibious assault recorded in history.

NORMANDY AMERICAN CEMETERY
COLLEVILLE-SUR-MER

14710-TREVIERES.FRANCE


TEL 31.22.40.62 FAX 31.21.98.73

UTAH BEACH MONUMENT

The Utah Beach Monument erected by the American Battle Monuments Commission, with the approval of the French government, commemorates the achievements of the American Forces of the VII Corps who fought in the liberation of the Cotentin Peninsula from 6 June to 1 July 1944. It consists of a red Baveno granite obelisk surrounded by a small, developed park overlooking the historic sand dunes of Utah Beach, one of the two American landing beaches during the Normandy Invasion of June 1944.


POINTE DU HOC RANGER MEMORIAL



The Pointe du Hoc Ranger Memorial is the battleground where Lieutenant Colonel James E. Rudder's 2nd Ranger Battalion scaled the 100-foot cliffs on D-Day morning, 6 June 1944, to seize this fortified enemy position which controlled the landing approaches to Omaha and Utah beaches. The Memorial consists of a simple granite pylon atop a concrete bunker with inscriptions in French and English on tablets at its base. This site, preserved by the French, was transferred to the United States Government by formal agreement on 11 January 1979 in Paris. This battle-scarred area remains much as the Rangers left it on 8 June 1944.



LEGEND :

- | | | |
|--|------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
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NORMANDY AMERICAN CEMETERY

